UNITED NATIONS  DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia

Introduction

On 15 March, 1995, the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Somalia will come to an end. Its effective presence, already restricted to a fortified retreat comprising Muqdisho’s port and airport, will probably expire sometime in late February. Despite the recommendation of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Mr.Victor Gbeho, that all UN agencies should withdraw together with UNOSOM, the UN’s role in Somalia will not end with UNOSOM’s departure, nor are most agencies likely to heed the SRSG’s warning. The remaining members of the UN family and the international NGO community must now come to terms with a future in Somalia without UNOSOM, for better or for worse.

Update on Situation in Somalia

The likely impact of UNOSOM’s ultimate departure is uncertain. UNOSOM’s position, spelt out in communications between the SRSG and the Secretary General, rings of "apres moi, le deluge" pessimism. UNOSOM’s leadership clearly believe that in their absence, Somalia’s fragile peace will give way to generalized anarchy and violence. Other international observers take a more sanguine point of view: UNOSOM’s actions have made little difference to security conditions, and have in any case only covered part of the country (most of Somalia has seen little more than a token UNOSOM presence, and no international troops). UNOSOM’s departure is therefore unlikely to have any material impact upon security conditions, and will probably make no difference to the operational constraints faced by aid agencies beyond an overall reduction of the UN’s communications and logisitics capacity. One common concern seems to be that UNOSOM’s withdrawal will cause a fierce battle for the material spoils left behind in the organisation’s Muqdisho stronghold, and may necessitate the temporary relocation of staff from Muqdisho during the period of withdrawal. But even if the civil war resumes as UNOSOM fears, a number agencies are likely to stay and work as best they can, when and where conditions permit.

More relevant, perhaps, to security concerns, is the pressure that UNOSOM’s withdrawal exerts upon the major Somali factions to form some kind of government and to reclaim the mantle of Somali sovereignty. General ‘Aydiid seems most sensitive to this pressure, and also most devoted to piecing together an administration over the coming weeks. Reports from Muqdisho suggest that he has overcome most of the remaining barriers to the formation of a coalition government: Colonel Abdillahi Yusuf of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) seems to have been won over, despite last minute objections, and may accept a senior post in an administration headed by ‘Aydiid (perhaps as one of three or four Vice Presidents). General Jaama’ Mohamed Qaalib seems to have replaced Abdirahman Ahmed Ali "Tuur" (former Chairman of the Somali National Movement (SNM) and ex-President of "Somaliland") as ‘Aydiid’s Isaaq candidate of choice, and may be nominated to another of the V.P. posts. ‘Aydiid may also be aiming for ‘Ali Mahdi to take up one of the remaining slots, though another prominent Abgaal could be found in case of Mahdi’s refusal. The end product could resemble a kind of "politburo", of four Vice Presidents (or three V.P.s and a Prime Minister) led by ‘Aydiid in the role of executive President. Departments (or Ministries) would then be grouped together by sector under the aegis of the concerned Vice President.

Pressure to conjure up an administration is not only incumbent upon General ‘Aydiid. ‘Ali Mahdi is in much the same situation. His battle with Mohamed Qanyare Afrah (USC Chairman) and much of the Murosade clan has left Mahdi’s present "government" full of holes at a time when ‘Aydiid seems poised to declare himself sole pretender to Somalia’s leadership. If ‘Aydiid does so, Mahdi may well be forced to declare a "new" government in order to defuse the SNA’s aspirations to international recognition. If ‘Aydiid doesn’t come up with a cabinet, Mahdi still faces pressure to announce one of his own and to regain the political initiative he has lost to the SNA.

In view of such stresses, conflict remains a probable outcome of the present political scenario. UNOSOM’s success in establishing the Muqdisho factions as the centre of gravity in a highly centralised "reconciliation" process means that such a conflict could spread far beyond Muqdisho. Virtually every Somali faction is now divided between subscribers to ‘Aydiid’s platform and those grouped around ‘Ali Mahdi. Nevertheless, there are some signs that the danger of imminent conflict and the make-or-break political stakes involved are producing positive chemistry among certain of the warring factions. There has been intensive dialogue recently between the various Hawiye clans in Muqdisho, and both ‘Aydiid and ‘Ali Mahdi face strong pressure from their constituencies to reach an agreement. Fragmentation within their respective camps has left both leaders weakened, and the political initiative seems to be moving out of their hands into the various clan "committees" that have recently been established. A joint "Justice Committee" in Muqdisho, which includes members of the judiciary from most of the city’s major groups, may pave the way for further gestures of local co-operation (it will also serve to dilute ‘Ali Mahdi’s new Islamist platform, since not all members of the committee support the imposition of Shari’a Law). Recent reports also indicate that the Habar Gidir political leadership (‘Aydiid excepted) would favour formation of a "Committee of National Reconciliation" among SNA factions instead of the new "government" sought by ‘Aydiid. The committee would be mandated to negotiate with the Somali Salvation Alliance or SSA (‘Ali Mahdi’s coalition) in order to conclude a lasting peace. Such developments would suggest that the window of opportunity for a pacific settlement is still open. Indeed, as pan-Hawiye sentiment seems to be ascendent within the clan’s various sub-groups, some observers go so far as to suggest that the warlords couldn’t muster the support for a fight, even if they wanted to.

Despite these positive signs, it is too early to be optimistic. The proliferation of factional players with the capacity to wage war (or peace) renders a cease-fire, let alone a peace-accord, virtually impossible to achieve and even harder to sustain. It is also entirely possible that one leader or the other, faced by dwindling support within his clan at large, might resort to provoking clashes in order to rally his kinsmen around him. ‘Aydiid has proven particularly adept at such a tactic. If fighting does again erupt, another popular scenario - the victory of one faction or the other - seems both improbable and unlikely to produce a stable administration. Neither major coalition has yet demonstrated the potential to administer Somalia (or large parts of it) effectively, even if victorious. Prior experience indicates that "victory" in Somalia does not necessarily mean "government." ‘Aydiid’s supposed plans for establishment of a national security force and other administrative organs may be harder to implement than his coalition cabinet expects, even if international support (most likely from regional powers) is forthcoming. Much of Somalia would not accept the fiat of such a government anyway (the north-east and north-west are almost certain to face internal division and perhaps even violence over this issue). On the the other side, ‘Ali Mahdi, having played into the hands of Islamic fundamentalists by imposing a draconian form of Shari’a law in areas he controls, is unlikely to win the kinds of friends he would need to prop up a government, either within Somalia or within the international community.

Changing Role of the United Nations

UNOSOM predicts that chaos and renewed violence attends its departure. This projection has met with scepticism. Whatever the case, the coming months will be a critical period of transition for the international community’s engagement in Somalia.

UNOSOM has already shed most of its major responsibilities: the military now hold only Muqdisho port and airport, while the humanitarian section, long since ineffective, is essentially defunct. Only the political portfolio is still pursued with any vigour, and the Secretary General has stated that a small team may remain behind to pursue a diplomatic solution after UNOSOM’s departure. In all other respects, the UN family’s engagement in Somalia will revert to the specialised agencies now active in the field, with the UNDP Resident Representative assuming his customary leadership role as primus inter pares (as UN Resident Co-ordinator).

Having comprehensively dominated the Somali scene for nearly two years, UNOSOM’s departure will leave considerable scope for new political and humanitarian endeavours. Since 1993, UNOSOM has provided a narrow focus for donor attention while absorbing enormous quantities of funding to little effect. As the operation winds down in the face of dwindling donor commitment and support for activities in Somalia, other actors may find themselves benefiting from greater access to resources once tied up in UNOSOM. Similarly, unambitious and low-profile peace-making initiatives may stand a better chance of success now that Somali political actors are no longer transfixed by UNOSOM’s imposing silhouette. UNOSOM’s departure holds out to Somalis and their partners in the international community the opportunity or imperative to explore new approaches to reconciliation and recovery.

UN Co-ordination and Leadership

Whatever advantages it may proffer, UNOSOM’s withdrawal will undoubtedly leave a leadership vacuum within the UN family and even within the broader international community in Somalia. In anticipation of the challenges posed by this transitional period, UN agencies have already responded with the recent formation of the "UN Co-ordination Team" (UNCT) as a forum for inter-agency co-ordination and joint "leadership" of UN activities. Underpinned by support of the UNDP Nairobi Liaison Office (NLO), the UNCT has already made some progress in winning the support of donors and UN agencies, most of whom express disappointment with the numerous previous co-ordination efforts.

Like the Ethiopian UN Disaster Management Team (DMT), the UNCT brings together heads of the concerned UN agencies on a weekly basis to discuss operational concerns (meeting alternatively in Nairobi and Muqdisho). At the direction of the UNDP Resident Representative, the NLO acts as a secretariat to the UNCT, publishing the weekly agenda, keeping minutes, and disseminating relevant documentation. Although the UNCT is significantly larger than the DMT (between 20 and 30 people may attend the meeting), its size does not appear to stifle active debate and frank discussion among its members, and its collective decisions seem to be voluntarily accepted as binding (as an example, at the Nairobi meeting I attended, agencies agreed to suspend all non-emergency activities in Muqdisho until the release of AICF logistics officer Rudy Marq - subsequently liberated).

Although NGOs are not invited to UNCT meetings (like the DMT), a UNCT "representative" attends gatherings of the NGO consortium and reports back to the other UNCT members. It has been agreed to invite ICRC to the UNCT meetings as an observer.

Co-ordination Issues

Somalia is unique in that the same ethnic group - Somali - inhabits both sides of the border along the entire length of its frontier. While this has undoubtedly contributed to Somalia’s historically cool relations with its neighbours, it also poses extraordinary challenges to the formulation of an appropriate international response to the Somali crisis. The Somali civil war, in one form or another, affects four countries (five including the self-declared "Somaliland Republic") and at least five major international or regional organisations: the UN, the OAU, the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). Consequently, the international dimensions of the problem make a co-ordinated response of the concerned parties exceptionally complicated.

Within the UN family, co-ordination is hardly less problematic. UN agencies in four countries of the Horn are somehow involved in managing fallout from the Somali civil war. This division of responsibility in managing what is essentially a single, though complex, problem often means duplication of effort, inadequate passage of information, and gaps in response. There is a clear need to upgrade the level of collaboration between agencies across these borders. The new co-ordination structure now developing within the UN family Somalia and Nairobi, may allow for substantial improvement in co-operation between UN agencies throughout the Horn.

Information dissemination: Dissemination of relevant information between agencies has been particularly weak across borders. This problem is exacerbated by the different reporting channels employed by the various agencies.

The UNDMT in Ethiopia has been effective in improving information exchange on Disaster Preparedness - a subject that has been broadened to included multiple dimensions of relief, rehabilitation and development. The UNCT promises to provide much the same service, while linking together the Kenya-based and Somali-based agencies actively involved in Somali affairs. Since both the DMT and UNCT serve as fora for major UN agencies, a direct linkage between the two groups would greatly enhance the access of all agencies to "cross-border" information, while complementing "bilateral" links enjoyed by most UN organisations.

Djibouti and north-west Somalia ("Somaliland") are somewhat estranged from the primary "loop" of information exchange within Somalia (and Kenya). In part this is because operational linkages (communications, logistics etc.) between north-western and southern Somalia are weak, and most agencies in "Somaliland" depend upon and report to (or via) their offices in Djibouti. Some agencies then report directly from Djibouti to their head offices. Others report to Nairobi or Muqdisho, often once information has been condensed or "summarized" en route. By the time such information reaches agencies in Ethiopia, it may be devoid of substantive content.

On issues of bilateral importance (e.g. the new influx into Ethiopia from Somaliland), such tortuous channels of information-sharing are inadequate. More efficient arrangements, like that of UNHCR for management of the repatriation operation to Ethiopia from Djibouti, could be applied in a broader context. The recent establishment of the Emergency Task Force in Somaliland which communicates on an ad hoc basis with Addis Ababa (i.e. UN-EUE and UNHCR) is a step in the right direction, but needs to be formalised. The UNCT in Nairobi was not fully aware of the ETF’s activities in Somaliland, nor in direct communication with this ad hoc local co-ordination mechanism at the time of my visit.

Refugees/Displaced: The issue of forced migration, involving refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees and "host populations" is perhaps the most obvious "regional" or cross border issue. Since 1978, perhaps 2,000,000 Somalis have successively become refugees in the Horn of Africa - a figure probably dwarfed by the number of "displaced" over the same period. Since many Somali clans enjoy residency in more than one country, categorising disaster-affected populations as "refugees" or "displaced" and coming up with appropriate responses is particularly difficult. The present conflict in "Somaliland," where war-affected groups have variously become internally displaced, returnees, registered refugees, and unregistered refugees, serves to highlight the limitations of traditional approaches to this particular problem. UNHCR, confronted with the issues raised by the new influx from "Somaliland," has already begun to review the status of such "transnational" populations under its protection mandate.

Another hindrance to effective action in favour of IDPs has been confusion concerning the mandate of any single UN agency to deal with the problem. UNHCR’s recent experiments with "cross-mandate" interventions, and a UNDP report on the subject, suggest that a co-ordinated inter-agency response to the needs of IDPs would actually be more effective than assigning the sole responsibility to a given agency. If this is the case, joint action from UN agencies will clearly require a higher level of co-ordination than that which presently exists. In the present situation, the co-existence of refugees, displaced, returnees and "hosts" all within roughly the same geographic area calls for better co-operation across international borders as well as within them.

Multi-dimensional crises: It has been fashionable for some time now to speak of a "relief to development continuum" in which international assistance takes place according to a more or less fluid temporal progression. As conventional wisdom on the subject begins to accept that the "continuum" may not be as smooth, nor as coherent, as the model implies, it has been suggested that a modified paradigm may be in order. This may well go no further than arguing that short-term interventions should, where possible, make long-term macro-economic (or "development") sense. In the Somali scenario, this case has been strongly made by the Multi-Donor Task Force report (led by the World Bank) of October 1993.

Inherent in either model is the concept that peace, stability and good governance are essential to recovery and development. The role of international organisations in promoting these conditions is rapidly maturing. Understanding the political context of crises, including identification of key stages such as conflict formation, crisis management, and conflict resolution, is an integral part of formulating an appropriate response. Greater investment in recovery programmes, like de-mining, disarmament and demobilisation is widely recognised to be an essential contribution to stability in a post-war situation. Clarification of the UN’s responsibilities, and information-sharing between concerned agencies should be developed and enhanced as part of a joint strategy for intervening in these vital and exceptionally sensitive areas.

Donors and Other Partners: Any proposed change in the UN system’s response to crisis will require the support of the specialised UN agencies if it is not to be stillborn. Likewise, the UN’s donors, host governments, and NGOs are unlikely to subscribe to any initiative about which they have not been consulted. This is particularly true in areas in which the UN intends to break new ground: the legal status of "transnational" displaced populations, involvement in conflict avoidance and resolution, or new, macro-economically sensitive approaches to emergency relief. Such potential partners will also have invaluable experience and expertise to share with the UN agencies in this regard.

 
Recommendations

Most of the issues raised in this report are contingent upon the approval and engagement of the UN family as a whole. It is therefore not possible to suggest any measures beyond the tabling of these issues and further discussion for the time being.

Problems like the UN system’s collective response to the "Somaliland" conflict, however, are matters of immediate operational and humanitarian importance, which deserve an urgent and concerted response. It is in this connection that the following recommendations are made:

• Information Sharing: Better dissemination of information of common concern will help to facilitate informed decision-making and inter-agency co-operation.. The DMT and UNCT already provide this function in Addis Ababa, Nairobi and Muqdisho. The ETF has made some progress towards this goal in the north-west and in Djibouti. In order to support these mechanisms and to render them as effective as possible it is recommended that:

• Consult with donors and/or organisations involved in conflict resolution: Information received from UNHCR, UN-EUE, and other aid agencies, suggests that the "Somaliland" conflict may soon produce a new round of violence, with serious humanitarian consequences in north-west Somalia, Ethiopia, and perhaps even Djibouti. The implications for aid agencies and donors requires no elaboration. It is therefore suggested that concerned donors, and organisations possessing expertise in conflict resolution, be apprised of the situation and invited to apply themselves to the problem. Heading off an imminent conflict could prevent a needless humanitarian crisis and wastage of donor resources.

Identify issues requiring regional co-operation: Discussions between agencies throughout the Horn could highlight areas requiring co-ordination above the national level. Issues such as conflict resolution, refugees, internally displaced, and epidemic disease (to name a few) all require co-operation across borders. Globally speaking, most problems affecting the Somali community fall into this category. The UN Heads of Agencies meeting of 9/10 February in Addis Ababa may provide an appropriate forum for discussion of such issues.

The comments and observations in this document represent the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations. Nor do the designations and presentation of material imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever of the UN concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, of its authorities, or concerning the delimitations of its frontiers or boundaries.