Update on Situation in Region 5

General

A mission from UN-EUE visited parts of Ethiopia's Region 5 from 03-09 April
1995. Two members of Medecins Sans Frontieres (France) participated in the
mission as a familiarisation visit to the region. The mission itinerary
included:

03/04 Jigjiga

04/04 Jigjiga - Dhagaxbuur

05/04 Dhagaxbuur - Qabri Dahar

07/04 Qabri Dahar - Gashaamo (via Wardheer)

09/04 Gashaamo - Jigjiga

This report is based upon observations from that mission, supplemented by
discussions held later in Addis Ababa.

Majority Rule

Equilibrium in Region 5 today hinges upon the single, simple and
intractable political calculation of majority rule. Who makes up the
majority of the population in the Region: the Ogaden clan and its
affiliates, or the coalition of largely non-Ogadeni Somali clans now
grouped together under the umbrella of the Ethiopian Somali Democratic
League (or ESDL)? The question, to which no disinterested, objective
response exists, is the key determinant in whether the people of the region
will know peace and stability for the next few years, or a return to the
insecurity and endemic violence of the recent past.

Moderate Somalis from all groups routinely deny that the population issue
is of real importance. "Somali unity" - that is to say the unity of the
Somali population of Region 5 - has become the battle cry of leaders across
the clan spectrum who advocate a concerted Somali platform in the context
of a national democratic forum (i.e. vis-a-vis Ethiopia's other ethnic
groups). In their view, clan differences must be put aside in the interest
of the common Somali good. Both the ESDL and the Qabri Dahar Declaration
espouse this point of view.

In practice, the reverse is more often true. Much of the leadership's
energy on all sides has been devoted to electoral issues - including the
allocation of electoral districts - that serve to emphasise rather than to
soothe clan-based antagonisms. Ogadenis, for the most part, perceive a
fundamental injustice in the way electoral districts have been arranged,
arguing that their clan will be denied representation to the constituent
assembly commensurate with its community's actual size and importance. Many
assume - without clear justification - that the Ogadeni constitute a clear
majority of the region's population.

Proponents of the ESDL, generally satisfied with the electoral
arrangements, can better afford to speak of Somali unity: they seem assured
of the upper hand in voting whether or not they actually enjoy numerical
superiority in the region. League supporters tend to assume that the
Ogadeni, though large (perhaps the single largest group) make up less than
half of the Region's inhabitants and that the ESDL has managed to cobble
together a substantially larger group from among other clans. Though a
number of League supporters cite the 1994 (Ethiopian 1987) census as a
basis for population figures, these statistics have yet to be officially
released and there is anyway reason to doubt the precision of the count in
Region 5, given the multifarious problems encountered by census teams.

In the course of such debate, the concept of "Somali unity" has become an
early casualty. The balance of seats within the regional assembly is of far
more immediate importance than the share of Somali representative in the
national parliament. Victory, democratic or otherwise, of either group in
the upcoming elections will undoubtedly be received as blatantly unjust by
their political opponents and, under certain circumstances, could lead to a
manifest deterioration in the prospects for stability and security
throughout the region.

Ogadeni Alternatives

Theoretically, Ethiopia's experiment with democracy and its new
constitution provides political space for legal dissent while guaranteeing
the rights of minority groups and nationalities. In practice, however,
numerous opposition groups have recently chosen to abstain from the
electoral process, jeopardising its credibility and implying that room for
opposition does not actually exist. An international election monitoring
team will be given the opportunity to pass independent judgement on this
issue. Meanwhile, the ESDL, ostensibly a pro-government movement, intends
to participate fully and is well organised for the vote. The Ogadenis, as a
community, remain divided over the issue. Several options are open to them.

ESDL (Ethiopian Somali Democratic League): The ESDL contains some Ogadeni
members, though they have little following among their kinsmen.
Realistically, the League is not perceived by Ogadenis as representing a
true pan-Somali platform, or a potential vehicle for Ogadeni clan
interests. Prevailing Ogadeni distrust of the ESDL runs so deep that
Ogadeni politicians who stand for the League risk isolation and even
rejection by their clans. Their participation under the ESDL flag should be
interpreted for the moment as a matter of personal choice and not of
widespread Ogadeni support for the party.

WSDP (Western Somali Democratic Party):

The WSDP, though practically moribund over the past year, may represent a
compromise platform for Ogadeni moderates. Candidates who had hoped to
stand for election as members of the ONLF have increasingly looked to the
WSDP as the ONLF hesitates over whether or not to participate. Some have
even suggested that the WSDP offers a kind of protest vote for those who
resent the ONLF's attempts to monopolise the Ogaden political field.

Though it lacks the organisation and structure of the ESDL, the WSDP could
possibly emerge from the election revitalised, and a powerful alternative
to the ONLF - especially if the ONLF abstains. Whether or not his is the
case will depend on how the Ogadeni community at large perceives the
electoral procedure: general ambivalence could work in favour of the WSDP,
while outright suspicion and hostility to the process would make it
unlikely that the community endorse any candidate under any banner.

ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front):

It is not possible to identify a single, coherent ONLF structure or
platform. Representation appears to be diffused between the Front's Addis
Ababa and London offices, while operational decision-making remains
effectively the domain of the leadership in the field. Statements by one or
another group cannot therefore be taken at face value, since the
relationship between the movement's spokesmen and its armed formations is
uncertain. In terms of renouncing the armed struggle and embracing the new
Ethiopian democracy, it is probably the decision of the ONLF's field
commanders and "executive committee" that matters most . It is also the
most difficult position to ascertain, given the guerrilla group's penchant
for isolation and relative secrecy.

Although ONLF has sought registration as a party in the elections, its
leadership's commitment to the democratic process is probably weak. Despite
having met regularly with EPRDF officials at various levels over the past
few months in the hopes of reaching a negotiated settlement, the
organisation has yet to take a firm stand. The confusion probably stems in
part from a contradiction between the ONLF's reluctance to challenge the
popular desire for peace (manifested at Qabri Dahar), and the field
leadership's reservations about the electoral process. Many see it as
little more than a trap, an mechanism for realising EPRDF colonialist
aspirations through the their League clients; others are no doubt simply
aware that more sophisticated (and in many cases newly arrived/returned)
Ogadeni politicians are likely to emerge during the elections,
marginalising the former guerrillas (to retire and savour their glory days
as freedom fighters). This potential challenge to ONLF leadership from
within the clan may well back ONLF hard-liners into a corner: rather than
risk a return to anonymity and impotence in the democratic arena, some may
well see little option but to continue the armed struggle. Discussion with
elders and ONLF members in several locations tend to confirm the belief
that some ONLF groups have a vested interest in the failure of the
electoral process and will work towards that aim.

ONLF's informal membership and its potential base of support is widespread.
A remarkable number of people encountered on this and previous missions
identified themselves proudly as ONLF members, whether they are active or
not (a pattern that would imply widespread identification of the Ogaden
community with that of the ONLF cause, not as evidence of an effective
organisational structure). Many local leaders wear their ONLF credentials
openly.

The Peace Committee and Popular Opinion

From our discussions throughout the region and in Addis Ababa, it seems
clear that Ogadenis and their leaders are deeply committed to the
maintenance of peace in their region. The Qabri Dahar conference represents
a milestone in the evolution of Ogadeni solidarity and the community's
determination to put an end to the violence of the past few years. In every
town, news of discussions between the Elders Peace Committee and the
central government was eagerly awaited in the hopes that it would reinforce
the public's commitment to peace. Leaders everywhere affirmed that even if
the news was bad, they would do everything possible to preclude a relapse
into violence.

Preliminary reports suggest that the news from the capital has not been
positive. Having reached agreement on only some, but not all, of the
concessions sought by the elders, the talks apparently unravelled. Though
some elders remained behind to try to salvage the dialogue, the majority
have reportedly giving up, while broadcasting their disappointment. Their
complaints will do little to enhance the community's confidence in the
prospects of a settlement. Far from supporting the cause of moderates, the
failure of the talks may well serve to convince even fence-sitting Ogadenis
that they are the victims of government injustice and that participation in
the election is futile. In such scenario, a net radicalisation of Ogadeni
opinion should be anticipated, offering the more extreme elements of the
ONLF the opportunity to pursue their military agenda.

Despite public fatigue with the ONLF's guerrilla campaign, the front will
probably be quick to exploit any popular disillusionment with the
democratic process. Elders and other community leaders admit that if ONLF
fighters resume their attacks on government forces they will be able to
rally public support to their cause. Even the most reluctant civilians are
afraid of the EPRDF reprisals they believe would follow such actions, and
would feel obliged to seek protection with the ONLF. As recent events in
Somaliland so clearly demonstrate, even a few militia, if determined, can
drag their kinsmen into a conflict no one wants or anticipates (N.B. The
killing of two EPRDF soldiers in Qabri Dahar this week has not yet led to
the reprisals feared, but if such attacks persist, it is unlikely that the
government could continue to respond so passively).

Conclusions

Present conditions of peace and security throughout Region 5 should not be
taken for granted. Prospects for the future will become clearer in the
post-election period, as various communities come to grips with new
political realities. Although some areas - particularly those controlled by
the ESDL - are unlikely to see any change, Ogadeni dissatisfaction could
produce unrest in other parts of the region. Serious planning of
rehabilitation and development work in Region 5, although clearly a
priority of the Ethiopian government and of its UN partners, should wait
until the situation clarifies itself over the coming two months.

Paradoxically, a determined ONLF confrontation with the government will not
in fact lead to a political solution. As Ogadeni elders readily admitted to
us, their grievances have much less to do with the EPRDF than they do with
the ESDL. It is primarily the EPRDF's presumed support for the league that
leads the ONLF to consider the government as an adversary. Only a
resolution of the rift between the Ogaden and no-Ogaden communities of the
region is likely to bring long-term peace and stability. A sustained
military confrontation between ONLF and the government will do nothing to
address this fundamental schism within the Somali community, and will serve
only to broaden Ogadeni support for the ONLF and their bellicose political
orientation. The diplomatic energies of leaders on both sides would be
better spent forging understanding between the Ogadeni parties and the
League, than in managing conflict between the ONLF and the central
government.

Given the present peaceful environment and general optimism, expectations
of the population are high that their circumstances will improve.
Establishment of a more efficient, progressive administrative, increased
investment, and greater UN and NGO activity are all expected benefits of
new-found stability. Failure to realise these expectations would certainly
shake public faith in the commitment of the government and of the
international community to the betterment of the area. If the danger of a
military confrontation during or after the elections can be contained,
donors, UN agencies and NGOs should seriously consider acting rapidly to
re-inforce stability in the area through support to public services and
reducing post conflict stresses within the community.

Although essential public services - primary health care, schooling, clean
water and veterinary services - all deserve priority, the complexity of the
current political climate would suggest that issues such as demobilisation
and integration of former militia into new professions or a national army
will acquire immediate importance. Although numbers of militia are probably
small in comparison with Somalia and Somaliland, they are a key factor in
the equation of peace and stability. Upgrading of transport,
communications, and police activity within the region will also be crucial.
As part of UNDP's new thinking upon crises and emergencies, it should be
possible to forecast the need the to support the government in this regard
and to develop a long-term strategy for conflict elimination for Region 5.
Partners in this field are many, and a co-ordinated initiative for Region 5
could be sought.