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Angola: Peace Process, 1
Date Distributed (ymd): 960328
From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success Position Paper, March 1996
Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA) * Holland Committee on Southern Africa (KZA) * Washington Office on Africa (WOA)
Since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994, Angolans have been living between war and peace. They are grateful for the cease-fire and peace process that ended the previous two years of unrestrained conflict. But they are concerned at repeated delays in implementation of the agreement. Despite many reasons for hope that things will be different, the specter of 1992, when UNITA's leaders plunged the country into war after rejecting the results of the internationally monitored September election, has not yet been exorcised.
Signs of hope include the higher level of UN engagement than in 1992, the high-level and energetic attention to the process evidenced in recent U.S. policy, the willingness of donors in Europe and elsewhere to provide funding for necessary reconstruction projects, and the recent momentum gained by the Angolan government's flexibility on several disputed points and the quartering of the first substantial number of UNITA troops. The UN Security Council's extension of the mandate for only three months on February 8 imposes pressure for substantial additional progress. The March 1 summit meeting in Libreville, Gabon between Angolan President Jos, Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi produced new commitments to advance on both military and political provisions, including scheduling UNITA's entry into a new government of unity and national reconciliation in June or July.
The prospect of new pretexts for delay, however, is still significant. The agenda includes not only completion of the quartering of UNITA troops, but also many other critical issues yet to be implemented, including demobilization or integration into the national army of quartered troops, integration of UNITA recruits into the police, and incorporation of UNITA into agreed posts in the national government. UNITA has raised questions about the legitimacy of the national assembly after November 1996, when its initial four-year mandate will have passed. Full implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, originally envisaged to be completed with UN assistance by February 1997, is far behind schedule. The engagement of Angolan civil society in the peace process is weak. The right to freedom of movement, particularly in UNITA-controlled areas, is systematically violated, without an effective response from the international community. And, despite large-scale international commitments of humantarian and reconstruction aid, the prospects for quick implementation of sustainable projects for reconstruction which could give additional momentum to peaceful activities are still hampered by government incapacity, UNITA fears of losing control over their population base, and the lack of sufficient local knowledge and problems of coordination among newly arrived agencies.
There is a danger that well-intentioned "best-case" thinking could inadvertently sweep under the carpet serious obstacles that could impose new delays or even sabotage the process entirely. Speaking to Inter Press Service correspondent Chris Simpson after the Libreville summit, a 'senior diamond industry source' familiar with the volatile situation in Angola's northeast complained, "It's dangerous as hell out there and the U.N. doesn't want to know. They're making exactly the same mistakes they made in 1992" when the earlier peace pact fell apart.
Despite the increase in international involvement, the low profile of African issues in general has meant that recent discussion of policy options on Angola has only sporadically entered the public debate in foreign countries with key roles in the process. Both within Angola and with respect to the bilateral and multilateral agencies involved, the public has not been adequately engaged in dialogue with policy-makers and other officials responsible for the details of implementation.
The policy framework that follows is intended as a contribution to a wider public debate. It is addressed in part to those, both Angolans and non-Angolans, who have direct official responsibility in the peace process--in the Angolan government, UNITA, the United Nations and the "troika" of the U.S., Russia and Portugal. But it is also aimed at all others interested in increasing the chances of success in that process--Angolan and non-Angolan civil society actors including non-governmental organizations, businessmen and others, whether currently involved in Angola or contemplating such involvement.
The statement originated with the Washington Office on Africa (WOA) in the U.S. and Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA) in the U.K., the successor organization to the British Anti- Apartheid Movement, and is endorsed by the Holland Committee on Southern Africa (KZA). These groups do not have direct organizational responsibility in Angola, but each has long been engaged in public advocacy concerning the Angolan crisis, in all its stages from the period of resistance against Portuguese colonialism through the present. It reflects insights from recent visits to Angola by William Minter, Senior Research Fellow at WOA's affiliate Africa Policy Information Center and by Ben Jackson, the Director of ACTSA, as well as consultation with other groups and individuals concerned with the peace process. The statement assumes familiarity with general background information, for which a short list of suggested sources is attached. The statement is not intended as a comprehensive plan or set of recommendations for those involved in the process on a day-to-day basis, but rather guidelines which in our judgement all parties need to consider in order to increase the chances of success. In many cases, while implementation depends primarily on the official actors, others may be able to think of creative small steps which could aid, if only in a small way, in moving the process forward.
In the last two months there has been significant renewed momentum in implementing the latest peace agreement signed almost a year and a half ago in Lusaka. But on the ground Angolans are still suspended between war and peace, hoping against hope for success while still fearful that their hopes might be dashed as they were so brutally after the orderly, transparent and internationally recognized elections in September 1992. We think it urgent that the international community continue to press for completion of the peace process, which will then give Angolans of all political persuasions the opportunity to engage fully in what will be a much more extended process of building sustainable democratic institutions and reconstructing their country. Recent advances are encouraging, but it would be a serious mistake to regard the process as already irreversible or to play down the many obstacles still to be overcome.
In Angola, the term "esquema" refers to the ingenious, creative and often devious "schemes" individuals are forced to find to survive and, in the case of a few, to enrich themselves. In order for the peace process to succeed, both Angolans and their friends, official and non-official, will have to discover large- and small-scale "esquemas" for peace.
We are much encouraged by recent initiatives by the U.S. and the international community in general to move the process along. But we are also concerned that the chances be minimized for repeating the mistakes of the past, in which the U.S. government often disregarded African and non-governmental views to pursue its unilateral agenda in Angola, and in which multilateral agencies found themselves unprepared to respond to predictable breakdowns in earlier peace processes. Members of the UN Security Council in particular, and major contributors to reconstruction such as the European Community, need to continue high-level involvement in maintaining the peace momentum as well as in implementation of particular projects.
The specific policy recommendations contained in this statement are necessarily illustrative and suggestive rather than comprehensive. What will count most heavily for peace in Angola is what is done on the spot day-by-day. But it also requires sustained international attention to the substantive issues at stake, and open debate on what measures can most increase the chances for peace. It is in that spirit that we present the following guidelines.
Guidelines for Increasing the Chances for Peace
(1) Maintain Momentum on Multiple Fronts.
Since January there has been significant momentum in moving the peace process along, culminating in intense pressure on UNITA to move its troops to the agreed quartering areas. Although UNITA did not fulfill the pledge by its leader Jonas Savimbi to have 16,500 troops quartered before the February 8 United Nations Security Council meeting, by March 6 the number registered at the four quartering areas had reached 16,985, while the number of weapons turned in at the camps added up to 14,485. The Security Council extended the UNAVEM mandate for three months, until May 8, instead of the expected six months, and explicitly called on UNITA to complete quartering of their troops within this time period.
Given past experience, there is no chance that this will happen without continued intense outside pressure. According to the Lusaka Protocol, the next steps--selection of UNITA troops to join the national army and demobilization of excess forces--will not begin until the quartering process is completed. However, it is extremely unlikely that all the forces can in fact be quartered without simultaneous progress on integration into the national army, implementation of UNITA's agreed-on participation in the political process, and other confidence-building measures. The declared total of 62,500 UNITA military personnel to be quartered is possibly an overestimate, but the pace will have to quicken even to quarter a more modest figure of 45,000 to 50,000.
If pressure to complete the quartering is not combined with measures to advance on other fronts, and attention focuses primarily on the numbers game of how many have been quartered, there are likely to be significant additional delays as well as increased chances of cease-fire violations and other incidents provoked by idle soldiers in the quartering areas.
Other issues mentioned in the Security Council resolution of February 8 include calls to UNITA to release its remaining prisoners, as the government has already done, and calls to both parties, but in particular UNITA, to implement freedom of movement of people and goods and to cooperate fully with humanitarian organizations. Given the natural tendency to concentrate on the more easily quantified issue of the number of troops quartered, these points need additional attention and high-profile pressure, just as in January and February high-profile pressure was focused on the quartering exercise.
It is also critical that plans move forward as rapidly as possible on the specifically military issues of integration into the national army, demobilization and integration into the police of the agreed UNITA recruits. Because of previous delays and ongoing discussions among the parties involved, the Lusaka Protocol has in practice been repeatedly amended since it was signed in November 1994. Instead of waiting until after the full completion of the quartering process, as the letter of the protocol implies, every effort should be made to move ahead with the next steps for the soldiers already in the camps, which would also free up resources for dealing with newcomers as they arrive. It is particularly important that details be finalized on the movement of UNITA generals into posts in the national army, so that they can accept joint responsibility for implementation of the remainder of the peace process from within rather than as commanders of a separate military force. It has also been evident that one of the flash points for incidents and for human rights violations is the practice of cattle rustling in the "neutral zones" separating government and UNITA forces. Off-duty soldiers of both sides, as well as free-lance bandits, have stolen cattle from civilians, leading to incidents of violence against civilians or clashes between the two armies. Until these areas are patrolled by forces which include recruits from UNITA as well as the existing government army, any government actions against banditry can easily turn into confrontations with UNITA.
(2) Increase Transparency and Involve Civil Society.
Discussion to date on these issues has tended to focus on the United Nations proposal to set up a UN radio, and on the difficult situation faced by an independent press sector facing both its own institutional weaknesses and opposition by some forces in the Angolan government to greater openness and freedom of the press. Irrespective of the resolution or non- resolution of these issues, however, the fact is that large numbers of Angolans are traumatized, suspicious and mistrustful, based on their previous experiences of repression and lack of transparency. They are particularly marked by the false dawn of the 1992 election, which was followed by greater violence than in the previous decades of war. The fear to speak out and participate is not dissipated easily, particularly since their fear that the international community may abandon them to their fate in the case of failure is a fully rational response.
Establishing public confidence in the process cannot be the task alone of the Angolan press. There are measures that the national and international parties involved in the process can take to alleviate this lack of public confidence. But since all the institutions involved--multilateral organizations and foreign diplomats as well as Angolan political institutions-- have well-established traditions of lack of transparency, this will require significant breaks with past practices.
The best way to illustrate this point is with a specific example. Considerable doubts have been raised, in the Angolan press and in private comments by Angolan government officials and others in Luanda, about the "quality" of the quartering of UNITA troops to date. Talk is widespread about "child soldiers" and obsolete weapons. Suspicion is widely voiced in private, among UN officials as well as Angolans, that many of those quartered are actually civilians or untrained militia rather than soldiers. The number as well as the quality of arms turned in does not correspond to the number of soldiers. These are serious issues which cannot be glossed over. While resolution of these points depends primarily on sustained attention within the Joint Commission involving all the parties, public confidence could be enhanced by more open dissemination of data, on such points as age ranges, types of weapons, and percent of weapons that are good, that is already agreed on among the parties.
The data collected and accepted by the parties in the Joint Commission is so far not sufficient to resolve all these questions, and is undoubtedly being supplemented by intelligence data collected separately by the parties. But from the data submitted to the commission, on the basis of birthdates collected by UN registrars, the widespread talk of "child soldiers," for example, does seems to be exaggerated, facilitated by a confusion between children (under 15) and youth (15-17). Public release of such data could aid in confidence building by reducing if not eliminating unnecessary suspicion.
Once such raw data is agreed on by the parties at the Joint Commission, including the Angolan government, UNITA, UN, the troika of the U.S., Russia and Portugal, there seems no valid reason, apart from bureaucratic traditions of lack of transparency, that they should not be published in full in the Angolan press and made freely available to all those interested in the process. This would promote a more informed public debate, alleviate artificial uncertainties and allow a more precise focus on the genuine points of doubt, such as missing weapons and the level of training of quartered troops as compared with those not yet quartered.
Angolan and international NGOS could facilitate the broad dissemination of such information, through organizational channels, word of mouth, publications and electronic means, thus facilitating the confidence building process and aiding in the formation of informed public opinion to which the official parties might hopefully feel some pressures to respond.
(continued in part 2)
ACTSA, 28 Penton Street, London N1 9SA, UK
Tel: +44 171 833 3133; fax: +44 171 837 3001;
e-mail: actsa@geo2.poptel.org.uk.
Holland Committee on Southern Africa (KZA),
Oudezijdsachterburgwal 173, 1012 DJ, Amsterdam, The
Netherlands. Tel: +31-20-6270801, fax: +31-20-6270441,
e-
mail: kza@kza.antenna.nl.
Washington Office on Africa (WOA), 110 Maryland Ave.
NE #509,
Washington, DC 20010. Tel: 202-546-7961; fax: 202-546-1545;
e-mail: woa@igc.apc.org.
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Angola: Peace Process, 2
Date Distributed (ymd): 960328
>From War to Peace in Angola: Increasing the Chances of Success Position Paper, March 1996
Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA) * Holland Committee on Southern Africa (KZA) * Washington Office on Africa (WOA)
(continued from part 1)
(3) Be Prepared for Failure.
Perhaps the most disturbing remaining parallel to the fiasco of return to war in 1992 is the apparent reliance on "best- case" scenarios, at least in the public statements of the international actors involved in the process. Whether or not it is appropriate to keep "worst-case" scenarios private, for the purpose of lowering the temperature of the rhetoric and not inflaming the process with threats, it would be a serious error to neglect contingency plans for the event of either a return to war or indefinite delays on the part of one party. In 1992, the international community (and indeed the Angolan government) did not take seriously UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi's warnings that he would take an election loss as a priori proof of fraud, and deliberately turned a blind eye to the fact that the UNITA army had been kept virtually intact while the government army had been reduced to a shadow of its previous strength.
While there have been and continue to be a variety of obstacles on both sides to implementation of peace, rooted in mistrust or practical political or administrative incapacity, the fundamental doubt continues to be whether the leadership of UNITA has the will to abandon its reliance on military strength (i.e. a separate army) and take its chances in the political arena, as both the 1991 and 1994 peace agreements demand. Most Angolans, as well as those of us who have followed events in Angola over a long period of time, tend to be more skeptical about new promises made at summits than many diplomatic optimists coming to Angola from other experiences. Hopefully, this time the optimists will prove right, and our doubts shown to have been unfounded. But the question is what combination of carrots, sticks and diplomatic initiatives will increase the chances of a positive answer to that question.
Recent movement is encouraging, and all parties should be congratulated for the stepped-up pace of implementation in January and February. But if the process should stall again-- and again--the question of the potential alternative--the stick or threat of the stick--is unavoidable. And it should be thought out in advance. The explicit threat made by the international community is obvious--walking away, terminating the UNAVEM mandate and letting the Angolan parties resolve the issue by--at the extreme--a return to war. Such a threat does put pressure on all who favor completing the peace process over the alternatives of war or an indefinite state of neither war nor peace. But its effectiveness as pressure on the leadership of UNITA in particular depends directly on other factors--namely, the extent to which the military balance continues tilted against them, and whether they think that in the final analysis the international community will support the elected Angolan government.
Every effort should be made to complete the process peacefully. But just as signing the Lusaka Protocol in 1994 only resulted from significant military advances by the Angolan government, so its implementation depends on the credible threat of resuming those advances, with the endorsement if not the active support of the international community. The more credible that threat, the less likely it is that it will have to be implemented.
Two distinct conclusions follow directly, which are difficult but necessary to combine in practice. One is that restraint and flexibility on the part of all parties is needed not only to move the process along but also so that if it does finally break down it will be very clear where the responsibility lies. Thus, early this year, Angolan government withdrawal of foreign military advisors and rapid implementation of the quartering of the Rapid Intervention Police aided in increasing pressure on UNITA to begin quartering significant numbers of their troops in February. On the other hand, any such move must be considered carefully in terms of its implications on the military balance. The Angolan government is understandably wary of repeating its mistake in 1992 of letting down its guard and trusting too much in the good faith of its opponent and in international rewards for an election victory.
The international community should avoid the fallacy that "evenhandedness" is always appropriate or the stance most conducive to peace. Objectivity is certainly appropriate in identifying and condemning violations of the accord or delays by either party. There can be no blanket endorsement of either side, in a confused situation of mistrust which requires patient confidence building and careful checking of a flood of conflicting reports. But it would be foolish and contrary to the facts not to recognize that the will to implement the accord is still most doubtful on the side of UNITA-- particularly when it comes to the critical points of integrating its military forces and surrendering the dictatorial control which it exercises over the population in the zones it occupies. The government is also the elected and recognized authority in the country, and the Lusaka Protocol mandates integration of UNITA into government military and political structures, not the formation of new structures on an equal basis.
That is why we think that proposals for an arms embargo on both sides, such as recently suggested recently by Human Rights Watch/Africa, however good intentioned, are mistaken. Such a move, if seriously implemented, would tend to increase the chances for war rather than for peace. Calls for restraint on both sides--whether in response to provocative incidents or in terms of new build-ups of military strength--are indeed appropriate. We also agree with HRW/Africa's call for transparency in arms sales, particularly if it is applied with equal weight to Zaire. But planning for a renewed embargo should focus on direct or indirect measures to squeeze the supply of weaponry which UNITA obtains through Zaire in exchange for diamonds. While all arms traffic is hard to trace, those purchased by the government and entering through Angolan ports are probably easier to identify that those moving to UNITA illegally through Angola's northern neighbors. In short, in this respect as in others, international and public pressure on both former belligerents is needed. But instead of being balanced equally, it should be proportional to the status of the parties as elected government and opposition force, and to the extent of the obstacles placed by either side to implementation of the agreed peace process.
(4) Make Haste Slowly.
While those directly and officially involved in the peace process must find the ways to go ahead on the principal agenda, a host of other efforts, in humanitarian aid, planning and beginning reconstruction, and private as well as public investment in economic recovery and transforming government structures are either under way or under consideration. The long-term success of these efforts depends on the peace process. It is equally true, however, that short-term advances on these fronts can increase confidence in the prospects for peace and add to the incentives for former belligerents and other Angolans alike to invest energy in peaceful activities.
The details of these issues--including economic reform, infrastructure development, demining, reform of government institutions--are beyond the scope of this statement. But two points are very clear. On the one hand, major changes are absolutely necessary in Angolan institutions. On the other, no simple transplant of international models, without sensitive attention to local Angolan realities, will be sustainable. As in the peace process in the more narrow sense, Angolan ownership of the process of reconstruction is essential if it is to work. This means that urgency to implement specific projects must be combined not only with training but also with dialogue and open debate.
The quantity of international resources coming into the country to support peace and reconstruction, or into specific projects, as measured in dollars, is undoubtedly important. Even more important, however, will be the quality of the planning and implementation. The test for any project and program will be whether it successfully combines international expertise and resources with Angolan perspectives and knowledge of the local reality, and whether it balances the urgent need for quick impact with the equally decisive imperative that there be some lasting result.
It is important to recognize that, in overwhelming numbers, Angolans survive not on charity or or on food handouts, but on their own individual and collective survival strategies. In many cases poorly funded initiatives by Angolan non- governmental organizations have proved more effective than much more expensive efforts mounted by foreign governmental or non-governmental agencies newly arrived in the country and lacking local expertise. Respect for these strategies should be a fundamental pillar of aid strategies from the international community. Yet, in some cases, there has been little effort to engage in dialogue with Angolans engaged in such efforts.
The international community should be congratulated for its support for both relief and recontruction efforts. These resources are a vital support for the peace process. But it is essential that those involved in such projects make every effort to learn from as well as work with their Angolan colleagues in civic society as well in governmental positions. Despite the sincere desire for improved relations on both sides, the lack of mutual understanding stemming from different cultural realities as well as decades of non-contact and political hostility is still profound. Sustainable cooperation efforts, in support of the current peace process and of improved bilateral relations in many sectors, must take this previous history into account. It is also essential that mechanisms be developed for evaluation of the success of projects implemented by international agencies and foreign non-governmental organizations, including not only internal review but also eliciting feedback and evaluation from Angolan civil society. Selected Sources for Background Information:
(1) Periodic reports of the United Nations Secretary General to the Security Council are available on-line on the APC computer networks in the conference unic.news and on the World Wide Web at the URL: gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/11/uncurr (2) The Angola Peace Monitor is published by Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA) in London. It is also available on the World Wide Web at http://www.anc.org.za/angola/apmintro.html.
(3) Angola: Country Profile (March 1995) is available from APIC (same address as WOA, below). A text-only version is available on the WWW at http://www.igc.apc.org/apic/index.shtml.
(4) Washington Notes on Africa, "A Second Try at Peace in Angola: Have the Right Lessons Been Learned?" June 1995. Available from WOA.
(5) ADRA monthly chronicle, in Portuguese and English. From Action for Rural Development and the Environment (ADRA), P.O. Box 3788, Luanda, Angola. Tel: 244-2-395132; fax: 244-2- 396683; e-mail: adra@angonet.gn.apc.org.
(6) Human Rights Watch Arms Project & Human Rights Watch/Africa, Angola: Between War and Peace, Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses since the Lusaka Protocol. February 1996. HRW, 1522 K St. NW, Suite 910, Washington, DC 20005. Tel: 202-371-6592; fax: 202-371-0124.
ACTSA, 28 Penton Street, London N1 9SA, UK Tel: +44 171 833 3133; fax: +44 171 837 3001; e-mail: actsa@geo2.poptel.org.uk.
Holland Committee on Southern Africa (KZA), Oudezijdsachterburgwal 173, 1012 DJ, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Tel: +31-20-6270801, fax: +31-20-6270441, e- mail: kza@kza.antenna.nl.
Washington Office on Africa (WOA), 110 Maryland Ave. NE #509, Washington, DC 20010. Tel: 202-546-7961; fax: 202-546-1545; e-mail: woa@igc.apc.org.
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Message-Id: <199603281517.HAA13704@igc3.igc.apc.org>
From: "Washington Office on Africa" <woa@igc.apc.org>
Date: Thu, 28 Mar 1996 10:10:06 -0500
Subject: Angola: Peace Process, 1
Editor: Ali B. Ali-Dinar
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