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Source : AGRICULTURE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND STRATEGIES IN ETHIOPIA



MAJOR CONSTRAINTS IMPEDING SUSTAINABLE
AGRICULTURAL GROWTH



Introduction
The major constraints impeding sustainable agricultural development may be classified into:
 

(i) resource and environmental constraints,
(ii) socio-economic constraints
(iii) technological constraints,
(iv) infrastructural constraints,
(v) institutional constraints,
(vi) human resource constraints, and
(vii) incentive and policy constraints.
 

Resource and Environmental Constraints

Land use and soil degradation:

It is to be noted that small-holder farming is the dominant feature of Ethiopia's agriculture. In this system, where the majority of peasants hold less than one ha per household, land fragmentation has been the basic problem for agricultural development. As a result, agricultural production and productivity have been extremely low.

Population pressure coupled with unfavourable land tenure system has been responsible for over-ploughing and over-grazing of farm lands. Environmental degradation has resulted from mismanagement of land resource, over-grazing, deforestation and inappropriate land use systems. This is fully reflected in the massive soil erosion that has taken place with the consequence of serious destruction of the fertile top soils in many parts of the country. Inappropriate and destructive farming practices have, to some extent, been responsible for the recurrence of droughts in a large part of the country. The seriousness of soil degradation in the Ethiopian highlands is amply demonstrated in the Ethiopian Highland Reclamation Study of 1986.

Since the turn of the century, severe deforestation has exposed the top soils to destructive erosion by wind and water. Absence of vegetative cover aggravated by over-grazing and over- ploughing can only result in barren lands, requiring considerable amount of time, effort and money to bring them back to their original state.

Water resources management:

Inadequate and unreliable rainfall is also another phenomenon constraining agricultural development in many drought-prone areas of the country. In the traditional small-holder farming and the pastoral systems, where irrigation is not practiced, rainfall and ground-water supply, if available, are the only source for crop and livestock production. When rainfall becomes erratic, which is usually the case, and ground-water sources are not replenished, then these most important farming systems suffer drastically. In Ethiopia, there is an extremely limited tradition in harvesting rain water and exploiting ground-water.

These waters are not properly conserved nor are they economically used. In spite of Ethiopia's high water resources potential, there is a severe limitation in area suitable for irrigated agriculture. Although some irrigated agriculture has been developed, which is less than 3 per cent of the potential, the current irrigation practice is inadequate due to inefficient application of water and lack of preventing harmful conditions stemming from water-logging, salinization and alkalinization.

In Ethiopia, there is no established tradition in irrigation. There is no experience in diverting perennial rivers and harvesting and storing water from flash floods. In the face of recurring droughts, there is a need to develop such practices.

In the absence of properly planned watershed management, Ethiopian rivers, which in the main are trans-boundary, carry a considerable amount of silt to neighboring down-stream countries. Similarly, many of the water reservoirs developed in Ethiopia are being silted up rapidly, with encroachment upon their capacities to produce electricity and cash crops. Uncontrolled. river erosion has thus adverse consequences for agricultural development, among other things.

Livestock population:

The large number of livestock, with sub-standard quality, together with land mismanagement has a deleterious effect on grazing land. There is no effort of significance to improve pastures and productivity of forage crops. It is to be noted that the feed base of the country comes largely (88 per cent) from natural grazing and browse, with crop residues accounting for some 10 per cent, and industrial by-products, such as oilseed cake, supplying the remaining 2 per cent of feed. Over-grazing no doubt creates soil erosion.

It is clear that there is a massive pressure on grazing lands with their carrying capacity becoming lower and lower in the face of ever-increasing livestock population and in the absence of any improvement made on feed and fodder availability. This in turn has adverse consequences for the quality of livestock and livestock products. That is why it has always been said, in connection with livestock production in Ethiopia, that quality and productivity should have precedence over sheer number.

Needless to say, large livestock population also places undue pressure on limited health facilities, drugs and vaccines for animals.
 

Socio-economic constraints

In the perception of the Ethiopian farmer an increase in production could only be attained through increased acreage. This stems from inadequate understanding of the proper use and management of land. Age-old customs and tradition, together with limited knowledge of risks involved as well as of costs and returns, have a decisive role in constraining peasant agriculture.

Customs and traditions:

The small-holder peasant is highly influenced by customs and traditions. The tools and implements used in crop cultivation are not only obsolete, but they are also inefficient and unproductive. Instead of applying modern agricultural inputs, there is a general tendency for farmers to stick to their old ways of doing things. The same is true with respect to livestock production.

Religious beliefs and customs are deeply entrenched in rural Ethiopia. As a result, farmers, on account of holidays, do not work for the most part of a month. This has adverse effects on agricultural production, particularly during the harvest season, when all hands are required to participate in view of higher labour requirements. In fact, these beliefs aggravate labour shortage during cultivation and harvest time.

Ethiopian pastoralists neither kill their livestock for food nor sell them to earn money. They have a special liking for and attachment to their animals. For these pastoralists, the size of animals they own is a sign of wealth and prestige. This has inevitably led to over-grazing and the concomitant erosion. The attitude of pastoralists has contributed to raising the size of livestock which, as discussed earlier on, is-inimical to productivity and quality of livestock.

Risk and uncertainty:

In the Ethiopian context, peasants strive to live at subsistence level. Many factors including tradition, custom, policies, etc. have contrived to influence the farmer's attitude to behave as a family unit rather than a business unit. For example, cropping patterns that involve more days or labour, that increase cash-crop output and reduce food crop production below family requirements, and that require the household to run a considerable market risk are avoided by the small farmer. There is an urge for farmers to minimise risk by maximising the return on a given financial outlay rather than the return per ha. In other words, area extension is preferred to intensification. In some cases, some farmers may be willing to apply selected low-risk, productivity-raising inputs but not the entire package of recommended cultivation techniques. They are always suspicious of what others tell them to do.

The attitude of peasants is understandable, particularly if previous experiences with extension agents had proven abortive. This, in addition to inadequate and unreliable rainfall, has rendered small farmers timid in their attitude towards new techniques of cultivation. In fact, it can be said that the Ethiopian farmer is a risk averter rather than risk taker.

The same can be said, with more rigour, in connection with Ethiopian pastoralists. Because of past mistreatment sustained due to government action and policies, the pastoralists have become highly suspicious of government support. They want to play it safe by moving from one place to another in search of water and grazing land. The very fact that they are nomads perhaps proves that sedentary life is full of risks and hazards for them. Since they don't live in one place, investment in land, and hence improved agricultural development, doesn't arise.

In the case of commercial agriculture, the above problems do not arise. Commercial farmers are risk takers and are, therefore, receptive to modern techniques. They are entrepreneurs and fully understand they are in business. They are capable of taking calculated risks and are fully aware of what fall-back position awaits them in the event of failure. Particularly those involved in irrigated farming are assured of adequate water supply, which eliminates much of the usual risk facing the small farmer or the dry farming commercial farmer.

This was the case with private commercial farmers in Ethiopia prior to 1974. After this period, when the government confiscated all private commercial farms, state farms came into existence. But these cannot be considered as real commercial entities as they have been mismanaged and inefficiently operated in the absence of any competition. Suffice it to state here that these farms have been daring enough to take risks at the expense of-government, particularly the Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank (AIDB) which extended a total loan of nearly Birr 3 billion to state farms with a loan recovery of some 10 per cent only, and hence the public at large.

The performance of commercial farms, together with the risks and uncertainty involved in the context of the new economic policy is yet to be seen. With over 3 years having already elapsed after declaration of the new policy, it would appear that implementation has lagged far behind expectations.

Costs and returns:

These have different meanings for small farmers, pastoralists and commercial farmers. In the perception of small farmers, who struggle on the verge of subsistence, it would be alright for them so long they survive the harsh realties of life, even at reduced food intake. In the remote rural areas, where barter is the mode of trade, costs and returns in monetary terms have no meaning. Satisfaction is derived if, through bartering, the rural farmers get what they want in terms of their basic needs, i.e., food, clothing, tools and implements, etc. There is no profit motive for these farmers. Investment in new lands and/or modern inputs is, more than often, out of question. Government policies regarding land tenure for example, also act as a constraining factor in this respect. The value system of these farmers is almost entirely based on survival. The same can be said with respect to pastoralists.

A distinguishing feature of the value system of pastoralists is that they attach more value importance) to the size of livestock they own. for wealth and prestige reasons, than to what is ordinarily understood by profit. In the absence of a monetised market, small farmers in remote areas and pastoralists alike have very limited concept of costs and returns. This in itself can prove a hindrance to agricultural development. The market information system that exists is limited in scope and marginalises these producers.

Those small farmers that live close to urban centres and are within the orbit of the existing market information system, however, attach more importance to costs and returns. In fact, they are more responsive to changes in price levels. They would be willing, for example, to shift their activities to the cultivation of crops that fetch higher prices, and/or would prefer to take their output to the nearby urban markets to selling their products to ruthless, exploitative merchants that visit their localities. With the proceeds of their sales, these farmers could buy manufactures and modern agricultural inputs, and send their children to schools. As such, their value system is different from that of small farmers in remote rural areas and pastoralists. However, there is a limit to how far they can go, as government policies in the past have shown how restrictive they could be.

Thus, whilst small farmers in the vicinity of urban centres have a better understanding and appreciation of costs and returns than those in remote rural areas, this is not sufficiently enough to permit them produce more effectively and efficiently. And there are those small farmers, that are between these two limits, who are better off than those in remote rural areas but worse off than those living near urban centres in terms of agricultural development.

Taken together, since most small farmers and pastoralists are out of reach of modern transport and information systems of the country, their concept of costs and returns is quite limited with the consequence that small farmer agricultural development has become insignificant.

In principle, commercial farmers should be in a better position, in many respects, to appreciate the meaning of costs and returns. In practice, however, in the Ethiopian context, state farms have been so heavily subsidised and pampered by government that they seem to have completely misread the meaning of costs and returns. These commercial farms have been given unlimited support at the expense of small farmers, in the absence of any competition, and yet they have become a heavy burden on government budget and other resources. For these farms, there is no meaning of costs and returns, and agricultural development is not on their agenda.

Technological Constraints

Crop production:

This is dominated by small-holder farming system, where cultural practices are primitive. There is virtually nothing to speak of modern inputs, such as fertilizers, Improved seeds, pesticides, improved tools and implements, agricultural equipment and machineries, etc. As a result, crop production and productivities are very low. In this respect, a formidable task awaits extension agents and researchers alike. It is not intended here to pursue this issue as it is amply covered in the previous chapters.

Livestock production:

As in the case of crop production, the method of livestock production is backward and the level of productivity very low. The productivity of the indigenous breeds of livestock is particularly low with very poor milk and meat yield. The primary constraint to higher productivity is inadequate feed aggravated by the widespread incidence of diseases and parasites.

Fish Production:

The major constraint to increased fish production is lack of access to harvesting and processing technologies. Landing sites, storage and transportation facilities with refrigeration, processing capacity and marketing infrastructure in the fisheries industry are far from adequate. Harvest equipment is also poor.
 

Infrastructural Constraints

Needless to say, transport plays a crucial role in agricultural development. A network of transport infrastructure is essential for distribution of farm inputs and other goods, provision of supporting services and carrying of farm produce to markets.

Road transport is by far the most important for the development of marketing and distribution of agricultural inputs and outputs in Ethiopia. Lack of adequate road network is one of the most serious physical infrastructure constraints in the country. Its development has been seriously impeded by wide topographical variations, extremely rugged terrain. severe climatic conditions and a widely dispersed population.

The low road density (the lowest in Africa) has given rise to the profuse use of pack animals and human porterage for the transport of farm produce and inputs, if any. These two modes of primitive transport bring almost all agricultural surplus to the primary markets, Intermediate technologies, such as animal-drawn carts, are non-existent due to the difficult topography and the peasants' limited affordability.

There is also a chronic shortage of road transport (trucks) in Ethiopia. The vehicle fleet is insufficient to meet agricultural and other demands, and the import of new trucks has not even matched normal replacement needs, let alone expansion. This shortage is the consequence of: i) unfavourable past government policies for the private trucking industry; (ii) centralised transport allocation system (Caetano) that led to rigidities in the supply of transport services, lowered utilisation of vehicles and roads, and discouraged new investment; (iii) control of tariffs and failure to update them to ensure cost recovery by truck operators; (v) very limited allocation of foreign exchange, particularly for the private sector, for spares and new vehicles; and (vi) the destruction of trucks during the war. These constraints are now being removed by the TGE.

There is only one railway line in Ethiopia, connecting Addis Ababa with Djibouti Besides being old and rundown, the railway runs mostly in dry and agriculturally marginal regions. Almost exclusively used for foreign trade, its contribution to domestic marketing and distribution of agricultural produce is insignificant. Nonetheless, it provides the necessary basic infrastructure for the opening up and development of the less privileged regions through Which it passes.

The import and export trade of Ethiopia is served by a total vessel capacity of nearly 88,000 DWT together with other ships that call at the ports of Assab and Djibouti. Imports of agricultural inputs and exports of agricultural produce are almost exclusively transported by sea. Although Ethiopia has since 1991 become a land-locked country, it would appear that its access to marine transport has not been curtailed due to special arrangements made with the neighboring countries.

In Ethiopia, the use of air transport in the marketing and distribution of agricultural inputs and produce is very marginal. This mode of transport serves mainly export of perishable agricultural commodities and import of some veterinary medicines. The available facilities would appear adequate for present needs.

Currently, rural Ethiopia is not adequately served by postal and telecommunication services. These coupled with the poor road network severely hamper dissemination of information on agricultural output and inputs prices and on market situations, in general.

The availability of warehouses at strategic locations is an important complement to transport. Over the last 20 years, the country has built an impressive warehouse capacity in both food surplus and deficit areas. This is a positive element for future development of agricultural marketing and distribution.-

ln rural Ethiopia, not all markets are monetised. In the remote rural areas, where there is no access to modern transport, some form of barter trade is practiced. Where primary markets exist business transaction is at a primitive level. Even the apparently highly developed monetised markets in urban centres are not particularly favourable for farmers in the vicinity due to market distortions caused by big merchants and government. This lop-sided competition can only benefit the big traders in the private and public sectors at the expense of the small farmer.

The state of the physical infrastructure in Ethiopia, no doubt, brings out both its diversity and backwardness. Evidently, the poorly developed infrastructure of the country has been one of the major constraints to agricultural development.
 

Institutional Constraints:

Institutional support to agricultural development in Ethiopia is given in the form of modern inputs, credit, research and extension service. The problem lies in the inadequacy of institutional capacity.

It is to be noted that government has been implementing package programmes for agricultural development in which fertilizers occupy a dominant position. AIMS, AMC and AISCO have been involved in the procurement and distribution of fertilizers. In the absence of domestic production of fertilizers, these agencies have to import the input. The operation of the parastatals has been beset with lengthy procurement and pricing procedures, inadequate port capacity inefficient transit operations, inadequate inland transport capacity, pool road network inadequate storage, weak institutional arrangements, absence of private participation, poor information system, etc. As a result, efficient and timely procurement and distribution of the input have been severely constrained.

Improved seeds in Ethiopia are produced by ESC, other government bodies (such as IAR) as well as state farms and some PCs under contract from ESC. Due to poor Information flow, production of improved seeds does not match demand.

In the absence of an established marketing and distribution network, ESC sells its products through state farms, AISCO and NGOs. This has its own limitations. In fact due to inefficient extension and marketing system, absence of market promotion, non-availability of suitable varieties, inadequate production capacity, poor quality of seeds and high prices have been the main factors responsible for low consumption of improved seeds by small farmers.

Pesticides are imported by different government organs such as AISCO, MCTSFD, IAR and ministry of Public Health. Some of the problems faced include shortage of pesticides, absence of pesticides regulation (until 1990), problems of package size,.etc.

However, as of recent some positive steps are being taken. For example, there are current plans to establish a national fertilizer project, permit the private sector to participate procurement and distribution of inputs, coordinate and streamline marketing and distribution activities, improve quality, etc.

The vital role of credit, in providing critical support for agricultural production through the supply of funds for procurement, supply and distribution of farm inputs can hardly be over- emphasised. It is to be recalled that all private financial institutions operating in Ethiopia were nationalised in 1975 by the government of the day, and their functions transferred to public agencies. The two major financial institutions presently dealing with rural credit are the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) and AIDB.

Many factors contributed, and are still contributing, to the limited access of the vast majority of Ethiopian small farmers to institutional credit. In the late 1970s and 1980s farms and SCs were the only recipients of credit, to the complete neglect of small farmers. Until very recently, major activities of both AIDB and CBE were in coffee growing regions, thus forcing small farmers to resort to borrowing from informal sources at high interest rates. The banks failed to launch effective extension services as was stipulated in the 1988 agricultural policy.

In terms of geographical distribution of the branch network of the banks, the majority of the branches (nearly 81 per cent for CBE, and almost 94 per cent for AIDB) are located in the cash crop or grain surplus woredas of the country. This is indicative of neglect of deficit/low productivity regions where the need for developmental credit is perhaps the greatest.

One of the reasons for low performance of the banks in the field of rural credit may be traced to the alleged bureaucracy and redtape in the processing of loans, with low loan sanctioning powers given to branches and sub-branches. Whilst AIDB takes over 60 days to process a loan, CBE takes over 50 days. Clearly, there is a need to streamline their operations and reduce redtapism and over-centralisation.

In the absence of a credit guarantee scheme and delay in land reforms, the problem of collateral provision by peasant farmers acts as a serious constraint to their access to institutional credit. In recent years, mounting loan arrears have become a serious problem. In June 1992,AIDB had arrears of over Birr 122 million with an arrear rate of 80 per cent.

Rural institutions, such as PAs, PCs and SCs, were grossly abused by the past regime. While they could have been effectively used as vehicle for developmental credit and other support, they were used for purposes of military conscription, resettlement, villagisation and forced financial contributions for drought and war efforts. Because of the animosity created towards these institutions, it will certainly be an uphill struggle to try to reinstate them.

On the positive side, there are various types of traditional self-help voluntary associations in the form of dabo, ikub, edir, mahber, etc. in all parts of the country, which can play a useful social and economic role in the rural society. These informal institutions must be preserved, nurtured and developed.

IAR and the Alemaya University of Agriculture (AUA) carry out applied and adaptive agricultural research. IAR has accomplished some major achievements in plant science research, especially in connection with breeding and adaptation of wheat, maize and sorghum cultivars. However, research in animal science has been insignificant.

Very few technologies have been developed for the small-holder farming system. In many cases, the advantages of improved varieties over local varieties have not been adequately demonstrated in adaptive trials on farmers' fields. Generally, many years of effort and investment in research have not been reflected in productivity increases. Also, new technology derived from research has either been inappropriate for the small-holder farming system, or the research outcome has not been disseminated.

The number of research centres and sub-centres, and trial sites is insufficient as well as inadequate in terms of geographical distribution. It is disturbing to observe that some of these research centres have been taken over by the recently established regional administrations. Their ability to manage and operate these research centres is questionable and hence cause for serious concern.

Research work by AUA is now on the decline, mainly due to shortage of experienced research staff and lack of adequare research funds. Its contribution has thus been marginal.

In the same vein, extension services provided to small farmers have been far from adequate. Particularly, in the absence of a strong link between research and extension service, whatever new innovations have been developed do not reach the farmer. Also, due to shortage of development agents and budgetary constraint, extension service coverage has ben mainly restricted to crop surplus producing areas. The efficacy of development agents under the newly created administrative regions remains to been.

Finally, there are many government institutions involved in promoting agricultural development in the country. Whilst specialisation demands that particular institutions be created to undertake specific fields of activity, undue proliferation of organisations is not warranted. Proliferation is bound to foster confusion, envy and above all duplication of activities and responsibilities, resulting in waste of scarce resources. This is particularly the case, where responsibilities and functions of the various bodies are not clearly defined as well as when there is no coordination and control of their activities.
 

Human Resource Constraints:

Almost all government organs and agencies in the agriculture sector face shortages of technical personnel. This problem is critical in most areas at the national, regional, local and the community levels. Lack or insufficiency of expertise is a constraining factor in the public agencies particularly charged with the responsibilities of: (i) agricultural policy planning, (ii) land use planning, (iii) research, (iv) technology promotion, (v) technology procurement and distribution, (vi) agricultural credit, (vii) agricultural census and surveys, etc.

Largely due to lack of incentives and low salaries, many public agencies have lost several of their experienced professionals. Also, since the political climate during the Derg regime was not conducive to the undertaking of professional work, many capable nationals left the country to work abroad. There have been many instances where some competent civil servants who were granted scholarships to study or make research abroad never came back. The same goes for those who left the country for seminars, conferences, etc.

Obviously, these problems apply not only to the agriculture sector, but also to the other sectors of the economy. In view of the size and importance of the sector, however it would appear that the impact on the sector (and hence the economy) has been most disastrous.

In tandem with these development. the standard of education at AUA and agricultural colleges in the country, as in any other Ethiopian university or college, has shown so fast a deterioration that graduates were ill-prepared to undertake any meaningful work upon joining the various agricultural institutions. Thus, the gestation period required to bring these new entrants upto an acceptable standard has been unduly long.

Caught between these unfavourable situations, the sector suffered and so did the whole economy. Many examples can be cited to portray the seriousness of skilled manpower shortage in the agriculture sector. Suffice it to state here that in the area of extension service, on the average, one development agent serves 9 PAs or 2520 households. This is about three times more than what a development agent is supposed to handle. On top of this when one considers lack of incentives and low salaries, clearly not much useful work can be accomplished under the circumstances.

Finally, while the available number of skilled technical personnel in the sector is small the capability is even worse in consideration of the low standard of education and limited experience. The sector deserves a much better treatment than this. More disturbing to observe is that while some qualified professional staff have been engaged in assignments that are beyond their capacities (and sometimes beyond their capabilities), some others have been left idle. This is perhaps a problem of staff allocation but still the outcome can be counter-productive.
 

Incentive and Policy Constraints:

The performance of the agriculture sector in Ethiopia has been disappointing. By virtue of its size and importance, it has adversely affected the overall economy. AGDP per capita in the 1980s has not reached the level attained in the 1970s. There are sufficient evidences sharply pointing to the inappropriateness of agricultural policies and the attendant disincentives for small farmers. Policies relating to land redistribution, collectivization, villagisation, rigidly controlled prices and grain marketing have been largely responsible for the stagnant, and at times retrogressive, performance of the agriculture sector. These policies did not only discourage investment in privately operated small holdings, but also drastically reduced community initiatives and labour investment in community based public work programmes.

Prior to 1990, the highly centralised and bureaucratic sector management and misguided agricultural development policies and strategies were geared towards overly ambitious socialisation plans. These policies gave undue importance to state farms and cooperatives, which together accounted for less than 10 per cent of agricultural production, and denied incentives to small farmers that accounted for over 90 per cent of production.

Through proclamation No. 31 of 1975, the previous government changed the structure of land tenure and agricultural production. The most noteworthy features of this proclamation were: (i) abolition of tenancy contracts; (ii) prohibition of hired labour in private farming; (iii) definition of private land holding rights and the institutional framework through which these may be exercised; and (iv) abolition of private property of land. The proclamation also provided for the formation, of, among others, PAs and cooperatives. Thus, farmers were required to organise into PAs to practise their rights to land. In addition, the proclamation foresaw individual households and PCs as production systems. Later on came state farms. It was planned that the share of individual farms, PCs and stBte farms in total area under cultivation would be 44 per cent, 49 per cent and 7 per cent, respectively. However, this was not possible to achieve in the face of declining production, famine, war, etc. If anything, the proclamation managed to destroy the initiative of small farmers.

The marketing policy in force put the marketing of agricultural inputs and outputs under state control. To implement the policy, PAs were organised into SCs which collected quotas of marketable surplus from PA members tor delivery to AMC and ECMC, as appropriate. Farmers could acquire inputs and other durable and non-durable consumer goods only, through SCs. from AMC and ECMC. Credit for inputs was to be provided only to those SCs that had no arrears.

As a result, small farmers found themselves trapped in a vicious circle from which they could not extricate themselves. Flow of goods and services was strictly under government control, and the cooperatives were politicised, thus firmly closing the door on farmers. The outcome of this is clearly reflected in the poor performance of the agriculture sector and the economy at large.

Agricultural prices were fixed by government and rigidly applied across-the-board Prices for grains were revised only once, and that at the request of international agencies involved in agricultural development assistance. Farm-gate prices were too low for small farms to boost their output. In fact, the fixed prices acted as a disincentive for farmers.

ln spite of all these burdensome policies, however, individual small farmers fared better than state farms and cooperatives. In terms of employment generation, return to invested capital, crop yield, potential for capital accumulation and marketable surplus production, it has been found out that small farmers achieved better results in most of the cases (ILO/JASPA, 1982). The fact, however, remains that they could have done better under suitable policies Finally, it may be noted that most of the other major constraints discussed above are a result of the misguided policies rather than ultimate causes that stand on their own. These constraints, with the possible exception of some aspects of the socio-economic constraints treated above (such as customs and traditions), were in the first place created by wrong policies. It stands to reason, therefore, that most of the constraints can be removed through appropriate policies which provide, for example, price and technological support as well as export and input incentives to farmers. In most instances, institution of policies opposite to the previous ones would seem appropriate. Even some harmful customs and traditions could be influenced for the better through well-thought out policies.