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United Nations Security Council SC/5995 Resumed 3499th Meeting 8 February 1995 PM SUMMARY
SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVES ESTABLISHMENT OF UNAVEM III TO HELP ANGOLA ACHIEVE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, PEACE
Resolution 976 Approves Mission of up to 7,000 Troops, 350 Military and 260 Police Observers, for Initial Six-Month Period
The Security Council this evening authorized the establishment of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), to help the Government of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) restore peace and achieve national reconciliation, thereby ending that country's 20-year civil war.
The Council took that action by unanimously adopting resolution 976 (1995) to create the Mission, which will replace UNAVEM II, whose mandate expires today. With an initial six-month mandate until 8 August and a maximum deployment of 7,000 military personnel, 350 military observers and 260 police observers, the Mission will assist the Angolan peace process on the basis of the "Acordos de Paz" of 31 May 1991, the Lusaka Protocol of 20 November 1994, and relevant Council resolutions. The Council urged the expeditious deployment of military and police observes to monitor the cease-fire.
By other terms of today's resolution, the Council authorized the immediate deployment of the necessary planning and support elements to prepare for the sending of peace-keeping forces to Angola, provided the Secretary-General remained satisfied that an effective cease-fire and mechanisms to monitor it were in place and that both parties in the Angolan conflict were allowing the free and safe flow of humanitarian assistance throughout the country. The Council also authorized the subsequent deployment of additional elements needed to set up operational quartering areas for UNITA forces.
The Council decided that infantry units would be deployed when the Secretary-General informed the Council that certain conditions had been met, including the effective cessation of hostilities, the provision of all relevant military data and the designation of all quartering areas.
By other provisions of the resolution, the Secretary-General is to report monthly to the Council on the progress made in deploying UNAVEM III and the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, including the maintenance of an effective cease-fire, free access by UNAVEM III to all parts of Angola, and compliance by both the Angolan parties with their obligations under the Lusaka Protocol. The Secretary-General is to submit a complete report to the Council by 15 July.
Furthermore, the Council declared that it intended to conclude UNAVEM III's mission when the Lusaka Protocol's objectives were achieved in accordance with the schedule attached to that Protocol and with the expectation of its completion by February 1997. Similarly, the Council stated that it intended to review the United Nations role in Angola, should the Secretary-General report that the cooperation from the Angolan parties was substantially delayed or not forthcoming.
Today's Council resolution also called upon both the Government and UNITA to stop acquiring arms and war materiel during UNAVEM III's presence and to devote their resources instead to humanitarian and social needs. It endorsed the Secretary-General's view that an effective information capability, including a United Nations radio station, should be established in consultation with the Angolan Government. The Secretary-General's intention to include human rights specialists in the Mission's political component to observe the implementation of the provisions related to national reconciliation was also welcomed by the Council.
Addressing the Council after the adoption of the resolution, Venancio de Moura, Foreign Minister of Angola, said certain provisions of the resolution violated the Lusaka Protocol. None the less, he expressed his country's support for the deployment of UNAVEM III.
Selected Excerpts from Statements (selection by APIC)
SIMBARASHE S. MUMBENGEGWI (Zimbabwe) said that even though the success of the peace process in Angola ultimately depended on the people of Angola, assistance from the international community was essential. The report of the Secretary-General had testified that the cease-fire, which came into force in November 1994, was holding. The parties to the conflict had demonstrated their firm commitment to peace and, therefore, satisfied the requirements set by previous Council resolutions.
The Security Council should immediately deploy the required peace-keeping force, in full, to oversee and verify the implementation of the agreements reached by the parties, he said. Since the parties had shown their commitment to peace, it would be a serious mistake to continue to test their patience any further. The Security Council should deploy UNAVEM III without undue delay and, in so doing, avoid mistakes of the past which could risk derailing the delicate peace process.
PEDRO COMISSARIO AFONSO (Mozambique) supported the Secretary-General's recommendation that UNAVEM III should immediately take over from UNAVEM II. Mozambique's experience in the deployment of the United Nations forces on its territory showed that the sooner a verification mission was established and deployed, the better for the success of the peace process. ... Peace in Angola could not be delayed any longer. More thanever, the United Nations and the international community were duty bound to extend their hand of solidarity to the people of Angola in their quest for peace and stability. In assisting the Angolan people, it was critical to uphold the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and non-interference in internal affairs of a Member State. In that context, Mozambique could not support the deployment of any peace-keeping operation with conditionalities attached. He supported Angola's assertion that some paragraphs in the draft resolution should be revised to address its concerns.
IBRAHIM A. GAMBARI (Nigeria), said the indications on the ground were that UNAVEM III was a viable prospect. The cease-fire was generally holding, and the parties seemed determined to pursue the cause of peace in the higher interest of national survival, reconciliation and reconstruction. Angola had offered to make a substantial contribution in kind to the new peace-keeping operation. It was hoped that gesture would induce similar cooperation on the part of the international community. "After decades of internecine civil war, it is conceivable that the people of Angola are now fully prepared to let go of the war psychosis in favour of the pursuit of peace." Through the mandate of UNAVEM III, the United Nations sought to provide a force that could contend with the enormity and complexity of the problem within a time-frame that would not imply a perpetual United Nations presence in Angola, he said. At the core of the proposed mandate was the flexibility which the Secretary-General must retain to determine the course, content and timing of the deployment of military forces and civilian personnel as the situation on the ground in Angola warranted.
The mandate of UNAVEM III must commence no later than 31 March. Nigeria would have preferred to see an initial deployment period of 12 months, but it accepted the six-month initial period proposed in the draft on the understanding that the United Nations was not about to terminate its presence in Angola after six months, but was prepared to extend the operation for additional periods, based on the Mission's performance to enable the political process to take root.
Speaking after adoption of the resolution, MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT (United States) expressed hope that the Lusaka Protocol had brought an end to the civil strife that had plagued Angola. It provided "concrete guarantees of UNITA's political and physical survival", through its participation in all sectors of the government, the military, and the police. And it ensured that UNITA would voluntarily relinquish its armed forces and assume its legitimate role as an opposition political party.
The Lusaka Protocol and the efforts of the Angolan parties to fulfil their commitments were vital to peace in Angola, and UNAVEM III would form an integral part of that process, she said. However, there was disturbing news today that Jonas Savimbi was casting doubts on the Lusaka Protocol. The Council resolution stressed the need for a meeting between him and President dos Santos, without delay. That meeting had now become more critical.
She went on to emphasize that any deployment of infantry units in UNAVEM III could not proceed without the Secretary-General's report that the Lusaka Protocol was being effectively implemented. "Our message to all parties is very clear: don't blow it. Do the right thing for your people and for the future of your country." The resolution represented the international community's confidence in the Angolan people. She hoped that it would not be undermined by any of their leaders. The mandate of UNAVEM III was clear: to monitor disarmament and demobilization of combatants; assist military and police integration; and facilitate the incorporation of UNITA into the Angolan Government. When those objectives were achieved, UNAVEM III would end its mandate. All of that could be accomplished within two years. "We mean to hold the Angolan parties to their commitment to complete the process." The Secretary-General would inform the Council every month of progress in deploying UNAVEM III and in implementing the Lusaka Protocol. The Council intended to review the role of the United Nations in Angola if the cooperation required from the parties was not forthcoming.
Continuing, Ms. ALBRIGHT (United States) said the Lusaka Protocol clearly set out a timetable, on which the parties had already fallen more than a month behind. Both the Government and UNITA must furnish the United Nations with details concerning their respective forces, including number of men, composition and type of forces, type of equipment and specific location. But the parties were sometimes reluctant to carry out their agreements. That recalcitrance must end for, without the input and active cooperation of the parties, the peace-keeping effort could have no more success than past efforts, and it would not be sustained by the Council.
The United Nations presence must not become an excuse of failure to move forward, she continued. The initial mandate of the operation was for six months; then the Council would be in a position to review progress before reviewing the mandate. The Angolan Government had offered to help offset the cost of UNAVEM III by providing free or at cost petroleum, aircraft, and building, in addition to the usual waivers of customs duties and other fees. The resolution called for active exploration with both parties of substantial additional contributions to help cover the costs of peace-keeping. "It is fitting and fair that the rich natural resources of Angola be made available to support UNAVEM III", she said.
Lieutenant-General MOMPATI S. MERAFHE, Foreign Minister of Botswana and Council President, then made a statement on behalf of his country. He said the launching of UNAVEM III in the presence of African Ministers of Foreign Affairs was a clear indication of the importance attached to settling one of the most brutal and destructive conflicts in Africa. It was hoped that the parties would leave no stone unturned to ensure the success of UNAVEM III. No one wanted to hear of a UNAVEM IV. "This is Angola's last dance", he said.
It was painful to see the people of Angola fighting in a region that now enjoyed peace and stability. "We want Angola to be another political success following on the footsteps of South Africa, Malawi and Mozambique." Peace-keeping operations were by nature expensive and were prone to breakdowns. They cold be wasteful and consumed resources that could otherwise be used for economic and social development. For that reason, the Angolans must appreciate the importance of the operation's success. However, some members of the United Nations were certainly as responsible as the Angolans for the destruction endured by that country. They should now turn to assisting that country in reconstruction. The operation must not be tied down by too many conditionalities. Restraint and flexibility were required. Isolated and sporadic violations of the cease-fire must not be used as a pretext for the Mission's withdrawal.
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