UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA - AFRICAN STUDIES CENTER
AFRICA ACTION Africa Policy E-Journal July 3, 2003
Liberia: Waiting for Washington (Reposted from sources cited below)
With President Bush's trip to Africa only days away, the Pentagon has been asked to prepare contingency plans for participation of U.S. troops in multilateral peacekeeping operations in Liberia, as demanded by Liberians, West African countries, and the United Nations. But the president has apparently not yet made his decision. Even if some troops are sent, serious questions remain on the details of participation, and particularly on the terms of U.S. engagement, given the Pentagon's preference for non-engagement or for total unilateral control. The longer the decision is delayed, the more prominence it will have as President Bush visits five African countries next week, two of them in West Africa.
This posting contains excerpts from two recent news stories from allafrica.com on the debate, and from an extensive 1995 report by allafrica.com's Reed Kramer detailing previous failures of U.S. Liberia policy, including when the President's father was faced with crisis in Liberia in 1990. The full paper, too long to include here, is available on the allafrica.com site at the link indicated below.
Meanwhile news reports indicate that the U.S. has suspended military aid to about 35 countries, including, in Africa, Benin, Central African Republic, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Niger, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia. The countries are signatories to the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC), and failed to satisfy U.S. demands to sign "bilateral immunity agreements" confirming that U.S. nationals can commit war crimes or other serious human rights offenses without fear of accountability to that international body. For a commentary on the ICC and Africa, see the issue of Pambazuka News for July 3, 2003 at: http://lists.kabissa.org/lists/archives/public/pambazuka-news
Bush 'Still Deciding' on Whether to Send Troops to Liberia
July 3, 2003
By Charles Cobb Jr. Washington, DC
U.S. President George W. Bush says he wants to get enough information before he makes a decision on whether to send troops to Liberia: "I'm in the process of gathering the information necessary to make a rational decision as to how to enforce the ceasefire -- keep the ceasefire in place," he told allAfrica.com Thursday morning.
The administration has been pressed by regional African leaders and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to send up to 2,000 troops to Liberia. Representatives of the West African regional organization, Ecowas, met with "our military thinkers Wednesday to discuss military options," said Bush, but a report of that meeting has not yet reached the White House. "Once the strategy is in place I will let people know," Bush promised.
No details on the number or type of troops that could be deployed as part of an intervention force have been released but the Associated Press Thursday quoted defence officials as saying that U.S. military command in Europe has been ordered to begin planning for possible American intervention in Liberia. A 'Warning Order' was sent Wednesday night to Europe Commander Gen. James Jones asking him to give the Pentagon his estimate of how the situation in Liberia might be handled. ...
Bush Pressed To Commit 'Boots On The Ground' in Liberia
July 1, 2003
By Reed Kramer and Charles Cobb Jr.
A decade after 18 U.S. Army Rangers were killed by an angry mob in the Somali capital of Mogadishu, the Bush administration is facing mounting pressure to put American 'boots on the ground' in Africa once again. Calls for an active U.S. intervention in Liberia are coming from the United Nations and various member governments, including Britain and France and leading African officials.
Senior administration officials met at the White House Saturday to discuss Liberia during a Cabinet-level 'principals' meeting of the National Security Council. Another session is scheduled for Tuesday, Secretary of State Colin Powell said during a television appearance Monday. "There's a sense of urgency with respect to the situation, and I don't want to pre-judge when the president might decide or what he might decide, but we are seized with the matter," Powell told interviewer Jim Lehrer on public television's NewsHour program. "We understand that this is a problem that has to be dealt with in the very near future."
Last week, President George W. Bush called on the Liberian leader, Charles Taylor, to leave office "so that his country can be spared further bloodshed." Addressing a U.S.-Africa Business Summit sponsored by the Corporate Council on Africa, Bush said: "We are determined to help the people of Liberia find peace."
Because Liberia was founded by freed American slaves in 1847 and was a staunch U.S. ally during the Cold War, particularly in the 1980s, many people in Africa and other parts of the globe see the country as an American responsibility. However, administration policy to date has sent mixed signals to the parties involved in the conflict. In mid-June, with fighting in Monrovia escalating, the Bush administration positioned a U.S. Navy amphibious assault ship, the USS Kearsarge, off the western shore of Africa to aid in the potential evacuation of American citizens. The ship, equipped with helicopters and a sizeable medical team, arrived just as negotiations over Liberia's future reached a critical point.
According to mediators taking part in the talks in Ghana, the presence of the American ship was a critical factor in persuading the warring parties, particularly Taylor's beleaguered government, to agree to end the fighting. But after only three days - before the ink on the accord was dry, the ship was ordered back to its homeport of Norfolk, Virginia, where it arrived Monday following six weeks involvement in the war on Iraq and a short stint providing security for President Bush's visits to Egypt and Jordan last month.
"Once Taylor saw that ship steam away, he reverted to his old ways - shifting and delaying and refusing to accept what he has already agreed to do," said one senior U.S. official involved in the issue. Instead of stepping aside for an interim administration, as the agreement envisioned, Taylor insisted he would serve out his term, which ends in January.
Despite this setback, the mediators last week managed to get a ceasefire in place, after first pressuring the rebels to end their assault on Monrovia and then arm-twisting Taylor to join in the truce. The accord was the work of Ghana's President John Kufuor, current chair of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), and General Abdulsalami Abubakar, a former Nigerian head-of-state, who is the chief Ecowas negotiator.
On Saturday, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan called on the Security Council to augment the Ecowas effort with significant support. "International action is urgently needed to reverse Liberia's drift towards total disintegration," he said. ...
During a previous war-enduced crisis in 1990, when the current U.S. president's father was in office, Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen toured West Africa to meet with key actors in the unfolding crisis, only to be recalled to Washington where the focus was on preparation for war with Iraq. "You can only concentrate on so many things at once," Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser to President Bush said in a 1993 interview. The decision proved costly in both human lives and humanitarian assistance, Cohen said in an interview last week. The instability spread through the region, engulfing Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire, and impacting the regional giant Nigeria.
The first Bush administration "looked the other way" while Liberia descended into chaos, Crocker said. This time around, Crocker said "it wouldn't surprise me" if President Bush "confronts the skeptics in the Pentagon -- and we all know that is where they are -- and says this is the time to act." ,,,
Asked about Liberia on Monday at the Pentagon, Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said: "We've spent
time over the weekend -- a good deal of time over the
weekend -- visiting among ourselves about that and
thinking through different aspects of it," he
said. The president has not yet "made a call,"
he said, "nor has the State Department requested
an evacuation out of Monrovia." "We ought
to be engaged," said Susan E. Rice, who was assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1997 until
2001. "Ecowas is saying they will send 3,000 troops
as part of a multinational force if the United States
will send 2,000 troops and takes the lead. I think
that is a bargain we ought to accept," she told
the Brookings forum. "For Liberia, the United
States is the international 911. There is no other."
Liberia: A Casualty of the Cold War's End
Africa News Service (Durham)
Excerpts only: see full text at: http://allafrica.com/stories/200101090216.html
July 1, 1995
By Reed Kramer
Half a decade ago, with the Berlin Wall coming down and the Soviet Union entering its final days, a small-scale conflict in West Africa quietly put post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy to an early test.
Liberia's civil war, which began with a cross-border raid by a tiny rebel band in late 1989, has claimed the lives of one out of every 17 people in the country, uprooted most of the rest, and destroyed a once-viable economic infrastructure.
The strife also has spread to Liberia's neighbors, contributing to a slowing of the democratization that was progressing steadily through West Africa at the beginning of the decade and destabilizing a region that already was one of the world's most marginal. U.S. taxpayers have footed a sizable bill -- over $400 million to date -- for emergency aid that arguably never would have been needed had their government used its considerable clout to help end the killing.
As fighting escalated in early 1990, the Bush administration faced a serious conundrum. Western European and most of Africa looked to the United States to take the lead in seeking a peaceful resolution of the Liberian crisis, since the country's history bears an unmistakable "made in America" stamp. But senior administration officials, determined to limit U.S. involvement in what was viewed as a "brush fire," rejected the notion of inherent American interest or responsibility.
"It was difficult to see how we could intervene without taking over and pacifying the country with a more-or-less-permanent involvement of U.S. forces," Brent Scowcroft, President George Bush's national security advisor, said in a 1993 interview with the author after leaving office. In addition, Scowcroft continued, U.S. attention was "dedicated towards other areas most involved in ending the Cold War." There was the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990, the build up the war in the Gulf. "You can only concentrate on so many things at once," Scowcroft said.
But a range of senior U.S. officials did focus considerable attention on Africa's oldest republic. During a crucial period of increasing carnage in mid-1990, Liberia was a regular item on the agenda of the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council, where most major foreign policy problems were handled. Later in the year as the crisis deepened, the Deputies dealt daily with both Liberia and Kuwait, according to participants in the sessions.
"We missed an opportunity in Liberia," Herman J. Cohen, assistant secretary of state for African affairs in the Bush administration, said in an 'exit interview' (CSIS Africa Notes, Number 147, April 1993). "We did not intervene either militarily or diplomatically." ...
The following account of the U.S. decision-making process during Liberia's disintegration is drawn from some 30 interviews with policymakers at all levels in Washington and abroad, and from a review of historical materials and public records, Some of the interviews were on the record, but most were with officials who agreed to talk only if their names and positions were not cited. ...
Ready-Made Cold Warrior
It became the job of William Tubman, a reform-minded career politician who was electe4d president in 1943 and inaugurated the following year, to lead the country into an era when the global spotlight turned towards Africa. ...
The core of his platform was the "Open Door" policy, designed to promote the development of the country's largely undeveloped interior based on joint ventures between the government and foreign investors. ...
As it had done in the two World Wars, Liberia steered a decidedly pro-American course as the Cold War engulfed the globe. The United States set up a permanent mission to train the Liberian military and began bringing Liberian officers to American institutions for further training. In 1959, Liberia concluded a mutual defense pact with the United States. ...
Although Liberia was no longer the focus of U.S. interest in Africa -- new nations like Ghana and Nigeria and the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa claimed the bulk of official and media attention -- U.S. aid grew steadily. From 1946 to 1961, Liberia received $41 million in assistance, the fourth largest amount in sub-Saharan Africa (after Ethiopia, Zaire, and Sudan). Between 1962 and 1980, economic and military aid totaled $278 million. In per capita terms, Liberia hosted the largest Peace Corps contingent and received the greatest level of aid of any country on the entire African country. ...
The Soldiers Take Control
Americo-Liberian political hegemony ended abruptly on April 12, 1980 when 17 young army officers of indigenous descent staged a bloody coup. Tolbert was slain in the Executive Mansion, along with more than a score of others, mostly security personnel. Another 13 officials died in a nationally televised execution 10 days later on a Monrovia beach. Coming amid rising public pressure for political and economic reform and a crackdown on dissent by the Tolbert regime, the takeover was welcomed by many inside and outside Liberia as a significant shift favoring the 95 percent of the population excluded from power by Americo-Liberians. ,,,
Caught off guard by the turn of events, the Carter administration reacted cautiously. But after a policy review, an aid package was approved "to exercise influence on the course of events," ...
After Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, support for Liberia was increased. Aid levels rose from about $20 million in 1979 to $75 million and then $95 million, for a total of $402 million between 1981 and 1985, more than the country received during the entire previous century. Ties with the Liberian army were strengthened; the military component of the aid package for this period was about $15 million, which was used for a greatly enlarged training program, barracks construction and equipment.
In 1982, Doe was invited to Washington for an Oval Office meeting with President Reagan. Although the session began on a miscue, with Reagan introducing his visitor as "Chairman Moe" during a photo taking in the Rose Garden, Doe received what he wanted -- a promise of continued American backing.
... As part of the expanding relationship, Doe agreed to a modification of the mutual defense pact granting staging rights on 24-hour notice at Liberia's sea and airports for the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force, which was trained to respond to security threats around the world. A year after the meeting with Reagan, Doe followed the precedent set by Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko in establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, thus breaking away from the isolationist stand adopted by most African countries in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.
A Cog in the Anti-Qaddafi Machine
Exerting a pivotal impact on Liberia policy was the closely held fact that Doe and his small country had been drawn into an effort to oust Libya's Muammar Qaddafi from power. Within weeks after Reagan's inauguration, the CIA, under the direction of Reagan's trusted adviser William J. Casey, began encouraging and supporting anti-Qaddafi activity by Libyan opposition groups and friendly foreign governments. ...
By the time Doe arrived at the White House in August of 1982, the CIA task force had pinpointed Liberia as a key operational area -- an easily accessible base for the CIA's heightened clandestine campaign against Libya throughout the area. According to government officials involved in Liberia at the time, one of the first steps taken was to make high-tech improvements in at least one of the communication facilities in Monrovia
Liberia's usefulness as a regional linchpin already had been tested during a covert operation in support of Chadian leader Hissene Habre, who had successfully ousted his Libyan-backed rival, Goukouni Oueddei in June. ...
According to Woodward, Casey selected Doe as one of 12 heads of state from around the world to receive support from a special security assistance program. The operations were designed to provide both extraordinary protection for the leaders and otherwise unobtainable information and access for the CIA. Unknown to almost everyone else involved in making decisions about Liberia for the administration, this gave the CIA and the White House a huge stake in keeping the Liberian regime in place.
That objective proved increasingly challenging. Although a 25-person constitutional commission headed by Amos Sawyer, then dean of the University of Liberia, presented its report in early 1983, the ruling PRC delayed the holding of a promised referendum, creating growing unease in the country. ...
In early 1984, the government shut down the leading daily, The Observer, edited by Kenneth Best, one of Africa's best known journalists. The PRC also used a ban on political activity, enacted in the aftermath of the coup, to crackdown on critics. ...
When [election] balloting took place, Doe declared himself the winner by 50.9 percent of the vote, despite ample evidence that he had been defeated. Nevertheless, the Reagan administration accepted the results. ...
Liberians were "baffled" by Washington's reaction and the "reluctance to concede the grimness of Doe's human rights record," Enoanyi says. The situation grew increasingly bad, particularly after a failed coup attempt by Doe's exiled former second-in-command Thomas Quiwonkpa, which was followed by stepped-up attacks on the opposition.
After the election results were announced, the [U.S.]
House and Senate each passed nonbinding resolutions
calling for an end to U.S. assistance, but the administration
announced aid would continue. ...
Meanwhile, the CIA activity in Liberia increased markedly. ... The country proved important for another covert action that year -- the airlift to Unita mounted after the 1985 repeal of the Clark Amendment, which had barred covert U.S. security assistance to any of the factions in Angola. Almost as soon as the votes were counted, the Agency began shipping materiel, with Roberts Field again playing a key support role as a transit point.
In early 1987, Secretary of State George Shultz landed at Roberts Field at the end of a six-nation African tour and, to the consternation of many, applauded "continued efforts towards political reconciliation" during a luncheon with Doe. ,,, On December 24, 1989 two dozen armed insurgents quietly crossed into Liberia from the Ivory Coast, ushering in a new and tragic phase of the Liberian saga.
U.S. Policy in the 1990s
The connections spanning two centuries and the particularly
close ties of the 1980s led Liberians and others to
expect that the United States would help when trouble
The 1989 insurgents were led by Charles Taylor, 40, a former procurement clerk in Doe's government who fled to the United States after being charged with embezzling a million dollars, was detained in Massachusetts for extradition and escaped from jail while awaiting a hearing. The rebels expected to quickly garner support and cover the 200 miles to Monrovia in a matter of weeks. ...
The unrest caused mild alarm In Washington. An interagency working group , chaired by Assistant Secretary Cohen, was convened to review the situation and reexamine options. This was followed by extensive discussions in the Deputies Committee. "There were different views on how active we should be," said one participant, "but ultimately, the prevailing view was that this was something for the Liberians to work out themselves."
The policy that evolved throughout 1990 can be viewed through the prism of three guiding principles.
1. Reluctance to Break with Liberia's Rulers.
As soon as the first reports arrived from Nimba, there were a few calls within the administration for a course correction that would distance the United States from Doe's unpopular rule. ...
As the deliberations moved up the policy chain, new global considerations took precedence. Liberia's proven utility as a military staging base and intelligence monitoring site weighed in Doe's favor. Moreover, policymakers were instinctually leery of Taylor, since they had intelligence indicating he had received modest backing from Libya, including training for some of his men.
2. Disregard for the Potential Impact of Low-Level Engagement.
U.S. prestige carried more sway in Liberia than most senior policymakers realized in their 1990 evaluations. The inclination was to downplay the significance of historical ties rather than employing them as tools for successful diplomacy. ...
3. Preference for Arms-Length Diplomacy.
Forceful diplomatic engagement of the kind that has long been routinely employed by superpowers was never attempted in Liberia. Instead, U.S. involvement was limited largely to the protection of American lives and the provision of emergency aid. And there was not much public pressure to do anything more. ,,,
West African governments, however, expected and wanted a more active American role. "We could not understand how the U.S. government with its long-standing relationship with Liberia could remain so aloof," said Ambassador Joseph Iroha, a career Nigerian diplomat who represented Ecowas in Monrovia for several years during the war. West African states sent in troops to stop the fratricidal killing," he said, because "we couldn't allow this sort of thing to continue."
What Have We Learned from Liberia?
Unfortunately, by the time Ecowas was able to organize an intervention force in late 1990, the country's dismemberment was far advanced and domestic division had been cemented with widespread bloody conflict. In addition, the peace force brought problems of its own. ...
Critics of U.S. policy argue that even after the administration decision to limit direct American involvement, Washington could have done much more, both materially and diplomatically, to bolster the West African effort and make it more successful.
No one can judge with hindsight whether the loss of an estimated 150,000 lives and the regional devastation spawned by the Liberian crisis could have been prevented without extended U.S. military engagement ...
What is certain is that failure to stop the fighting during 1990, before the entire country was demolished, erected barriers to a solution that still have not been overcome. The result was to condemn Liberia and much of the region to continuing suffering and to divert scarce international assistance from economic development to sustaining refugees. ...
Date distributed (ymd): 030703 Region: West Africa Issue Areas: +political/rights+ +security/peace+ +US policy focus+
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AFRICA ACTION Africa Policy E-Journal July 7, 2003 (030707)
Africa: Talk or Action on AIDS? (Reposted from sources cited below)
As President Bush departs for Africa today, key questions about his AIDS policy remain unanswered, including the level of funding that will actually be appropriated. While $3 billion a year has been authorized by Congress, the president has requested no additional funds for this fiscal year and less than $2 billion for fiscal year 2004, including only $200 million instead of $1 billion for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS. News reports say Republicans in the House of Representatives are planning to approve even less than the president's low request.
This postings contains (1) an action alert from the Washington Office of Africa, focusing on the expected vote this week on funding levels for AIDS, (2) a notice of today's send-off demonstration for President Bush by the Student Global AIDS Campaign and ACT UP, and (3) an update from South Africa's Treatment Action Campaign on continued South African government delays on AIDS treatment. Another posting today focuses on the role of the pharmaceutical industy and the U.S. stance on the use of generic medicines.
For additional documents on issues related to President Bush's trip to Africa, see http://www.africaaction.org/desk and http://www.africaaction.org/docs03/chr03.htm
The Washington Office on Africa:
An Urgent Action Alert
July 3, 2003
HIV/AIDS Funding to be Decided July 10 in the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee
On July 10 the House Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee will decide the amount of money that the U.S. will give to bilateral and multilateral HIV/AIDS programs for the fiscal year 2004. The U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act of 2003, passed recently, authorized $3 billion for these efforts, including "up to" $1 billion for the multilateral Global Fund. What "Foreign Ops" sets is important in this next stage of the appropriations process.
Discerning our actions: What we at WOA think
We believe that the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee should appropriate $3.5 billion to fight global AIDS, TB, and malaria, at least $1.75 billion of which should go to The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria. According to conservative estimates from the WHO and UNAIDS, $14.2 billion is needed globally to combat and treat AIDS, TB, and Malaria in fiscal year 2004. While the U.S. should be contributing 34.8 percent (its share of the global economy), we are requesting that the U.S. contribute at least 25 percent of the total, or $3.5 billion.
AIDS spending must be both bilateral and multilateral. Some U.S. agencies have high administrative overhead, and more than twelve months may pass before benefits from their programs are realized. We believe that a high percentage of this funding should go to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, which is already functioning well, despite being starved for funds. Countries can turn to the Global Fund with written proposals that are a collaborative efforts between governments, NGOs, and the private sector. Unfortunately, President Bush has only proposed providing $200 million for the Global Fund in 2004, which will cause many of the grant requests to be turned away. The international community is looking to the U.S. as a leader in the Global Fund - our funding is necessary because it will help to encourage other donors.
In. addition, Congress should agree to appropriate only NEW money, meaning that funds should not be taken from other accounts, including health-related programs and the core HIV/AIDS accounts. We believe that the House needs to appropriate more funding without removing precious resources from other development and humanitarian aid programs.
We ask that you contact your member of Congress, urging that the Foreign Operations Subcommittee ensure that fiscal year 2004 appropriations include adequate funds to fight global AIDS, with $3.5 billion for all HIV/AIDS programs, of which $1.75 billion should go into the Global Fund. As a minimum, the Subcommittee should meet the call of the U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act of 2003, of $3 billion, including $1 billion for the Global Fund.
If your member of Congress sits on the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, please contact the district office during the July 4th recess, or in Washington, as soon as possible with the message above. Remember that the Subcommittee will "mark up" (revise and decide) on AIDS appropriations on July 10! Membership includes:
Jim Kolbe, Arizona (chair) Joe Knollenberg, Michigan Jerry Lewis, California Roger F. Wicker, Mississippi Henry Bonilla, Texas David Vitter, Louisiana Mark Steven Kirk, Illinois Ander Crenshaw, Florida
Nita M. Lowey, New York (ranking) Jesse L. Jackson, Jr., Illinois Carolyn C. Kilpatrick, Michigan Steven R. Rothman, New Jersey Marcy Kaptur, Ohio
If your member of Congress does not sit on the Subcommittee, ask that he or she weigh in with the Chairperson or the Ranking Minority Member, depending on party.
A sample message appears below, which we encourage you to adapt and make your own.
Given security delays with regular mail, we suggest contacting your Member of the House of Representatives by e-mail or fax. You can access e-mail links, get district office and other contact information by going to http://www.house.gov/house/MemberWWW_by_State.htm or you can call 202/225-3121. Write to Members of Congress at the U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Representative (name):
The House Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee will soon be deciding the amount of HIV/AIDS bilateral and multilateral aid given by the U.S. in fiscal year 2004. The U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act of 2003, passed recently, authorizes $3 billion for these efforts. A minimum of $3 billion should be given to these efforts, but I urge that we go beyond this figure to provide $3.5 billion. This is the U.S. fair share.
>From this $3.5 billion, $1.75 billion should be given to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, a multilateral initiative designed by the UN. As a minimum the U.S. should fully fund the $1 billion authorized by the U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act of 2003. Our government's example of giving will influence other countries to do the same.
I also request that the funding not be removed from other key accounts that work on health and development issues. The core HIV/AIDS accounts and other programs that promote global health are necessary components to the fight against AIDS. According to conservative estimates from the WHO and UNAIDS, $14.2 billion is needed globally to combat and treat AIDS, TB, and Malaria in fiscal year 2004, and we should be giving as much funding as possible.
Global HIV/AIDS is an issue that we must prioritize to ensure global health, safety, and security, and I request that my tax money be used to support the prevention and treatment efforts. Thank you very much for your consideration.
For further information call us at WOA at 202/547-7503, or write to us at 212 East Capitol Street, Washington, DC 20003. Our e-mail address is email@example.com., and you might also consult our website, http://www.woaafrica.org.
The Student Global AIDS Campaign and ACT UP
July 3, 2003
For Immediate Release Contact Micah Sucherman: (303) 641-2123 Sean Barry: (202) 361-8293 Alexander Post: (617) 230-7832
Grim Reapers Gather at White House
Bush Travels to Africa As Overworked Grim Reapers Protest AIDS Policy
8500 Deaths per Day "Grim" Even by Their Standards
11:30 am meet at Office of National AIDS Policy (734 Jackson Place) Followed by procession to White House Gate, arriving at 12:00 pm
On July 7th, dozens of Black-clad Grim Reapers wielding tall scythes will gather at the White House gates to condemn President Bush and his administration for an AIDS policy which has left them harried and overworked. "Sure we're pro-death, but 8500 AIDS deaths a day is ridiculous," complained a Reaper. "With over 14000 new infections daily, this situation is grim even by our standards," he added.
In January Bush took a significant step forward, pledging $15 billion dollars over the next five years to fight the global AIDS pandemic. But after five months the President's promise has begun to ring hollow. Despite signing and publicly endorsing the $3 billion AIDS authorization bill in May, it now appears that the President will settle for the appropriation of only half that amount - $1.52 billion - to pay for on-the-ground AIDS services. In addition, the Bush Administration intends to gut funding for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, which experts identify as the world's most potent institutional weapon against the AIDS pandemic. The President's paltry $200 million request for the Global AIDS Fund will leave the Global Fund unable to fully fund worthy grants during its next round in October.
AIDS will not go away by itself - the virus will spread and sick will die in overwhelming numbers until the United States begins taking real steps to combat the disease. "Less rhetoric and more action," the Reapers demand, "the AIDS pandemic is working us to death!"
Photo Ops: AIDS activists and people living with AIDS dressed as Grim Reapers carrying scythes, signs ("Too much AIDS - Too much Work!") in front of White House.
AIDS Activists Demand that President Bush:
(1) DONATE THE DOLLARS: Request and ensure that Congress appropriates the full $3 billion to fight global AIDS in 2004 that was promised in the global AIDS bill President Bush signed. The U.S. should provide at least $1 billion of this amount for the super-efficient and effective Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.
(2) DROP THE DEBT: Implement the provision contained in his AIDS Bill to deepen debt relief for poor countries, as well as countries outside of HIPC - like Nigeria - thereby freeing up $1 billion in debt service payments that could be re-directed to combat AIDS and poverty.
(3) TREAT THE PEOPLE: Stop negotiating intellectual property regimes in new free trade agreements which go beyond those established by the World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings at Doha, and thereby deny poor peoples access to essential life-saving medications. Additionally, the President must ensure that his emergency plan for AIDS relief allows countries the freedom to procure generically manufactured drugs.
Treatment Action Campaign http://www.tac.org.za
TAC Electronic Newsletter 1 July 2003
[excerpts; for full newsletter see TAC website]
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1 July 2003
A Treatment and Prevention Plan: Where do we stand with Government? Where to from here for TAC?
In late April, TAC suspended its civil disobedience campaign following our meeting with Deputy-President Zuma. However, presently there is growing concern among TAC members and volunteers that we have received very little in return from government. A commitment to a treatment and prevention plan that includes antiretroviral therapy is still far from certain. As one activist explained in a meeting discussing civil disobedience in Johannesburg, we can suspend the civil disobedience campaign, but we cannot suspend the pain of people with HIV/AIDS and their friends and families.
We are at a critical turning point in South Africa's response to the HIV epidemic. TAC suspended its civil disobedience campaign to give government the space and opportunity to commit, on its own terms, to a treatment and prevention plan that includes antiretroviral therapy. There were some positive signs that the Cabinet would soon make such a commitment. We are aware that the costing study conducted by the task team composed of members of the treasury and health departments was completed and awaited approval by Cabinet since April. Furthermore, the Treasury put aside contingency money for treatment in the 2003/04 budget clearing the way for a change in policy. The NEDLAC negotiations were also to have resumed. TAC's meetings with the Deputy-President on 25 April and with a number of Cabinet ministers at the SANAC meeting on 14 June gave hope that there were some leaders in government who recognised the urgency and the moral and legal imperatives to extend access to antiretrovirals to South Africa's poor as part of the national response. In addition, the Western Cape MEC for Health recently made it clear that it is a matter of time before government begins rolling out an antiretroviral treatment programme. In private discussions, this sentiment has been echoed by a number of senior civil servants.
These were tangible reasons to be hopeful and to give government the benefit of the doubt by suspending civil disobedience. It is in all our interests for a treatment and prevention plan to be attained via a voluntary change in government policy, rather than via civil disobedience and litigation at the Constitutional Court. If we have to resume the latter route, the treatment programmes that will ultimately be implemented are unlikely to be as successful as a plan implemented by a government that is politically committed to treatment. Despite protest by government that it has a "five year strategic plan", we still believe that the existing plan is inadequate and that policy to treat has to be much more rigorously monitored in its implementation if it is to be successful.
But the TAC leadership is being continually reminded that there is a limit to the patience of people confronting their own mortality. Government cannot dither any longer. The timeframe for decisions to be taken is now days, at most weeks, not months. Every delay is measured not in inconvenience, but in death and suffering. If TAC is being mislead and if government promises have been in bad faith, the subsequent return to civil disobedience will be more intense than before, involve much larger numbers of people and will not be suspended or stopped without the implementation of a treatment plan.
A report that appeared in the Star (27 June) is reprinted in this newsletter. It points out serious government delays such as the failure to date to sign the Global Fund agreements, the failure to release the costing study on antiretroviral treatment which merely needs the go-ahead from Cabinet and the failure to release the latest antenatal clinic study. To this we can add the failure to officially release the report that was produced at the HST scientists conference last year. We hope that there are no longer senior people in government who intend to scupper moves towards treatment. However, if there are, we cannot appeal to your conscience. We cannot ask you to consider the lives and suffering of hundreds of thousands of your fellow citizens. Instead we must appeal to your self-interest and ask: are you willing to risk the sustained pressure of civil disobedience, international embarrassment and litigation through to the April 2004 general elections and beyond?
In the meanwhile, irrespective of which route government chooses and as TAC prepares for its provincial and national congresses over the next month, activists must prepare for a new phase in TAC in which we consolidate our branches so that they are better equipped to assist with the implementation of the government's current programmes and any new ones that might become policy, such as antiretroviral treatment. It would be wrong of TAC to expect government to take sole responsibility for the health interventions for which we have advocated. Our duty to ensure their successful implementation is critical. Therefore, in this issue of the electronic newsletter, we have included two important discussion documents that are being circulated at TAC branches. One, written by Zackie Achmat, examines the role and responsibilities of TAC branches. The other, written by Sipho Mthathi, gives concrete suggestions for how TAC branches can ensure that people become educated about HIV issues.
Let us work together to implement a successful treatment and prevention plan that will build a better health care system.
It's all talk, no action as people succumb to AIDS
By Lynne Altenroxel, The Star, 27 June 2003
Just a few days ago, time finally ran out for Jenny*, an HIV-positive nurse who worked at a government hospital in Southern Gauteng.
Ever since she started working at the hospital thee years ago, she had seen deaths of countless Aids patients in her care. By this year, five to 10 Aids patients were dying each week in the medical wards where she worked. Witnessing their painful demise made her fearful of her own fate. She knew, she said a few weeks ago, that it was the same way she would go too. Jenny died at her parents' home on June 12 without ever accessing the antiretrovirals which could have spared her from an early death at the age of 29. A short six months after passing her staff nurse exams with distinction in November, she had become one of the 600 South Africans dying daily as a result of HIV.
She died frustrated and angered by government delays in implementing a programme to provide antiretroviral treatment to people who needed it. "She was very, very angry. Up to the last day she was very angry," a colleague recalled, describing how she knew that Jenny was distraught by witnessing the deaths of the people she nursed.
"I would see that she was really affected. She wouldn't want to talk when she came out of there She wouldn't even want to eat when she came out of dealing with a very sick patient."
Now, several days after Jenny's death, there is still no answer to the question of whether the government will ever provide anti-Aids drugs to people who cannot afford them. On Wednesday the cabinet met again without discussing a report on the cost of providing antiretroviral therapy - even though more than two months have passed since the report was finalized. For people living with HIV, it seems as if there is no sense of urgency about dealing with an issue which, for them, is a matter of life and death. Lifeline counselor Isaac Skosana, who is HIV-positive, will tomorrow bury one friend who succumbed to the virus. On Wednesday, as the cabinet met without discussing anti-Aids drugs, he buried another.
"What I hear is only promises. Bt commitment and things that are practical, I see nothing," said Skosana, who is healthy but dreads the day when his immune system needs antiretrovirals to prop it up. ...
... For health professionals such as Sister Sue Roberts, head of Helen Joseph Hospital's HIV clinic, the list of people in desperate need of antiretrovirals is growing. The clinic diagnoses 80 to 90 new HIV infections in patients each week. More than half of the HIV patients on its database are in desperate need of treatment, with less than 5% able to afford to buy the drugs themselves. "We've had a lot of patients who could have done extremely well on drugs. And a lot of them are no longer with us," Roberts said.
So many people are dying without treatment that nurses
who suspect they are HIV infected are reluctant to
acknowledge that they, too, have the virus. "One
of the biggest problems with healthcare workers is
that they see that nothing is done for HIV, so they
don't come forward," Roberts explained. "They're
petrified of being identified as positive... because
they're seeing sick patients dying in front of them
all the time."
* Names have been changed to protect identity.
Date distributed (ymd): 030707 Region: Continent-Wide Issue Areas: +health+ +US policy focus+
Message-Id: <200307031949.h63JnLH14924@marduk.africapolicy.org> From: "Africa Action" <firstname.lastname@example.org> Date: Thu, 3 Jul 2003 15:51:02 -0500 Subject: Liberia: Waiting for Washington
Editor: Ali B. Ali-Dinar
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