Horn of Africa: Mixed Signals on Border Conflict,
11/15/07
Horn of Africa: Mixed Signals on Border Conflict
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Nov 15, 2007 (071115)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
The Security Council has called on Ethiopia and Eritrea to
implement without delays or preconditions a 2002 border ruling, But
observers warn that the conditions are ripe for a return to war.
The U.S. voted for the resolution. But many critics say that the
chances for war have been significantly increased by U.S. officials
who have labeled Eritrea as a supporter of terrorism and failed to
pressure Ethiopia to implement the binding arbitration decision of
2002.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains a brief summary and call for
international action to avert war, from the International Crisis
Group, and excerpts from an extended commentary by Yohannes
Woldemariam and Okbazghi Yohannes denouncing the U.S. policy of
aggravating tensions in the Horn in the name of combating
terrorism. Woldemariam and Yohannes are critical of both Ethiopian
and Eritrean regimes, but warn that U.S. intervention on the side
of Ethiopia can only have negative effects.
U.S. policy has also come under critique in the U.S. Congress, with
a primary focus on human rights violations in Ethiopia, resulting
in the passage by the U.S. House of Representatives in October of
the Ethiopia Democracy and Accountability Act. The Act is still to
be considered by the U.S. Senate
(see http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-2003 for
current status, and http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/sub_africa.asp
for hearings by the House Africa Subcommittee)
Another AfricaFocus Bulletin sent out today has recent updates on
Somalia, including the regime's crackdown on journalists.
For earlier AfricaFocus Bulletins on Ethiopia and Eritrea, see
http://www.africafocus.org/country/ethiopia.php
and
http://www.africafocus.org/country/eritrea.php
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Ethiopia and Eritrea: Stopping the Slide to War
International Crisis Group
http://www.crisisweb.org
Africa Briefing N 48
5 November 2007
Nairobi/New York/Brussels, 5 November 2007
Overview
The risk that Ethiopia and Eritrea will resume their war in the
next several weeks is very real. A military build-up along the
common border over the past few months has reached alarming
proportions. There will be no easy military solution if hostilities
restart; more likely is a protracted conflict on Eritrean soil,
progressive destabilisation of Ethiopia and a dramatic humanitarian
crisis. To prevent this, the international community - in
particular, the UN Security Council and the U.S., which is the
single most influential outsider - must act immediately to give
both sides the clearest possible message that no destabilising
unilateral action will be tolerated. Once the immediate danger is
past, efforts should be reinvigorated to ensure that the parties
comply with their international law obligations, disengage on the
ground and restore the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) - in a longer
time frame - to develop political and economic initiatives for
resolving the fundamental problems between the old foes.
Citing Eritrean encroachment into the TSZ, Ethiopia announced on 25
September 2007 that it was considering terminating the Algiers
agreement, which ended the war in 2000. In reply Eritrea accused it
of repeated violations of that peace treaty and called again for
the Security Council to enforce the decision of the Boundary
Commission Algiers established. The U.S. now estimates that Eritrea
has 4,000 troops, supported by artillery and armour, in the
supposedly demilitarised TSZ and an additional 120,000 troops
nearby. In August it estimated that Ethiopia maintains 100,000
troops along the border.
Both sides agreed in Algiers to submit the border dispute to the
Boundary Commission, whose mandate was to "delimit and demarcate
the colonial treaty border based on pertinent colonial treaties
(1900, 1902 and 1908) and applicable international law". They
further agreed that its decision would be final and binding. In
April 2002 the Commission gave its ruling, delimiting the border on
the map and in so doing locating the village of Badme, the site of
the original dispute that sparked off the war in 1998, in Eritrea.
Since then Ethiopia, though it won on other aspects of the ruling,
has blocked demarcation of the border on the ground, while Eritrea
has called for the international community to insist on this
without further delay. Eritrea has right on its side on this point
but has played its cards very badly. Frustrated by the lack of
progress, it has alienated many of its supporters, including a
number of Western states, aid agencies and the UN. It has seized
their vehicles, restricted their monitoring teams, expelled their
personnel and arrested Eritreans working for embassies. In
addition, its repression of its own people and lack of democracy
have left it shunned by all but a handful of states.
The stalemate came to a head at the Commission's most recent
unproductive meeting, in September 2007, during which the Ethiopian
delegate insisted on prior satisfaction of a range of extraneous
measures. On balance, however, Ethiopia has played its hand
skilfully. It has used its position as the major power in the
region to win U.S. toleration of its intransigence and to keep
criticism of its own human rights record to a minimum. Its military
intervention in Somalia has drawn little overt adverse response. It
would not be surprising if Addis Ababa believes an effort in the
near future to stage a coup in Asmara and use force against an
Eritrean government that has few friends would also be tolerated in
Washington.
The rapidly approaching danger point is the end of November, when
the Boundary Commission indicates it will close down unless it is
allowed to proceed to demarcation. Before then it is essential that
the two sides be left in no doubt that use of force, directly or
indirectly, is not acceptable and that a party that resorts to it
will be held accountable. Specifically this means that:
- the U.S. should convey a firm private message to both sides that
direct or indirect use of force to resume the conflict and reach a
unilateral solution would be unacceptable and, specifically to
Ethiopia where its influence is at this time stronger, that it will
take appropriate diplomatic and economic measures against it if it
attacks or seeks to overthrow the Eritrean regime; and
- the Security Council should pass a resolution reiterating its
support for the Boundary Commission decision, requesting it to
remain in being beyond the end of November so that it is available
to demarcate the border, and stating that even without such
demarcation the border as found by the Commission is acknowledged
as the legal boundary between the two countries.
Once this line has been drawn, the international community should
resume with new urgency its efforts to break the immediate
stalemate. Consideration might be given to the following:
- a Security Council resolution or statement reiterating the
requirement on Ethiopia to accept the Boundary Commission ruling
unconditionally and cooperate in its implementation, including by
pulling back from its forward military positions south of the
border, and on Eritrea to withdraw its army from the TSZ;
- appointment by the Secretary-General of a new Special
Representative and head of the UN mission (UNMEE), who should press
both sides to allow the international peacekeepers to reoccupy the
positions they have been forced to leave in the TSZ and proceed
unhindered in their work; and
- discussion among members of the Security Council and within other
key international constituencies including the guarantors and
witnesses of the Algiers agreement - the African Union (AU), the
UN, the U.S. and the European Union (EU) - about incentives
(primarily economic) and disincentives (credible sanctions) that
would likely be required to obtain cooperation in de-escalating the
situation on the ground and implementing the Commission decision.
In the somewhat longer run, Addis Ababa and Asmara will need to end
their military and financial support for rebels operating on the
other's soil, respect the arms embargo on Somalia and restart a
dialogue with the support of their regional and other international
friends. None of the steps to break the current deadlock and begin
to rebuild mutually beneficial relations will be easy or quick. But
the immediate need is to prevent the war from restarting so that
there is time to work on them.
War Clouds in the Horn of Africa
12 November 2007.
By Yohannes Woldemariam and Okbazghi Yohannes*
*The writers are both professors of international relations and can
be reached at yohannes99@hotmail.com
[Excerpts only. Full article available at
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24685]
November 10, 2007 - As we collect our thoughts and reflect about
what a future war could possibly mean to the peoples of Eritrea and
Ethiopia, dark rumors of war are rampant in the African Horn;
whether these rumors of war are an indication of an impending war
or simply a function of public posturing is something that only the
near future can tell. If it happens, a fresh war now could spell
disaster of tragic proportions for both countries, but especially
for Eritrea. It appears that Ethiopia is determined to take
advantage of the desperate internal Eritrean conditions. ...
This feverish Ethiopian preparation for aggression on Eritrea has
a crucial international dimension, supplied by none other than the
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Jendayi Frazer. She
has actively been on a personal crusade to orchestrate an
international demonization of the Eritrean leader and his regime as
part of a coordinated effort to facilitate aggression. In Ms.
Frazer's vernacular, the Eritrean regime is a sponsor of
transnational terrorism, and the answer must be "regime change".
Even Washington analysts have understood the metaphoric
significance of her rehearsed statement as a dangerously
opportunistic signal to Ethiopia's Meles to begin his well
calculated journey of aggression on Eritrea. Ken Menkhaus put it
right when he opined: "recent statements made by the Assistant Sec
of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, may have aggravated
an already tense situation in the Horn. She made a statement about
the government of Eritrea - in order to stay off the list of states
sponsoring terrorism, one of the ways to do that would be regime
change. By using that expression, that sent a message throughout
the region that looked like the United States was implicitly
accepting the possibility of an Ethiopian attack. And I hope that
was not her intent, but that is how it was interpreted." VOA News.
We believe that this is the exact interpretation that Ms. Frazer
wanted to communicate. If the rumors are credible, Meles's
understanding of the signals from Washington could be one of the
factors that have precipitated the current crisis and the frantic
preparation for war as well. As the Indian Ocean Newsletter
recently reported in March 17, 2007:
"According to a source close to the Ethiopian ministry of defence,
the Ethiopian army has obtained satellite photos from the American
intelligence services, showing the northern border of Ethiopia and
providing useful information on Eritrean troop concentration.
Moreover, the leaders of the Tigray People's Liberation Front
(TPLF, hard core of the EPRDF in power in Addis Ababa) are
currently waging a propaganda campaign based on the slogan "repeat
in the North the victorious military operation in Somalia"...
[This] has caused diplomats on post in Addis Ababa to wonder
whether the United States military cooperation with Ethiopia to
prepare their joint offensive into Somalia could now be repeated in
Eritrea. All the more so since the relations between the USA and
the government of Asmara are at their lowest point ..."
There should be no mistake that the reason for another war between
Eritrea and Ethiopia is not that Eritrea has suddenly become a
state sponsor of transnational terrorism, but the fact that
Ethiopia desperately needs a pretext to create a material
foundation for its de facto rejection of the Hague decision on the
border issue. ... it is important to recall that the two countries
signed a binding agreement in Algiers in December 2000 pertaining
to their disputed boundary. Two crucial provisions of the agreement
are worth mentioning here. First, the two countries agreed in
advance to accept the final decision of a boundary commission
without any qualifications. Second, the United States, the European
Union, the U.N. and the African Union all guaranteed the full
implementation of any binding decision once made by the boundary
commission. The commission gave its final and binding verdict in
April 2002. While Eritrea accepted the final decision in full
without reservation, Ethiopia rejected the decision outright
because the town of Badme (the flash point of the 1998-2000 war)
has been awarded to Eritrea. Even after over five years since the
final verdict, Ethiopia has yet to accept the unqualified
implementation of the decision and continues to block the U.N.
technical committee from starting the task of boundary demarcation.
...
In an ironic way, Meles and his cronies have proved to be diligent
students of the Bush Administration's postmodern preemption
doctrine, regardless of whether it violates the conventional norms
of international politics and the fundamental principles of
international law or it offends a basic sense of justice. The
difficulty for both the Bush Administration and Meles is the fact
that both international law and the practice of international
diplomacy support Eritrea's position. Even John Bolton, former Bush
appointee to the U.N. acknowledges the legal validity of the
Eritrean case in his new book (Surrender Is Not an Option:
Defending America at the United Nations ) in these terms:
"neither the Ethiopian nor the Eritrean government would win any
popularity contests, and I certainly had no favorite, but it seemed
to me that Eritrea had a point: Ethiopia had agreed on a mechanism
to resolve the border dispute in 2000 and was now welching on the
deal."
Likewise, David Shinn's (former U.S. ambassador to Ethiopia) words
also echo Bolton's observation (VOA October 26)
"Strictly from a legal point of view, the Ethiopians are on shakier
ground for the simple reason that it was a binding arbitration to
begin with and Ethiopia chose to conclude that there were
problems... They did not accept the final agreement. Well, you
cannot do that. Binding arbitration is binding arbitration."
... why has the Bush Administration decided to cast its lot with
the Meles regime in the face of Meles's open defiance of the
international rule of law? Answers to these questions should
untangle and illuminate the issues. An examination of Secretary
Condoleezza Rice's world outlook and her intellectual pedigree as
well as that of her protégé, Ms. Frazer, can provide an important
piece of the puzzle.
During the 2000 presidential campaigns, Ms. Rice wrote an essay in
the Foreign Affairs magazine in her capacity as foreign policy
adviser to then candidate Bush. ...The thrust of her proposition
was that the United States was the sole hegemonic leader in global
affairs, something that had to be continually demonstrated by
America's global power projection and the containment and
domestication or eradication of "rogue" states. The means to this
objective was power politics, pure and simple. According to this
formula, America's national interest could not and should not be
hampered by international moral considerations and legal niceties;
...
... States that complement American effort to project its power are
to be rewarded and nurtured regardless of their internal
particulars in terms of whether they are violators of international
law or perpetrators of domestic crimes. Conversely, states that
contradict American strategic interest are to be demonized as
"rogue" or state sponsors of transnational terrorism. It is in this
light that Ms. Frazer's statements and testimonies must be
understood. After all, Ms. Rice was Ms. Frazer's doctoral thesis
adviser, a mentorship that has continued to this day. ... While Ms.
Rice is the strategic architect of U.S. policy in the Horn, Ms.
Frazer is the tactician and foot soldier in charge of implementing
that policy. ...
In keeping with this objective, Eritrea and Ethiopia must somehow
be differentiated along the axis that separates "good" from "evil."
Meles's presumed positive style of governance and valuable alliance
on the "war on terror" must sharply be contrasted with Isaias's
dictatorial rule and alleged "sponsorship of terrorism." The truth
is that both Isaias and Meles are twins in substance and addiction
to power. ...
The Bush Administration's Janus-like approach to the African Horn
has unavoidably raised concern even here in the United States. The
U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution in October 2007,
requiring the Administration to tie U.S. aid to Ethiopia to
improved conditions of human rights, even though Ms. Frazer fought
hard against this congressional move. Even some of the
Administration's own supporters found her staunch opposition to the
effort to promote human rights governance in Ethiopia confusing, if
not objectionable. For example, Republican Congressman and
presidential campaigner, Tom Tancredo, found Ms. Frazer's testimony
frustratingly confusing. As he put it:
"...It is a question I have that really has never been
satisfactorily answered, and that is this: Is there a specific
criterion that the State Department uses to determine at what point
we become an apologist for a country that otherwise would not be
the case? That is to say, we would - if that one factor, their
support for our efforts in the war against radical Islam, if that
were not there, we would be on a decidedly different relationship
with them. We would be antagonistic about them because of their
human rights abuses. ...
Can you help me understand what the thinking process is inside the
State Department to determine which countries we will support, even
if their human rights abuses are as identified in these reports in
Ethiopia?
Ms. Frazer, instead of directly answering the Congressman's
question, offered a convoluted explanation of the Administration's
position ... The crucial subtext of her answer is that America has
strategic priorities in the African Horn other than promoting human
rights in Ethiopia. ...
...For example, he should not be pressured to fully accept the
international decision on the boundary issue; he has to be
encouraged to accept, at least in principle, a peaceful settlement
of the dispute with Eritrea; but, if or when he continues to ignore
the will of the international community or even if he takes
Ethiopia to war with Eritrea, then the U.S. would support him,
albeit reluctantly, in order to preserve his loyalty to Washington.
This posture can be rationalized by establishing a moral
equivalence between Meles and Isaias on the border issue, in
general, and by designating Isaias as a sponsor of transnational
terrorism, in particular. ...
... the Bush Administration then directly inserted itself in the
matter, ostensibly as an impartial mediator. Ms. Frazer was
designated as the trouble shooter to shuttle between Asmara and
Addis Abeba to make the two sides talk about how to modify the
Hague decision, in effect shelving away the final and binding
verdict of the boundary commission. However, when the Isaias regime
refused her request to visit the disputed boundary and assess the
situation with a view to modifying the final and binding verdict,
Ms. Frazer felt snubbed. On the other hand, Meles opportunistically
exploited the fissure between Isaias and Ms. Frazer and provided
all the necessary accommodation for her to visit the disputed area
from the Ethiopian side. Following her visit to the area, Ms.
Frazer then proposed that a "referendum" be held to determine the
future of Badme. This posture not only rewards Meles's
intransigence but also represents an open repudiation of the Hague
decision. ...
It is an undeniable fact that Isaias and Meles have been shopping
for surrogates to undermine each other's political survival. On
this point neither can claim a moral virtue. ...
>From Ms. Frazer's perspective, if Isaias is determined to destroy
America's "man" in Ethiopia, who has demonstrated his loyalty to
Washington by the blood and sweat of his troops in Somalia, then
the "regime change" formula must be applied in Eritrea. Here both
Ms. Frazer and Meles see a presumably promising substitute to
Isaias in the self-proclaimed Eritrean opposition. Before tackling
the flawed "regime change" thesis, it is useful to clarify our own
attitude toward the regime now in Asmara in order to preempt any
distortion of our views by some. We are neither defenders of nor
apologists for Isaias. We firmly believe that Eritrea today is
ruled by a regime of brigands, political hoodlums and a handful
sycophant intellectuals, presided over by Africa's reincarnated Idi
Amin. We, too, desperately yearn for regime change in Eritrea, but
not one initiated, financed and directed by outside forces with the
so-called Eritrean opposition providing enabling services. For a
long time now, the Eritrean people have been subjected to total
internal terror. And now they face a perpetual threat of external
terror in the form of Ethiopian aggression and possible
reoccupation. Those who parade themselves as Eritrean opposition
and yet seek the sponsorship of Washington and Addis Abeba to bring
about regime change in Eritrea can only subject the Eritrean people
to more horrors of external intervention. Iraq and Somalia are
immediate examples. ...
In so far as our own informed observation goes, the members of the
so-called opposition who have associated themselves with the Meles
regime and seek redemption from their external sponsors are equally
dangerous. An opposition which has miserably failed to lead itself
cannot lead a nation. ...
Meles may seize the opportunity to invade Eritrea and occupy at
least some parts of it under the pretext of assisting the so called
Eritrean opposition. ... He may believe that he could obtain
American assistance to use the Eritrean opposition as a vehicle.
This explains in part the rush by certain elements to welcome Ms.
Frazer's attempt to characterize the Eritrean state as a sponsor of
terrorism. In principle, we are neither against opposition to
Isaias's dictatorship nor regime change. But the effort should be
fundamentally homegrown and or the external opposition should
dissociate from Meles and should demonstrate independence coupled
with an evidence of democratically inclusive vision.
Here we don't want to convey the impression that we are painting
all members of the opposition with a broad brush. We are cognizant
of the fact that there are many honorable and patriotic Eritreans
that operate under the general rubric of opposition. We hasten to
add that there is a simple rule of thumb that distinguishes between
genuine patriots and fly by night opportunists who seek a shortcut
to power through foreign agency. In Eritrea's current reality,
accepting advice, support and money from the Meles regime with his
vested interests in Eritrea's disintegration is a political kiss of
death. Anyone who solicits such funds or claims to be a safe
conduit for such funds to "genuine democrats" is by definition, not
a true democrat.
...
Ironically, Meles's refusal to abide by the Hague verdict and
America's counter-productive meddling in the matter has contributed
to the longevity of the Isaias regime. In our view, the surest way
to effect meaningful change, not only in Eritrea but also in
Ethiopia, is to be true to international law and due justice to
Eritrea on the boundary issue. No doubt the United States can play
a constructive role. However, harvesting the promise of a new Horn
of Africa policy ... require[s] a [wise] diplomacy. ...
Whether Washington respects the outcomes of international verdicts
and helps to enforce them is the crucial factor for peace between
Eritrea and Ethiopia. Giving orders, issuing public demands and
pronouncements, reneging on world court decisions and declaring
arbitrary expectations are not prudent. In the Horn of Africa, U.S.
double standards and disregard for international law can only
plunge Eritrea and Ethiopia into unimaginable destruction.
The United States must declare in words and show in deeds that it
is always on the side of the Eritrean people and their democratic
efforts. A no-less-important part of such a declaration should be
a commitment to respect the independence and sovereignty of
Eritrea. It must use its political and economic leverage to weigh
on the Ethiopian regime, so the Hague verdict on the border can be
implemented. A necessary corollary of these democratic principles
must be to make it clear that the United States will neither anoint
any group or person as the future leader of Eritrea in the name of
regime change.
from africafocus@igc.org
date Nov 15, 2007 4:35 PM
subject Horn of Africa: Mixed Signals on Border Conflict
Page Editor: Ali B. Ali-Dinar, Ph.D.