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Liberia: WOA Letter to Clinton
Date Distributed (ymd): 960429
April 26, 1996
President William Jefferson Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500
Dear Mr. President:
We are writing to join our voice to those of the many Liberians and friends of Liberia who are urging sustained and energetic US involvement in restoring the prospects for peace desired by the vast majority of Liberians.
We applaud your recent decision to allocate an additional $30 million to the West African peacekeeping force (ECOMOG) to enable it to maintain a level of stability sufficient to permit longer-term peace efforts, as well as urgent humanitarian relief, to take place. And we welcome the assurance that the US will isolate anyone taking governmental power in Liberia by force. However, our consultations with colleagues in the churches and other organizations, both with Liberians and others familiar with that country, convince us that this alone is certain to be insufficient. Without a higher level of US engagement, renewed peace efforts will be vulnerable to violent and perpetual collapse.
The primary responsibility for the war over the last six years--and for the latest violence in Monrovia--lies with the leaders of the Liberian armed factions, who have put their personal quests for power above the desire of Liberians for peace. The record of the West African peacekeeping force, which brought some stability to parts of Liberia, has been mixed, and its failure to react when violence broke out early this month was a proximate cause of the high level of destruction.
But the international community must also shoulder a large share of the blame for the current disaster. And in the case of Liberia, with 150 years of close US ties, "international community" means above all the United States. The US failure to respond to the initial outbreak of war in 1989-1990 cost the lives of thousands of Liberians and consumed close to $500 million in emergency aid. Many observers warned that the latest peace agreement was doomed to collapse without adequate international support for disarmament of the militias and for the peacekeeping efforts of ECOMOG. That support did not come--a failure which invited a costly humanitarian disaster and set the scene for the evacuation of US citizens and many other foreign residents earlier this month.
It would be an unacceptable betrayal of our moral values and abdication of leadership for the US simply to walk away. But half-hearted efforts to assist are highly likely to sow the seeds of repeated failure. Our response must be thoughtful, holistic, and effective. Liberians, other Africans, and the rest of the world are looking to the US for leadership.
We do not venture to suggest the details of what needs to be done. But there are several points that stand out as indispensable:
(1)West African states must continue to play a central role in peacemaking and peacekeeping, regardless of the shortcomings of their past involvement. While Liberians want peace, they are at the mercy of small armed factions. West African nations are willing to provide the security necessary for Liberians to survive and to rebuild their country. But these states on their own do not have the diplomatic clout, the credibility, or, above all, the logistical resources to do the job.
It follows that:
(a) The US must continue energetic and consistent engagement in the diplomatic process and be willing to demonstrate its urgent concern. Africans and friends of Africa perceive a double-standard in the disproportionate attention which the US government appears to devote to crises in Europe and the Middle East as compared with equally serious ones in Africa.
(b) The US must provide promptly the necessary material means for ECOMOG to be an effective peacekeeping, and, if necessary, peace enforcing presence. We understand that adequate ECOMOG engagement may entail costs as high as $12 million a month over several years, for which the US would have to take primary responsibility.
(2)There is need both for immediate action and for long-term engagement. Even if the latest cease-fire holds, humanitarian agencies cannot return without some assurance that they will not need a new rescue operations a few weeks or months later. And that means the rapid reestablishment of a safe haven in Monrovia. At the same time, however, the longer-term peace process needs to be restarted, restructured and provided with adequate international resources to give it a real chance of success.
Among the implications:
(a) ECOMOG must be the primary force for interim stability, first of all in Monrovia. But the US must take a proactive role in directly and immediately supplying the necessary means for it to do so. We recognize that, in practice, this may mean the need to use the US troops already on the scene, in well-defined roles to deliver logistical and communications supplies to ECOMOG. Improvements in ECOMOG performance are imperative. But for that to happen, the support must be forthcoming without delay. It is essential to avoid the lengthy delays that have sometimes accompanied earlier supplies of equipment for African peacekeepers, both in Liberia and in the case of Rwanda in 1994.
(b) Before Liberians themselves can maintain peace without the presence of an outside force, a number of steps must take place, including the disarmament of factions, the election and installation of a legitimate civilian government, and the training of at least minimal Liberian security forces, primarily police. The ECOMOG presence must be guaranteed for the minimum one to two years that such a process could entail. During this period the US should help ECOMOG to maintain adequate force and equipment levels and to achieve greater professionalism. At the same time, the US should encourage diversity within ECOMOG, facilitating the involvement of all willing West African states.
(3)In order to succeed, the peace process must be linked to plans for demobilization and reintegration of combatants, must provide political space for the vast majority of unarmed Liberians and civil society institutions, and must not be held hostage by any of the leaders of armed factions. The US must play an active role in providing high-level and consistent diplomatic pressure and financial resources in support of each of these prerequisites.
Among the implications:
(a) Continued participation by faction leaders in the political process should be contingent on their cooperation with disarmament. To prevent the leaders of armed factions from holding the process hostage they must be disarmed as specified in the Abuja peace agreement. This action should be accompanied by strong and effective pressure on neighboring countries, particularly Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Guinea, to restrict the supply of arms to the factions.
(b) Disarmament of the factions will not be possible without simultaneous planning for demobilization and reintegration of combatants and restoration of civilian economic opportunities. Delays in planning these elements were one of the critical reasons for the failure to disarm in the period since last fall. Such a comprehensive plan will be costly. But it is more practical--and, in the long term less costly--than responding to repeated humanitarian emergencies.
(c) Additional steps must be taken to guarantee a much more active role for civilian institutions in the transition process. Last year's Abuja peace agreement was heralded by some and criticized by others for making the faction leaders the key players in the transitional government leading to elections. This process can only work if prompt disarmament and international protection for civilians is implemented simultaneously. Unless new adjustments in the next phase create space for civilian political activity, the peace process will again be doomed to collapse. In closing, we would like again to thank you for your recent decision to provide more support for ECOMOG and for the clear stand taken by the Twaddell delegation to Monrovia against any effort by the armed faction leaders to seize power. We know that in practice it will be difficult to implement the necessary high-level US commitment to promote peace in Liberia. We urge you to stay the course.
Sincerely,
Dan Hoffman, President
Imani Countess, Executive Director
cc: Anthony Lake, Warren Christopher, Susan Rice, Brian
Atwood, George Moose, Vincent Kern, John Hick
************************************************************
Message-Id: <199604291448.HAA12379@igc3.igc.apc.org>
From: "Washington Office on Africa" <woa@igc.apc.org>
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 1996 10:46:44 -0500 Subject:
Liberia: WOA Letter to Clinton
Editor: Ali B. Ali-Dinar
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