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Liberia: WOA Update/Alert
Date Distributed (ymd): 960729
Washington Office on Africa
Update/Alert
July, 1996
After a resurgence of violence last spring, relative calm has returned to parts of the Liberian capital, Monrovia, over the past two months. The West African peacekeeping force has regained control over the city and armed factions loyal to different warlords have been separated.
However, the peace process which collapsed violently in April is not back on track. The humanitarian situation remains desperate. International involvement, whether from West African states or the broader international community, still falls far short of the measures necessary to curb the power of the warlords and open up space for Liberian civilians to reestablish a functioning society.
The United States and others are discussing the prospects of holding elections in Liberia before the end of the year. Liberian civic groups as well as outside observers, however, warn that meaningful elections are impossible unless the power of the warlords is effectively checked. They emphasize the need for disarmament and demobilization of the factional fighters, monitored by a more effective international military presence.
Since the April explosion of violence in Monrovia, the United States has kept open its embassy there and has taken a higher-profile role in the peace process. Washington has pledged an additional $30 million to the West African peacekeeping force, known as ECOMOG, to enable it to maintain minimum levels of stability so that longer-term peace efforts and humanitarian relief can go forward. The U.S. government has also stated strongly that the international community will isolate anyone taking governmental power in Liberia by force.
Despite these steps, the current level of international involvement remains insufficient. Without a higher level of engagement by the United States in particular, renewed peace efforts will be vulnerable to violent and repeated collapse.
To increase the chances of sustainable peace, diplomatic and humanitarian assistance must be accompanied by support for:
* An adequate international peacekeeping presence, to ensure disarmament of the factions. This may require an expanded United Nations force if ECOMOG proves incapable of the task;
* Sanctions to deter and restrict the international trading channels by which Liberian warlords exchange diamonds and other Liberian resources for arms;
* A greater voice for Liberian civilians at home and outside the country, such as by convening a broad national conference with international sponsorship and support.
Six Years of War
Liberia was founded in the early 19th century by African Americans who returned to Africa as settlers. Their descendants, known as Americo-Liberians, dominated the country's government for more than 150 years. Ties with the United States were close, with continuing high levels of aid and investment. In the 1960s and 1970s, Liberia received the highest per capita level of U.S. aid of any country on the African continent.
In 1980 the settler-dominated government was overthrown. Many Liberians hoped for reform and a shift of power to the indigenous 95% of the population. But military leader Samuel Doe bypassed grassroots opposition groups and ran a military dictatorship, favoring his own small ethnic group.
The United States provided massive support for the Doe regime in the 1980s, with a total of $402 million in aid between 1981 and 1985--more than during the entire previous century. At the time Liberia was a key staging post for a large-scale covert U.S. operation against Libya's Muammar Qaddafi. Washington continued its support for Doe despite documented human rights violations and a 1985 election widely seen to be marked by fraud and repression.
In late 1989 insurgents led by Charles Taylor crossed into Liberia from the Ivory Coast, beginning a war against the Doe regime. The conflict led to high levels of atrocities against civilians by Taylor's forces, the remnants of Doe's army, and as many as five other armed factions. Doe himself was killed by another rebel leader in September 1990.
Washington provided humanitarian aid--more than $425 million from 1990 through mid-1995. But former U.S. officials testify that they were instructed not to take an active role in peacemaking. The initiative for peacekeeping and peace negotiations was left to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with Nigeria playing a leading role.
The West African peace-keeping force arrived in late 1990, after the conflict was well under way. Its intervention has been flawed, but is generally credited with saving lives. West African governments meanwhile have supported continuing mediation efforts. The most recent is the Abuja accord of August 1995, which provided for an interim government involving all the warlords, and for the disarming and demobilization of their forces before elections this year.
The Abuja accord came after almost six years of war which killed as many as 150,000 out of a population of 2.6 million. Some 800,000 people fled the country as refugees, and more than a million were displaced from their homes within the country.
Accord Breaks Down
Implementation of the Abuja agreement depended on either the goodwill of the warlords or decisive international support for their disarmament. Neither materialized. Liberian civilians were kept out of the process, and the predictable breakdown came in April when warlord Charles Taylor decided to launch an attack in Monrovia against a rival force. Both sides had by then infiltrated armed forces into the capital, previously a relatively safe haven from the conflict in the countryside.
The fighting forced the evacuation of humanitarian relief agencies. Their supplies were looted by the warlords, who used the relief goods for military ends. In mid-June, 13 international agencies said they would not reestablish full operations in Liberia until minimal security can be assured.
Fighting has recently recurred in several other parts of the country. Despite the relative normalcy in the capital, Liberians say that off the main streets there is no security. Basic services, such as electricity and running water, are not available, and food is scarce. During June over 1,500 bodies were recovered by health workers from shallow graves.
The primary responsibility for the war over the last six years--and for the latest violence in Monrovia--lies with the leaders of the Liberian armed factions, who have put their personal quests for power above the desire of Liberians for peace. The record of the West African peacekeeping force, which brought some stability to parts of Liberia, has been mixed, and its failure to react when violence broke out in April contributed to the high level of destruction.
But the international community must also shoulder a large share of the blame. In the case of Liberia, with 150 years of close U.S. ties, "international community" means above all the United States. The U.S. failure to respond to the initial outbreak of war in 1989-1990 cost the lives of thousands of Liberians and close to $500 million in emergency aid.
When the latest peace agreement was signed, many observers warned that it was doomed to collapse without adequate international support for disarmament and demobilization of the militias and for the peacekeeping efforts of ECOMOG. That support did not come. This failure invited a costly humanitarian disaster and set the scene for the evacuation of U.S. citizens and many other foreign residents in April.
Giving Peace a Chance
The majority of Liberians want peace. But the chances of achieving it are slim unless the capacity of the warlords to make war is curbed.
Liberian civil leaders and traditional rulers, meeting with ECOWAS leaders in mid-July, urged strong international sanctions against faction leaders to enforce compliance with peace agreements. They stressed that ECOMOG should be empowered and provided with logistical support to enforce peace by disarming combatants, as a precondition to free elections.
The Liberian leaders also demanded that the international community impose sanctions on the export of Liberian natural resources by the warlords. "On no account should there be elections without first complete disarmament, encampment and integration of these combatants into the society," stated the chair of the Liberian Bar Association, Frederick Cherue.
In sum, three basic steps are needed if Liberian civilians are to have a chance to rebuild their society. The United States must play an active role in providing high-level and consistent diplomatic pressure and financial resources in support of the entire process.
(1) The international peacekeeping force already on the ground must be maintained and upgraded. West African states must continue to play a central role in peacemaking and peacekeeping, regardless of the shortcomings of their past involvement and doubts about the future. (Leadership of West African peacemaking efforts is shifting, as Ghana's President Jerry Rawlings ended his term as chair of ECOWAS in late July. His successor is General Sani Abacha, head of the Nigerian military regime.)
But the West African states do not have the diplomatic clout, the credibility, or the logistical resources to do the job entirely on their own. The ECOMOG force needs adequate logistical support. Its efforts also need to be supplemented by consistent backup and monitoring from the wider international community, including an expanded United Nations peacekeeping presence which can balance the West African role. (2) The peace process must be linked to plans for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants. Continued participation by faction leaders in the political process should be contingent on their cooperation with disarmament, as specified in the Abuja peace agreement. The warlords likely will only comply with such demands if action is taken to block the flow of arms. This includes strong and effective pressure on neighboring countries, particularly Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, to restrict the supplies of arms to the factions.
At the same time, disarmament will not be possible without simultaneous planning for demobilization. Successful reintegration of former combatants into civilian life in turn depends on the creation of economic opportunities within the civilian economy. Delay in planning these elements was one of the main reasons for the failure to disarm in the period since last fall. Such a comprehensive plan will be costly. But it is more practical--and, in the long term less expensive--than responding to repeated humanitarian emergencies.
(3) Steps must be taken to guarantee a more active role for civilian institutions in the transition. Last year's Abuja accord was praised by some and criticized by others for making the faction leaders the key players in the transitional government leading to elections. This could only work if prompt disarmament and international protection for civilians were implemented simultaneously.
The peace process should provide political space for the vast majority of unarmed Liberians and Liberian civic institutions. It must not be held hostage by any of the armed faction leaders. Unless new measures are taken to protect and encourage vibrant civilian political activity, the peace process will be again be doomed to fail.
What You Can Do
[Note to non-U.S. readers: This posting is provided both for your background information and for possible forwarding to those of your U.S. contacts you think would be interested.]
1. CONTACT THE ADMINISTRATION
Write to National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and to Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Urge that the United States increase its active engagement in the search for peace in Liberia. Talking points:
* The United States bears special responsibility for helping to resolve the situation in Liberia because of its historical ties to Liberia and U.S. aid to the Doe regime.
* Peace agreements cannot succeed without much more active international support for disarmament and demobilization of factional fighters, and for West African and international peacekeeping efforts. This requires sanctions to block the flow of arms to the warlords.
* Liberian civilian institutions must play a more active
role in the transition to a legitimate government.
Elections will only be meaningful if there is security
and a real opportunity for Liberian civilians, inside
and outside of Liberia, to have a greater voice.
Mr. Anthony Lake
National Security Council
Washington, DC 20500
Fax: (202) 456-2883
Secretary Warren Christopher
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC 20520
Fax: (202) 647-6434
2. CONTACT CONGRESS
Send copies of your messages to the Africa subcommittees
in Congress and to the Congressional Black Caucus.
Consider enclosing a short note thanking these members
of Congress for their efforts to focus attention on
the crisis in Liberia, and asking them to continue
to press the Administration for stronger action.
Addresses:
Sen. Nancy Kassebaum
Chair, Africa Subcommittee
302 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510
Fax: (202) 224-3514
Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
Chair, Africa Subcommittee
127 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
Fax: (202) 225-5620
Rep. Donald Payne
Chair, Congressional Black Caucus
417 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
Fax: (202) 225-4160
3. KEEP INFORMED
For updates on the situation in Liberia, contact Ezekiel
Pajibo, Africa Faith and Justice Network, 401 Michigan
Ave. NE, Washington, DC 20017. Tel. (202) 832-3412.
Fax (202) 832-9051. E-mail: afjn@igc.apc.org.
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Message-Id: <199607291424.HAA26294@igc3.igc.apc.org> From: "WOA" <woa@igc.apc.org> Date: Mon, 29 Jul 1996 10:21:41 -0500 Subject: Liberia: WOA Update/Alert
Editor: Ali B. Ali-Dinar
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