| UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA - AFRICAN STUDIES CENTER |
Nigeria: Sanctions Need New Push
Date Distributed (ymd): 960324
After the Nigerian military regime hanged environmental and human rights leader Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other activists on Nov. 10, 1995, there was a wave of protest around the world. Hundreds of organizations spoke up to denounce the execution of Saro-Wiwa, a leader of the Ogoni people in the Niger delta. The international campaign in support of the democracy movement in Nigeria took on significant momentum.
Even before the executions, the United States and other governments criticized the Nigerian regime, cut off aid, restricted arms sales, and imposed visa restrictions on Nigerian officials. After the executions, the U.S. and other foreign ambassadors were withdrawn from Nigeria in protest, previous sanctions somewhat strengthened and stronger actions threatened. President Nelson Mandela of South Africa, who had also invested his prestige in "quiet diplomacy," led a successful move to suspend Nigeria from the Commonwealth and called for oil sanctions.
Oil sanctions have been endorsed by a wide range of individuals and organizations, including Nobel Prize winners Wole Soyinka and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Human Rights Watch, Greenpeace, the Sierra Club, the AFL-CIO, TransAfrica, the Washington Office on Africa, and many other international and Nigerian groups. But governments have been reluctant to take stronger sanctions, particularly any affecting Nigeria's oil exports.
Bills introduced in the U.S. Senate by Sen. Kassebaum (R-Kan.) and in the House by Rep. Payne (D-N.J.) fall short of comprehensive sanctions. But they do include new measures that go beyond the Administration's actions to date, including a ban on all new U.S. investment in Nigeria and a freeze on the personal assets of top officials of the Nigerian regime. After an extensive policy review, the Clinton administration in early March floated a trial balloon of similar measures. But reaction from European countries has been negative. And the quiet return of ambassadors to Nigeria, including the U.S. and South Africa, has given the impression of a trend to lessen rather than increase public pressure.
Meanwhile Congress is focused on domestic issues, and Nigeria has faded from the news. The momentum for stronger action from either the administration or Congress will continue to drop unless the Nigerian regime adds new well-publicized provocations or the pro-democracy movement succeeds in escalating protests. If the United States is to give more than lip-service support to Nigerians seeking democracy for their country, sustained public pressure is essential.
Background to the Crisis
Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has alternated between short periods of intense civilian political competition and longer stretches under military rule. Military governments ruled from 1966 to 1979, and from 1984 to the present.
Under British rule, Nigeria was divided administratively into three geographical areas: the north, predominantly Muslim and Hausa-speaking; the southeast, predominantly Christian and identified with the Igbo-speaking ethnic group; and the southwest, also predominantly Christian and largely Yoruba-speaking.
Between 1967 and 1970, Nigeria fought a civil war over the secession of the eastern region, called Biafra. Despite intense ethnic polarization and perhaps as many as one million killed during the war, the winning federal government followed a policy of non-retribution. Subsequent division of Nigeria into smaller states produced larger representation for ethnic groups other than the big three.
While political competition often paralleled ethnic and regional divisions, there were also many cross-cutting divisions and alliances based on distinctions between civilian and military, rich and poor, and a host of other factors. A wide array of groups--private business, communications media, labor unions, professional associations, religious bodies, and a literary scene with world-renowned authors--built solid foundations for democratic culture and a vibrant civil society.
Military Rejection of Democracy
In 1987 President Ibrahim Babangida, who came to power in a 1985 coup, officially began a program of transition to civilian rule. After many delays, it culminated in presidential elections in June 1993.
The electoral system imposed two political parties created by the military: the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Both parties chose wealthy Muslim businessmen to run for president. The NRC candidate was Bashir Tofa, from northern Nigeria; Chief Moshood Abiola, from the southwest, was the candidate for the SDP. Although both had been approved by the military, Abiola, a flamboyant media magnate and philanthropist, was seen as potentially more independent.
Abiola won majorities in 22 of Nigeria's 31 states. Even in the north, he won 43% of the vote, including majorities in four of the 11 northern states. Northern feudal leaders and sections of the military feared loss of their power. President Babangida refused to allow official announcement of the vote count and annulled the results, alleging that the candidates had been buying votes.
Protests followed, in which the army killed more than 150 demonstrators, finally leading Babangida to resign. He installed his own civilian caretaker, Ernest Shonekan, who was in turn deposed by General Sani Abacha, a high-ranking member of the previous military regime.
The new regime removed previously elected national and state legislatures and civilian state governments and banned all political activity. Since General Abacha took power in November 1993, human rights abuses by the regime have increased and have been met with escalating protests.
In June 1994, shortly before the first anniversary of the election, Chief Abiola proclaimed himself president. He was promptly arrested and put on trial for treason. Hundreds of other opposition figures and activists have also been arrested or harassed, and some have been mistreated in prison. Although some have been released after periods of detention, most have not.
The military has tried to portray the pro-democracy forces as simply ethnic compatriots and supporters of Abiola from the Yoruba-speaking southwest. But the campaign is in fact much wider, and includes Nigerians of all ethnic groups and religions. Almost all stress that their priority is support for the democratic process as such, not the political fortunes of one man.
The campaign includes human rights groups which have long been active in demanding electoral democracy and respect for civil rights. Although Abiola is a Muslim, both Catholic and Protestant church groups have made statements calling for the results of the June 1993 elections to be honored. National organizations representing Nigeria's doctors, university teachers and staff, and students have actively pressed for the release of political prisoners and recognition of the election results.
The Campaign for Democracy, which spearheaded the demonstrations leading to Babangida's resignation, is the largest coalition of independent pro-democracy groups inside the country. A National Democratic Coalition, meanwhile, was formed in May 1994 by political figures opposed to the regime, including many elected officials dismissed from their posts.
In 1994, Nigeria's oil worker unions went out on strike, including among their demands a hand-over of government to the civilian winner of the June 1993 election. Oil accounts for over 80% of Nigeria's export earnings, and the strike was extremely effective for two months. The military eventually broke the strike, arresting key officials and suspending the leadership of the two oil unions and the Nigerian Labor Congress.
Intensified Repression
In October 1995, General Abacha announced a new three-year program of transition to civilian rule and commuted death sentences for some 40 opponents of the government in prison for allegedly planning a coup. The regime sought to portray its opponents as unpatriotic and their international supporters as mounting a campaign against Nigeria as a country. And it continued the well-worn strategy of buying out some opposition figures while harassing or forcing others into exile.
Legal maneuvers or international pressure sometimes forced the regime to reverse its steps. But newspapers with bans lifted after promises of self-censorship still had to fear arson, confiscation of published papers, and attacks on journalists. Human rights activists who managed to get out on bail could expect to be redetained at any moment. And even world-famous figures such as Nobel Prize-winning writer Wole Soyinka were forced to flee into exile. Former head of state General Olusegun Obasanjo, who handed over power peacefully to civilian rule in 1979 and subsequently made an international reputation as a statesman, was arrested in March 1995. He remains in prison along with others sentenced by a military tribunal for alleged involvement in a coup attempt.
In November, finally, came the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his colleagues. The hangings capped years of protest by Saro-Wiwa's movement against environmental degradation of Ogoni land by multinational oil companies, particularly Shell Oil. According to Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and other human rights organizations, the military tribunal which tried Saro-Wiwa on charges of instigating the murder of four Ogoni leaders was marked by torture of witnesses and other abuses. The nine activists were executed despite appeals for clemency from many world leaders.
Since then, the regime, apparently impervious to the wave of international criticism, has continued on its course. It has consistently rejected demands to release political prisoners, and in February this year refused to consider a proposal by the National Democratic Coalition for an alternative one-year transition to civilian rule. The Coalition's plan includes release of presidential election winner Abiola, the creation of a transitional government of national unity, and the calling of a sovereign national conference to draft a new constitution.
Local elections the regime claims are a first step to democracy were held last week. They have been dismissed by pro-democracy advocates, given the failure to release political prisoners and the fact that those elected may be dismissed at will by the head of state.
The International Response
With the options for protest inside Nigeria being steadily narrowed, much of the dynamic of the pro-democracy struggle has moved to the international arena. As with the anti-apartheid movement in the 1960s and 1970s, this international movement is built on the efforts both of exiles and of a wide range of non-Nigerian friends.
Dozens of small groups operate among the large Nigerian expatriate population in the United States and elsewhere. Key common demands are that political prisoners be freed and that the military step down.
Internationally, the pro-democracy movement has drawn in environmentalists, human rights activists, trade unionists, church groups, students and many others, in addition to Africa advocacy groups. Vested interests and inertia, however, mean that the obstacles to bringing significant pressure on the regime are still very large.
Only days after the executions, Shell Oil and other companies decided to proceed with plans for a $3.8 billion investment in a new natural gas facility. Oil provides over 90% of Nigeria's export earnings, and the regime's survival depends on these earnings.
The United States is the largest customer for Nigeria's oil, consuming more than 40% of the country's output. However, oil from Nigeria accounts for only 8% of U.S. oil imports, and 3.5% of total U.S. oil consumption. "It is both economically possible and morally imperative that we stop the consumption of the oil that fuels the current regime," noted a December 1995 statement endorsed by almost 100 U.S.-based church, human rights, labor, environmental and pro-democracy groups.
The current bills before Congress are limited steps. But they would impose real penalties on the regime, and would build momentum for stronger action if the military still refuses to budge. The Senate legislation also specifically urges the Administration to seek support for international embargoes on oil imports and arms sales to Nigeria.
WHAT YOU CAN DO:
1. Become informed:
* Contact the International Roundtable on Nigeria, c/o Amnesty International, c/o Amnesty International USA, 304 Pennsylvania Ave SE, Washington DC 20003, Tel: (202) 544-0200, Ext. 234; Fax: (202) 546-7142.
* Get in touch in your community with one of the many local pro-democracy groups of Nigerians in the U.S. There is no one central office, but local contact information should be available from Dr. Bolaji Aluko or Dr. Julius Ihonvbere, Global Network of Nigerian Organizations, P.O. Box 91291, Washington, DC 20090 or P.O. Box 200985, Austin, TX 78720. Tel: (202) 806-6617 or (512) 335-0287; Fax: (202) 805-4632 or (512) 471-1061; E-mail: maluko@scs.howard.edu or julius@jeeves.la.texas.edu.
* If you have access to the World Wide Web, find current information from a wide variety of sources beginning at the Web site of the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars: http://www.prairienet.org/acas/siro.html
* The Sierra Club has been particularly active in pushing the legislative initiative for sanctions. More information on congressional action is also available from Stephen Mills, Sierra Club International Program, (202) 675-6691, or by e-mail at stephen.mills@sierraclub.org. You can also visit the Sierra Club on the WWW and check out their Ken Saro-Wiwa page at http://www.sierraclub.org.
2. Take Local Action
Raise the issue in your local church, church council, or local government, working with other concerned groups. Such action helps educate the public and lets national officials know that citizens care. Among other groups, the Church Council of Greater Seattle and the New York City Council have passed strong pro-democracy resolutions on Nigeria, including support for the sanctions bills before Congress.
3. Contact Congress
Write or call your members of Congress. Ask your Senators to co-sponsor S. 1419, introduced by Sen. Nancy Kassebaum. Ask your Representative to co-sponsor H.R. 2697, introduced by Rep. Donald Payne. Urge them to press for quick action to impose significant sanctions against the Nigerian military regime. Be sure to mention any local initiatives under way in your community (see #2). Send copies of your letters to the sponsors (Sen. Kassebaum and Rep. Payne), to the White House, and to the U.S. State Department.
Note: By January 23, twenty Senators had agreed to co-sponsor S. 1419. No new co-sponsors have been added since then. By February 28, 55 Representatives had signed up as co-sponsors of H.R. 2697. No new co-sponsors have been added since then.
The address for senators is U.S. Senate, Washington, DC 20510; for members of the House, write to U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515. Capitol Switchboard for reaching congressional offices: (202) 224-3121.
Mr. Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor, National Security Council, White House, Washington, DC 20500
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Department of State, Washington, DC 20520
[Note to non-U.S. readers: This posting is provided both for your background information and for possible forwarding to those of your U.S. contacts you think would be interested.]
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Message-Id: <199603241559.HAA10687@igc3.igc.apc.org> From: "Washington Office on Africa" <woa@igc.apc.org> Date: Sun, 24 Mar 1996 10:56:58 -0500 Subject: Nigeria: Sanctions Need New Push
Editor: Ali B. Ali-Dinar
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