UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA - AFRICAN STUDIES CENTER
Sudan: Policy Proposals, 1 Date distributed (ymd): 010320 Document reposted by APIC
Africa Policy Electronic Distribution List: an information service provided by AFRICA ACTION (incorporating the Africa Policy Information Center, The Africa Fund, and the American Committee on Africa). Find more information for action for Africa at http://www.africapolicy.org
Region: East Africa Issue Areas: +political/rights+ +economy/development+ +security/peace+
This posting contains two recent policy statements on Sudan, one from the Canadian Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group and the other the executive summary of a new report from the Sudan task force of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a center-right Washington thinktank. Another posting today contains a critique of the CSIS report. This posting also includes brief excerpts from other reports: Christian Aid on "Oil and War in Sudan, One World on independence for Southern Sudan, and Human Rights Watch on new internal conflict in the South.
The posting begins with a cover note from Salih Booker, executive director of Africa Action.
Oil Rush a Key Obstacle to Peace
The world's longest war grinds on in Sudan, with increased bombing of civilians by the Khartoum government, massive civilian displacement linked to oil development, new government-manipulated fighting among groups in the south, and continuation of slave-raiding as one of the human-rights abuses encouraged by Khartoum. With predictions of displaced people at risk of famine rising towards the one million mark, relief agencies face both shortages of funds and the inability to reach people cut off by fighting.
All the reports in this and the next posting agree that new and much stronger international efforts for peace, at different levels, are essential. Without an end to the war, these abuses will only continue. But peace efforts will be futile if built on illusions. "Constructive engagement" with the minority regime in Khartoum, which remains the principal architect of war and obstacle to peace, will only promote further intransigence. The oil revenues that finance the government's war efforts should be shut off and their resumption tied to a timetable for achieving a just peace.
Much else needs to be done, of course, to increase the
chances for peace. Promotion of human rights and democracy
in the North as well as the South is an indispensable
ingredient for peace, not just a goal to be postponed
until after a settlement (see last year's Kampala Declaration
of Sudanese civil society - http://www.africapolicy.org/docs00/sud0007.htm).
But if Washington under the Bush administration, as
well as Ottawa and Stockholm, regard pressure on the
oil industry as 'out-of- bounds,' their statements
in favor of peace will ring empty.
-- Salih Booker
Statement by the Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group
February 13, 2001
Note: The Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group (SIARG) is a forum of 22 Canadian organizations with programming on Sudan. For the text of SIARG's letter to parliament, see Inter-Church Coalition on Africa (Canada): http://www.web.net/~iccaf/humanrights/sudaninfo/sudan.htm
Constructive Engagement with Sudan Is Not Working NGOs Recommend Change in Direction
One year ago, the Harker Report on human rights violations in Sudan was released, and the Government of Canada embarked on a policy of "constructive engagement" with the Government of Sudan and Talisman Oil, a Canadian oil company that is in business with the Government of Sudan. Today, members of the Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group (SIARG) claim that the policy of constructive engagement has not been successful, and they are asking for a change in direction to support the people of Sudan. In Sudan, like China, Canadian financial interests have been given priority over the security and human rights of the people of Sudan, in the name of "constructive engagement."
In a letter to Members of Parliament, SIARG claims there is scant evidence of positive results from Canada's current policy, while there is abundant evidence that life for the people of Sudan is worse than it was one year ago. Among others, they cite the following facts:
* The number of bombardments of civilian targets has dramatically increased in the last year, according to an independent report by the U.S. Committee of Refugees. In November, for example, 14 bombs were dropped on a school, forcing children to flee into the bush. This happened within kilometers of Talisman's expansion project. These actions violate international laws and the recent Security Council Resolutions 1261 and 1314 on Children and Armed Conflict that Canada pushed forward. Little action has been taken by the Government of Canada on this matter.
* An IMF report shows that the Government of Sudan has dramatically increased its military expenditures since it began to receive oil revenue, while investments in the crucial area of agriculture and food security have not increased.
* The Government of Sudan scuttled implementation of the agreement it signed at the Winnipeg Conference for War-affected Children to secure the release of the abducted children from Northern Uganda, who are enslaved in Sudan by the Lord's Resistance Army. Over the past ten years, they have been used by the army of the Government of Sudan in raids against communities in the South.
* The IGAD Peace Process is not working because the parties in the conflict do not take it seriously, in spite of Canada's investment in a permanent secretariat. Sudan's current leader, Omar al Bashir, has publicly stated that they intend to use the oil revenues to purchase more weapons and win the war, not negotiate a just settlement with the opposing forces in Southern Sudan.
The war in Sudan has already claimed over two million lives and forced more than four million people to leave their homes. More people have been impacted by this conflict in the last decade than all the wars in the Balkan region combined, but the world at large has turned a blind eye to the suffering of the Sudanese.
Control over oil resources has become a focal point for the conflict, along with demands for separation of the state from Islamic religious laws and self-determination for the people in Southern Sudan.
One sign of hope in Sudan is growing peace efforts by civil society organizations. These include the "people-to-people" peace process launched by church leaders in Southern Sudan, and the struggling efforts of human rights groups in both the North and the South to hold their government accountable. They hoped the Harker Report would help their cause, but Canada's failure to act on it undermines their heroic efforts. These people are consistent in their message that oil development now scuttles hopes for peace. Canada's policy is inconsistent in that it supports peace building through CIDA and then undermines it with trade decisions that fuel increased conflict.
Members of SIARG propose a shift in Canada's foreign policy to support the people of Sudan. This would include:
1. High level diplomatic initiatives by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs to hold the Government of Sudan accountable for human rights violations should include public statements. A strong and consistent campaign should be pursued in the international arena to stop the serious human rights abuses. These include violations of the Geneva Conventions for conduct during war, the Convention on the Rights of the Child which applies during conflict, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and more specific international laws against torture, slavery, genocide, displacement, and denial of access to humanitarian assistance.
Earlier this year a strong, public campaign by non-government organizations (NGOs) and friendly governments stopped Sudan from getting a seat on the Security Council. Greater transparency in the diamond trade in Sierra Leone resulted from a public campaign by governments and NGOs; the same approach should be applied to Sudan.
2. Provide greater support for civil society peace initiatives and greater balance to Canada's presence in Khartoum by increasing support for sustained, independent, human rights monitoring in the areas where oil development is taking place and publicly releasing these reports.
3. Consider supporting United States' initiatives to prevent oil development from contributing to the conflict. The Sudan Peace Act, proposed earlier this year, includes measures to cut off access to capital markets for investments in Sudan. Proposing similar measures in Canada would help in Canada's desire to build good relations with the US Congress.
4. Commit to introducing new legislation to deal with "militarized commerce" and mandate the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs to hold public hearings on what should be included in a new law that would provide effective tools to hold all Canadian companies accountable for complicity in contributing to armed conflict.
5. Publicly report on the failure of Sudan to keep the agreements it made in Winnipeg on behalf of children and aggressively seek international support to secure the release of the children abducted from Northern Uganda and stop the bombings of schools, health centers, and other places where children gather.
The Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group includes a variety of Canadian development, peace, and human rights organizations that work with counterparts in both North and South Sudan.
U. S. Policy to End Sudan's War Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Executive Summary [full report available on http://www.csis.org]
Although the policy debate on Sudan encompasses a myriad of issues, the CSIS task force concluded that the central problem on which virtually everything else hinges is the devastating war that has raged in Sudan since 1983. Now is an opportune and appropriate moment for the United States to join actively in a strong multilateral push, in collaboration with interested European powers, to end Sudan's internal war. A sine qua non to any future progress is the cessation of the government of Sudan's aerial bombardment of civilian humanitarian sites in the south.
Sudan continues to matter significantly to U. S. interests - on human rights, humanitarian, and security grounds. Washington cannot afford to ignore Sudan's extreme circumstances, rooted overwhelmingly in Sudan's 18- year internal war.
The new administration is well positioned to take a fresh look and move beyond a policy of containment and isolation that has made little headway in ending Sudan's war, reforming Khartoum, or ameliorating Sudan's humanitarian crisis and gross human rights abuses. Realistically, the only viable course to end Sudan's war and see progress in other critical areas is through a hard-nosed strategy based on diplomacy, heightened engagement with all parties, enhanced inducements and punitive measures, and concerted multilateral initiatives.
In the past two years, Sudan's rising oil production has shifted the balance of military power in the government's favor at the same time that significant internal rifts have surfaced in Khartoum. The surrounding region is in flux in its relations to the Sudan conflict, and it has become clear that competing regional peace initiatives hold no promise. In this fluid context, the United States possesses significant leverage. Among major powers, it is the lone holdout in renewing a dialogue with Khartoum. Equally important, it is the principal backer, in humanitarian and diplomatic terms, of the southern Sudanese opposition, recognizes the south's moral cause, and will not countenance the military subjugation of the south.
In brief, the task force recommends that the Bush administration exercise leadership on Sudan:
* Concentrate U. S. policy on the single overriding objective of ending Sudan's war.
* Actively join with the UK, Norway, and Sudan's neighboring states in establishing an international nucleus to press forthwith for serious and sustained talks between Khartoum and the southern opposition. Its aim should be to end the war as the central means to restore fundamental human rights, stability and improved democratic governance, and regional security. This extra-regional initiative will be essential to move beyond the stasis surrounding regional peace initiatives.
* Build this new extra-regional initiative on prior agreement by the Sudanese government and the opposition on the Declaration of Principles as the basis of negotiations.
* Seek first to reach agreement on the creation of an interim arrangement - a 'One Sudan, Two Systems' formula - that preserves a single Sudan with two viable, self-governing democratic regions, north and south.
* Devise enhanced multilateral inducements and pressures that move both sides to participate in peace negotiations in good faith.
* Catalyze the launch of a high- level international plan for a viable selfgoverning south, including commitments of substantial bilateral and multilateral resources toward its eventual realization.
* Assign top priority in negotiations to early, mutual confidence-building measures; improvements in human rights and humanitarian access; revenue-sharing mechanisms; clarification of the north- south border; definition of regional and central powers; and international guarantees.
* Resume full operations of the U. S. embassy in Khartoum, including the expedited appointment of an ambassador, and preferably a high- level, fully empowered envoy.
* Aggressively seek the successful conclusion of ongoing U. S.- Sudan negotiations on terrorism.
Other New Policy Reports on Sudan (brief excerpts)
Christian Aid The Scorched Earth: Oil and War in Sudan http://www.christian-aid.org.uk/indepth/0103suda/sudanoil.htm
In Sudan, oil and war are inextricably linked. For this reason Christian Aid, which has been working for 30 years in Sudan, and its partners, recommend that:
* Oil companies directly involved in oil in Sudan, such as Talisman Energy and Lundin Oil [of Sweden], should immediately suspend operations until there is a just and lasting peace agreement.
* Companies such as TotalFinaElf, which own concessions in Sudan but are not yet operational, and those which have invested in the Sudanese oil industry, should refuse to take any further steps to begin operations or supply equipment until a peace agreement is reached.
* BP, Shell and other foreign and institutional investors in Sinopec and PetroChina, two subsidiaries of CNPC, should divest their holdings.
* The Government of Sudan should cease its abuse of civilians and breaches of international humanitarian and human rights law. It should publish reports of the use of oil revenue to demonstrate that it is used to benefit people in all of Sudan, north and south.
* The SPLA should also cease its breaches of international humanitarian and human rights laws.
* The UK government should take steps to put in place strong and enforceable regulation of transnational corporations to ensure that they cannot be directly or indirectly complicit in human rights violations.
OneWorld US Special Report Independence for Southern Sudan? http://www.benton.org/OneWorldUS/sudan1.html
A study prepared by Dunstan M. Wai, an exiled Southern Sudanese scholar.
The two main points argued here are that it is time for world leaders to focus on a solution for the Sudan, and the solution must involve self-determination for the Southern Sudanese people. It is the contention of his paper that U.S.- and all external - involvement should be aimed at brokering an end to the conflict and a referendum allowing southern Sudanese to choose between remaining part of the Sudan or becoming a separate nation.
Humanitarian Disaster in Southern Sudan Human Rights Watch Writes to US Secretary of State March 1, 2001 http://www.hrw.org/hrw/press/2001/03/sudan-ltr.htm
Despite the complexity of the situation in southern Sudan, early and skillful U.S. diplomatic intervention could make a significant difference in sparing the lives of tens of thousands of civilians. The Nuer-Nuer fighting, a war within a war, for now overshadows the civil war in ferocity of fighting and cost in civilian lives. But it is also very integral to the civil war, which since 1983 pits the Khartoum government against marginalized peoples, particularly Africans in the southern third of the country.
The current crisis also involves the unraveling of the Wunlit agreement, signed in 1999 and enthusiastically endorsed by the U.S., which put an end to years (1991-99) of Dinka-Nuer cross-border raids. These raids involved thousands of civilian casualties, large-scale theft of cattle, abduction of women and children, and destruction of hundreds of villages. Attacks on civilians and the ruin of the pastoral economy were the immediate cause of the devastating 1993 famine in southern Sudan, in which tens of thousands perished. The current fighting follows the same pattern, and recurrence of famine is almost inevitable unless immediate action is taken.
As usual, a key actor in the current violence among southerners is the Khartoum government, which arms whichever factions and militias are fighting the SPLA. The Khartoum strategy of divide and destroy has worked extremely well in the past, keeping southerners split - Dinka from Nuer, and Nuer from Nuer. Accordingly, Wunlit was the government s worst nightmare, and its disintegration serves Khartoum well. By provoking divisions among Nuer and other southerners, Khartoum can develop the rich oil resources that lie beneath Nuer territory.
Sudan: Policy Proposals, 2 Date distributed (ymd): 010320 Document reposted by APIC
Africa Policy Electronic Distribution List: an information service provided by AFRICA ACTION (incorporating the Africa Policy Information Center, The Africa Fund, and the American Committee on Africa). Find more information for action for Africa at http://www.africapolicy.org
Region: East Africa Issue Areas: +political/rights+
This posting contains a critique of a new policy report on U.S.- Sudan Policy prepared by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The CSIS is faulted for a 'deeply flawed' report that short-changes the primary victims, goes too far to appease the government in Khartoum, and fails to "address the immediate and devastating consequences of oil development for the local population." In contrast to the CSIS report, the critics propose energetic U.S. pressure for a freeze in oil production as an incentive for a settlement.
Another posting sent out today includes several other recent policy comments, including a cover note from Africa Action director Salih Booker.
A Critique of the CSIS Report on Sudan
February 25, 2001
Roger Winter, Eric Reeves, and Ted Dagne
[for more information on this critique contact Alison Seiler at the U.S. Committee for Refugees (email@example.com)]
Tomorrow the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) will publicly unveil its Report of the Task Force on U.S.-Sudan Policy.
We believe the Report can make a significant contribution to the increasing debate on U.S.-Sudan relations. Yet because we also believe that in Sudan's terrible war, the National Islamic Front (NIF) government in Khartoum is the primary abuser, while the civilians in South Sudan and the Nuba Mountains are the primary victims, we find the CSIS Report's strategy to be deeply flawed. The recommendations in the report, in our view, cannot lead to the "just peace" it claims as its goal.
Herein is an initial version of a more balanced approach that does not short-change the victims. Additional materials will be forthcoming. We invite others who are like-minded to send us their comments.
The second civil war in Sudan has entered its 18th year, with over 2 million casualties and an estimated 4 million people displaced. The war is grinding the South into oblivion, slowly but surely. A number of efforts to end the war have failed over the years, in large part because of the habitual intransigence and arrogance of regimes in Khartoum. In fact, the NIF overthrew the civilian government in 1989, deliberately aborting the agreement reached between the SPLM and the civilian government in Khartoum.
The most recent and perhaps serious peace effort, under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), has not led to a major breakthrough, despite significant progress on some issues. The National Islamic Front government has consistently and deliberately undermined the IGAD peace talks. In 1994, the NIF government walked out of the talks only to return in 1997 after a string of military victories by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).
Peace has been elusive in Sudan because of the NIF government's belief that it can win the war militarily, a view that is at the core of the NIF political philosophy. The SPLA for its part is determined not to retreat or be forced into surrender. Consequently, as long as the NIF regime believes that it can win the war outright, a just peace will be unattainable, for Khartoum will not make real concessions to the south.
Another obstacle to a negotiated settlement is the constant shift in the balance of power between the NIF government and the SPLA. In the late 1980s, the SPLA had the military upper hand with over ninety percent of southern Sudan under its control, which led many observers to conclude that the war would be over by the end of the decade. By 1992, after the ouster of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, and a split within the SPLA/M leadership, the balance of power shifted in favor of the NIF regime. At that, most observers suggested the end of the SPLA.
By the mid-1990s, the balance of power once again shifted in favor of the SPLA. NIF support for radical groups in neighboring countries and support for international terrorism led to its isolation and loss of allies in the region. Ethiopia and Eritrea shifted their support from the NIF to the SPLA, while the United States launched a campaign to isolate the NIF regime. With Khartoum isolated, the SPLA soon regained lost grounds.
The military option is seen as viable in large part due to the absence of a serious commitment to a negotiated settlement by the NIF regime. At the core of this dilemma is the SPLA conviction that real concessions from the other side will only come through military and political pressure. The SPLA is unlikely to accept a settlement based on the putative goodwill of Khartoum or one-sided pressure from the international community. In the view of many southerners, a just peace can be secured only by strong guarantees from the international community, especially the United States.
The challenge to prospective mediators is not to identify the "right formula", but rather to put in place a set of strong "enforcement mechanisms," a clear timeline and agenda, and support for these from a unified international community. If peace is not to be frustrated, mediators must act swiftly in the face of obvious intransigence and compel the obstructionist party to return to the negotiating table. The mediators must also be prepared to offer "solutions" in the event of deadlock and be prepared to function as arbitrators.
A new report by a CSIS task force on Sudan, scheduled to be launched on February 26th, proposes to shift significantly U.S. policy toward Sudan, focusing on "the single overriding objective of ending Sudan's war." The U.S., along with its European allies and Sudan's neighbors, should establish a new peace process, using the Declaration of Principles (DOP) adopted by IGAD as a basis for negotiations.
The report proposes a "One Sudan, Two Systems" formula, supposedly modeled on the SPLA confederation proposal for the interim period. This formula, according to the report, offers a way out of the current quandary since Khartoum's desire for a united Sudan and the SPLA's aim for a self-governing southern political entity will be achieved. As an incentive for the SPLA, the report calls for the international community to provide substantial resources to enable "a viable self-governing south."
The Clinton Administration's policy of containment and isolation is harshly attacked in the report as "rhetorical excesses...unbacked by sufficient political will and material resources to meaningfully strengthen the south's hand in its war against the north." The report asserts that the "web of sanctions" imposed by the Clinton Administration did not weaken the NIF regime, although it contributed to the isolation of the NIF regime.
The CSIS report offers some constructive proposals and may have triggered a useful debate over the direction of U.S. policy toward Sudan. The report, however, is excessively governed by issues deemed by the authors as "politically acceptable"to decision- makers in Washington. Its findings are largely based on questionable assumptions and a problematic analysis of the situation in Sudan. Moreover, the authors are insufficiently specific on a number of key issues.
Some of the shortcomings of the CSIS Report:
1. The document asserts that "oil is fundamentally changing Sudan's war. It is shifting the balance of military power in favor of Khartoum." Oil revenues are indeed likely to change the balance of power in the future, but no one can be certain how this shift will occur. In the short to mid-term, the new revenues are unlikely to have significant impact on the balance of power. Over the past several years, the SPLA has taken the military initiative and has gained additional ground both, in the south and other parts of the country. There is no clear evidence, as the report suggests, that oil revenue has already shifted the strategic balance of power in favor of the government, although government attacks on civilian populations in the oil regions have intensified very significantly and become more brutal.
The report argues that it is important for the south to negotiate now instead of waiting for several years. The presumption here is that the south has not been serious about negotiations. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the SPLA was seriously engaged in negotiations in Abuja, Nigeria; former President Jimmy Carter also put considerable efforts in the 1990s, and the Bush Administration in the early 1990s proposed a "disengagement" proposal-only to be rejected by the NIF regime. A peculiar assumption in the report is that since the government is getting stronger because of oil revenues, the best time for them to make a deal is now. But this forces an obvious question, why should the NIF government negotiate seriously or make concessions if it is getting stronger and the south getting weaker?
The report considers oil development in Sudan in the context of overall military balance, but fails to offer clear policy options that address the immediate and devastating consequences of oil development for the local population. The depopulation and terrorizing of civilian populations around the oil fields should be taken much more fully into account in policy formulation. Instead, the report largely ignores this unacceptable state of affairs. Allowing oil development to continue unimpeded creates a major disincentive for a negotiated settlement, exacerbates conflict, especially in Upper Nile, and thus produces more suffering and unnecessary bloodshed.
2. The document argues, "Regional initiatives hold little promise for ending Sudan's war." Consequently, the authors propose to establish a "new international nucleus dedicated to ending the Sudan's war." The United States can and should take a leadership role, but not always, according to the report. But in the same paragraph, the authors suggest that the United States should be relegated to helping Norway and Britain, since this approach "offers the greatest promise of bringing heightened pressures and inducements to bear." This leaves the precise role of the U.S. unclear. If the highest priority of the United States should be to end the war, why not take the leadership role instead of passing on that responsibility to others. Is the assumption that Norway and Britain have more clout and credibility than the United States in getting the job done? In what circumstances would this be true? The authors of the report have not offered a sufficiently clear roadmap for the U.S. Administration.
The assumption that Norway and Britain can play this central role without the U.S. is misguided. Britain and the other European countries for some time have been engaged with the NIF government in a "critical dialogue." But this engagement has become in effect appeasement. For this reason, the south is likely to express serious reservations about a process led by countries already engaged in a process of economic and diplomatic exchange that seems to have ignored their just and pressing interests. Moreover, though it is given a marginal role by the authors of the report, the active participation of regional actors, including Egypt, Nigeria, and members of IGAD, will be key in the process.
The report ignores the uniquely significant role that can be played by the United States. No other country can assume such a leadership role. The U.S. alone has the diplomatic and political force required to confront NIF intransigence and insure that sufficient pressure is applied to produce good faith participation in any peace process. Moreover, the United States is the only country that is acceptable to the south in playing such a key role. Even the NIF government has said repeatedly that without Washington's leadership, a negotiated settlement would be difficult. The argument that Washington cannot be effective because it is seen as a supporter of the south and therefore not neutral is belied by the facts of past negotiations. For example, the 1972 Agreement was facilitated and secured by Ethiopia, considered then a staunch ally of the south.
3. The report ignores or fails to provide appropriate remedies for continued bombardment of civilians in southern Sudan and the enslavement of southern Sudanese. The report criticizes the NIF government for targeting civilians and slavery, but does not offer clear policy options to deal with these immediate problems. The authors assert that by ending the war these problems will be resolved. But what are the victims expected to do in the interim? And what of continuing, unabated liquidation of the peoples of the Nuba?
4. The report consequentially ignores northern opposition groups allied with the SPLA and considers the problem in Sudan as a north-south problem. The conflict in Sudan is not merely between SPLA and the NIF. This narrow view of the Sudanese conflict is too simplistic and ignores the reality on the ground. The people of the Nuba have been fighting for survival and dignity alongside the south for over a decade. Northern opposition forces have also been fighting the NIF government since it forcefully and violently overthrew a democratically elected civilian government in 1989. Is it a desirable policy objective to ignore the democratic forces of Sudan? To do so is to implicitly legitimize further the NIF, which is surely not in the interest of improving their willingness to negotiate in good faith.
5. The authors problematically assume that there is no political will in Washington for a tough, yet constructive policy toward Sudan. In doing so, they ignore the critical role that can be played by Congress and the powerful and growing constituencies across the country working to influence the new Administration. The purported consensus of the report is not reflective of the views of the majority of the Sudan constituencies and offers no clear vision for policy-makers. Normalization of relations and consultation with allies will not by itself bring peace to Sudan nor will it change the behavior of the extremist government in Khartoum.
In fact, if the proposed approach is adopted by policy-makers in Washington, it will make the NIF more intransigent and give it undeserved legitimacy. An extremist government that has proved its anti-American sentiments repeatedly over the years, sitting on a large oil reserve, will only become a greater obstacle to peace and stability in one of the most sensitive regions of the world. This is the same NIF government that played the key role in the assassination attempt on President Mubarak of Egypt; that provided safe-havens to well-known terrorist organizations and individuals, including Osama bin-Laden; and is the same NIF that backed and continues to back Saddam Hussein of Iraq.
6. The report proposes the resumption of "full operations of the U.S. embassy" and calls for the appointment of "a senior talent as ambassador." The authors also propose the designation of a "senior-level lead contact" with the SPLM. In the same paragraph, the authors suggest the appointment of a Special Envoy "to conduct consultations" with allies in Europe, Middle East Africa, that is, if the "Bush Administration see the compelling need" for an envoy. The authors cannot have revealed more clearly the internal contradictions in their report. Despite the justification for an envoy, the authors undercut both the ambassador and the envoy by creating another layer of contact with the designation of a senior contact with the SPLM. The authors also reduce the role of the envoy to one of mere "consultation" with allies. Even the Clinton Administration gave Special Envoy Harry Johnston a broader mandate than is being proposed in this report. If the United States' objective is to end the war, the Special Envoy must be given a clear mandate in this area.
A. Ending the War. The United States must lead a new peace effort to end the war with the support of the international community, and if necessary, to work unilaterally in forceful ways. If we are serious about ending this intolerable conflict, we must be prepared to act accordingly.
B. Special Envoy. Appoint a high profile, effective, Special Envoy with a clear mandate to lead a new peace initiative. The Envoy should have exclusive control over management of the peace process and be the lead contact to both the government and SPLA.
C. U.S. Embassy. Resume embassy operations WITHOUT the appointment of a high profile ambassador since such a move will create confusion about the role and function of the Envoy. U.S. interests can be well served with a full staffed embassy without a "senior talent ambassador."
D. Maintain Sanctions. U.S. unilateral sanctions and international pressures should be maintained against the government of Sudan until the government effectively halted its aerial bombardments of civilians, its participation in slavery, and has disarmed and controlled the marauding militia. It must also halt the brutally destructive military actions in the oil fields, and reach an agreement with the SPLM on an interim arrangements.
E. Oil Development. Tens of thousands of civilians have been forcefully displaced from their homes because of oil development projects in southern Sudan. Revenues from oil are being used to kill innocent civilians. The Bush Administration should actively consider imposing capital market sanctions on the foreign oil companies participating in Sudan's various oil development projects, thereby insuring that American capital is not directed toward supporting these projects. The United States government should also work energetically to produce a freeze in oil production until a settlement is reached or arrangements are made to insure the safety of civilians, the constructive use of oil revenues, and equitable sharing of these resources between the south and the government.
F. Ending Slavery and Aerial Bombardments. The United States government should do everything in its power to end slavery in Sudan and the deliberate targeting of civilians.
Message-Id: <200103201837.NAA02762@server.africapolicy.org> From: "APIC" <firstname.lastname@example.org> Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2001 13:36:06 -0500 Subject: Sudan: Policy Proposals, 2
Editor: Ali B. Ali-Dinar
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