UNITED NATIONS  DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia

General

In mid-November, the city of Hargeysa, capital of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, was wracked by violent clashes between government forces and soldiers associated with anti-government figures led by former President Abdirahman Ahmed Ali "Tuur." The fighting, according to members of relief agencies and other foreign observers, caused massive displacement of Hargeysa’s population (some reports say as much as 80%) and generated some 150 casualties including at least 100 injured. As of 25 November, as many as 20,000 people were reported to have crossed the border from Somaliland, seeking asylum in Ethiopian refugee camps. Although the fighting has since subsided, much of Somaliland is reported to be tense, including the major towns of Booraame and Bur’o, and there would seem to be a danger of further clashes in the near future.

This most recent fighting is clearly a sequel to the battle for control of Hargeysa airport of mid-October, essenitally involving the same protagonists: the "airport" militia of the ‘Iidagale clan arrayed against pro-government forces comprising predominantly Habar Awal troops. Although (as usual) versions of the incident differ, reports suggest that the immediate cause of the latest fighting was a renewed government offensive against the new ‘Idagale base situated nearly 20 km from Hargeysa airport. Although government troops managed to overrun their objective, several opposition "technical vehicles" equipped with heavy automatic weapons managed to escape intact. They moved rapidly to a commercial section of central Hargeysa populated largely by the Habar Awal clan, where they opened fire indiscriminately. Government troops engaged the ‘technicals’ and two days of heavy fighting ensued. Calm has since returned to the city, though sporadic shooting and skirmishes are reported.
 

Political Context

Dissatisfaction with the Egal administration had been widespread among the Garxajis clans (Habar Yonis and ‘Iidagale) for some time prior to the clashes, but did not seem to be at the danger point. With the exception of certain ‘Iidagale families forced to decamp from their settlement at Hargeysa aiport, Garxajis and other Isaaq mixed freely and without trepidation in the days leading up to the conflict. Three Garxajis Ministers sat in Egal’s cabinet, Garxajis elders took part in the daily affairs of parliament, and Garxajis soldiers had been integrated into the new "National Army." The kind of strain that typifies inter-clan relations in the face of imminent hostilities was not in evidence in the days leading up to the clashes, and does therefore not suffice to explain the present situtation.

Recent developments suggest an alternative probable cause for the violence. Strident opposition to the Egal administration has for some time been concentrated among a group of Garxajis political and business leaders, somewhat removed from the more subtle dissatisfaction permeating the Garxajis clan. Among these figures, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali "Tuur,"(former SNM chairman and Somaliland’s first President) has recently taken prime of place among opposition figures by renouncing the commitment to Somaliland’s sovereignty that he once personified as the man who declared the territory’s independence in May 1991 and declaring himself now in favour of a united, federal Somalia. Several other Garxajis political figures, including former Minister of Finance Isma’il "Buubaa," SNM colonel Ahmed Mire, and Egal’s nemesis of long date, ex-police General Jamaa’ Mohamed Qaalib (Jamaa’ "Yare") have associated themselves with Tuur’s new political platform.

The tactics of this opposition clique failed, until very recently, to attract the sympathy of their clansmen among the ‘Iidagale and Habar Yonis clans, mainly because their platform ran contrary to mainstream sentiments among the Isaaq in general. Tuur and Jamaa’ Yare solidarity with the airport militia (including generous patronage of the group) at a time when even the ‘Iidagale elders had effectively disowned their young guns as outlaws was a particularly unpopular political posture. Tuur’s subsequent conversion to the cause of a united Somalia further alienated conventional Garxajis (and Isaaq) public opinion. The resort to force, when Egal’s term of office is less than six month’s from expiring, is simply the most extreme devlopment of an opposition trend, but it may yet serve to provoke a general schism within Somaliland in general, and among the Isaaq in particular.

The recent fighting has already dramatically radicalized clan attitudes throughout Somaliland, sharply lowering the threshhold for violence. By drawing blood, the opposition group have managed to involve the Isaaq community in a simple blood-feud - on a large scale - involving powerful cultural and legal obligations to exact retribution or compensation for death and damages. Without rapid and effective negotiation, the vendetta could easily escalate to the point of civil war. Since certain parties already seem disposed to war (Jamaa’ Yare has recently declared as much over the BBC), the chance of successful reconciliation at this stage would appear remote.

Leaders on both sides of the divide are guilty of exacerbating the situation. Despite Egal’s appeals for calm, a number of known Habar Awal SNM colonels have returned to ‘active service,’ mobilizing troops and financial resources in support of further military action. Among the opposition, Jamaa’ Yare’s inflammatory statements have convinced many Garxajis that an escalation of the violence is imminent. Garxajis military leaders, like their Habar Awal counterparts, have been busy raising the backing they need to wage war. Tuur is reputed to have won some support for his cause from General ‘Aydiid, while Jamaa’ Yare has himself recently returned to Addis Ababa from Sana’a where he has reportedly been trying to cash in on Egal’s hasty recognition of South Yemen during the Yemeni civil war earlier this year.

Analysis / Prospects

Since the initial clashes, Hargeysa has been calm and discussions, mediated by delegations from the Dhulbahante and Gadabursi, are now in progress. Apart form the slender hopes for a negotiated settlement proffered by this process, there are few positive signs. Forces of all clans are taking steps to improve their states of readiness, though two clans (Habar Je’lo and Arab) remain as yet uncommitted one way or the other. Tuur’s group seems determined to pursue a course of violence, while even some of Egal’s supporters are voicing doubts about his sincerity in wanting a peaceful solution. In a climate of such pervasive uncertainty and mutual suspicion, even the most well-intentioned negotiators from all clans are bargaining at a disadvantage.

One clear danger would seem to be the tactics adopted by the opposition leaders so far. Having failed to win broad political support for their federal platform, they have managed, through violence, to polarize the community along clan lines. Their public posture implies that even if clan leaders are able to find a peaceful exit from the present crisis, they are not ready to accept a peaceful solution. The exodus of primarily Garxajis clan members into the Aware refugee camps , while Habar Awal communities have remained so far on the other side of the border would suggest that the Garxajis leadership have given their people cause for pessimism about the future. Having announced his groups intent to pursue a course of violence, Jamaa’ Yare’s efforts to have the newest refugees recognized by UNHCR could by interpreted as an attempt to enhance the international profile of the opposition, while clearing the decks for further fighting.

Fears are also justified that any fighting may spread to Region 5 of Ethiopia, where all Somaliland clans are also represented. President Abdirahman Ugaas says he has already taken measures to prevent instability spreading across the border: additional EPRDF units have been deployed to prevent international movement of heavy weapons, and border controls are meant to inhibit the carriage of small arms (a heavy load of weapons is already rumoured to have been caught near Aware by the EPRDF on the "white road" from Muqdisho). Any interclan killing in Ethiopia will be met with severe punishment, and clans will be held collectively responsible for violence. Neighbouring clans, such as the Reer Isaaq (Ogaden) and the Jidwaq have been warned not to be drawn into the conflict, even if provoked. Such preventive diplomacy may well induce a degree of restraint in the concerned clans on this side of the border, though even President Abdirahman admits that these measures may not be fully sufficient.
 

 25 November 1994

The information contained in this report is gained through second-hand sources in Jigjiga and Addis Ababa, and is neither confirmed nor authoritative.
  

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