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[This brief is intended as background information for the humanitarian community and does not necessarily reflect the views of the UN]
SIERRA LEONE: IRIN-West Africa background briefing on the Conakry Peace Accord, 28 January 1998
Every deadline set for implementing the six-month international peace plan for the handover to civilian rule in Sierra Leone has been missed. With three months of the Conakry accords remaining, analysts say the restoration of ousted civilian president Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah is now in the balance.
February will be critical for the future of Sierra Leone, according to observers. Failure to make progress will jeopardies not only the agreement between Sierra Leone's ruling Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), but also put under further strain the Sierra Leonean army's new alliance with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).
All parties to the conflict have said they are uncertain about the future and maintain the option of using force to secure their goals. Renewed fighting between Kamajor militia, who are loyal to the civilian government-in-exile, and the AFRC threatens an already precarious humanitarian situation in parts of the country, analysts say.
The Conakry peace plan
ECOWAS mandated Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Ghana and Guinea to form a Committee of Five to solve the political and military stand-off between the AFRC and ECOWAS, which followed the May 1997 coup d'etat by junior army officers in Sierra Leone. The Committee agreed a six-month plan with the AFRC in Conakry in October to restore civilian rule to Sierra Leone. The Conakry communique called for:
- An immediate ceasefire - Kabbah's re-instatement by 23 April 1998, but with a "broadening" of his power base to reflect the interests of all parties - Continued UN and ECOWAS embargoes on arms, fuel, and travel by members of the AFRC - Disarmament and integration of the armed groups competing for power from 1 December 1997 - Commencement of humanitarian assistance operations from 15 November 1997 - Repatriation of refugees from 1 December 1997 - Immunity from prosecution for the May coup leaders
The Committee of Five also agreed with the AFRC that RUF leader Foday Sankoh, imprisoned in Nigeria since the coup, should be released and allowed to return to Sierra Leone to "contribute" to the peace process.
Guarded optimism and misgivings
Monitoring of media reports in recent months has shown that although Sierra Leone's capital Freetown enthusiastically greeted the news that the Conakry agreement had been reached, most of the population remained guarded in their optimism a solution to the crisis had been found.
Foremost among concerns for Sierra Leone analysts was the peace plan's lack of detail. Compounding this prospect of further negotiations to come, AFRC Chairman Major Johnny Paul Koroma announced his immediate misgivings on 4 November, specifically:
- The timetable for demobilising all armed elements within the country was not realistic. In addition, since the army was the legally constituted Sierra Leone defence force, it should not disarm. - Sankoh remained in detention in Nigeria. There was no clear timetable for his release. "Any talk of disarmament and resettlement will be futile without his participation," Koroma said. - AFRC forces could not be expected to surrender to Nigerian ECOMOG troops. Nigeria had become a party to the conflict in Sierra Leone by attempting to bomb the AFRC into submission after the May coup.
Kabbah, who was at the Commonwealth summit in Edinburgh when the Committee of Five negotiated the Conakry accord, initially claimed he was satisfied with the peace plan. Kabbah then said he had not been consulted on the agreement with the AFRC, who had negotiated in bad faith. Analysts said distrust between the AFRC and Kabbah was further compounded when the ousted president told AFP on 12 November he would be compelled to punish AFRC leaders in "exemplary fashion" in spite of the promised amnesty for the May coup leaders. A Sierra Leone analyst told IRIN one of the contributing factors to the AFRC May coup was Kabbah's decision in December 1996 to revoke the amnesty granted to members of the previous military regime creating an atmosphere of apprehension and uncertainty within the army.
Increasing pressures
In addition to alleged weaknesses in the agreement itself, analysts say the major principles of the deal between the AFRC and the Committee of Five are under increasing pressure, specifically:
- The ceasefire
The ceasefire between AFRC forces, ECOMOG troops deployed in Sierra Leone and Kamajor militia loyal to Kabbah is in danger of collapse. Fighting between the AFRC and the Kamajors broke out again in early November, while AFRC soldiers allegedly fired at ECOMOG jets in December and January.
Ambushes in early November marked the start of a new campaign to assert Kamajor control of south and east Sierra Leone, according to media sources. Villages were allegedly attacked near Zimmi on the Liberia border in mid-December, and by the end of the month AFP had reported "fierce fighting" in many parts of the country. Kamajors announced they would cut off all road movement after 20 December unless demobilisation started. Kamajor attacks were also reported in Sierra Leone's second city Bo, 160 km east of Freetown, on 4 January, and close to Freetown itself on 13 January. Three days of bitter fighting for the Tongo diamond-mining area in mid-January led to an AFRC offer of an amnesty to the Kamajors. "We are now in a situation which if not contained quickly could destabilise other parts of the country," a senior military official reportedly told AFP. IRIN sources in Freetown were sceptical Kamajors would accept any AFRC offer, however.
Tension between the AFRC and ECOMOG was also quick to escalate. On 7 November, ECOMOG threatened to attack two ships in waters off Freetown it said were breaking sanctions. ECOMOG reportedly bombed Bendamu near Freetown on 11 December and Zimmi on 13 December, claiming a Nigerian Alpha jet had been engaged by ground fire. Some 20 civilians were killed in the Zimmi attack, the AFRC said. A further firing incident took place on 7 January when an ECOMOG jet flew over Freetown. ECOMOG Commander Major General Victor in charge at the time, Malu told IRIN the jet was looking for ships trying to enter Freetown.
- Disarmament and the restoration of civilian rule
The actual implementation of the Conakry plan stalled almost the moment it was signed, according to diplomats. Although AFRC and ECOMOG officials agreed to re-open port facilities and establish joint patrols at certain checkpoints on 11 November, the two sides could only agree to set up committees to finalise demobilisation plans, passage of humanitarian aid, and the return of displaced persons. At the time of writing these committees were still to meet.
A Committee of Five meeting scheduled for 20 November to discuss the AFRC's concerns about the Conakry plan was also delayed while ECOWAS and the AFRC disagreed on whether to meet at Nigerian-controlled Lungi airport, or in Freetown. The meeting finally got underway on 27 November, but media sources reported no progress had been made in implementing the peace plan.
Tension reportedly rose as the deadline for demobilisation to start ran out on 1 December, and reached a height on 19 December when Koroma told the BBC the AFRC was "unlikely" to hand over power to Kabbah. AFRC spokesman Amadou Balioh Bah confirmed on 8 January that the AFRC questioned the timing of any handover, although AFRC Secretary General Colonel Abdul Sesay issued a correction the next day. Sesay insisted the AFRC would handover power as planned after all.
Sierra Leone observers told IRIN no one knew what would eventually happen. "It is all brinkmanship," one humanitarian source in Freetown said. "Each side is keeping its options open while also keeping the other side guessing." Another source speculated delaying tactics were used to wear down international resolve to see Kabbah reinstated.
At a meeting in Freetown on 15 January, UN Special Envoy for Sierra Leone Francis Okelo asked Koroma to clarify the AFRC position. Okelo told IRIN the AFRC had reaffirmed its commitment to hand power back to the elected government under the Conakry agreement. But he said the AFRC had also re-iterated its three reservations. Okelo asked if the reservations amounted to conditions. He was told no, "but ECOWAS will have to take into account these concerns if progress is to be made." Okelo told IRIN this was "a big but" in his opinion.
- Humanitarian aid
In spite of WFP warnings on 7 November that the health of tens of thousands of vulnerable people in Sierra Leone would quickly deteriorate in coming weeks, with the exception of medical supplies, humanitarian assistance has still not been allowed to cross into Sierra Leone from Guinea. The Office of the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Sierra Leone, confirmed in January that the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone had worsened. The UN office said food aid distributions had virtually halted because existing stocks in Sierra Leone were not replenished by cross-border supplies. The price of rice, meanwhile, has tripled since the May coup.
In spite of Malu's announcement on 11 November 97 that aid could start "within days", WFP told IRIN on 22 January that the agency was still waiting for clearance to move aid across the border. Humanitarian sources say difficulties in negotiating the clearance of humanitarian aid is ironic, since as in most war situations, Sierra Leone's borders are porous to all kinds of illegitimate goods. According to analysts humanitarian assistance has been used to lever a flagging political process. "It's an all or nothing mentality," a humanitarian source in Conakry told IRIN.
An interagency team was expected to arrive in Sierra Leone in early February to assess the impact of UN and ECOWAS sanctions on the civilian population.
Further concerns
Analysts say the Conakry peace plan is jeopardised by additional pressures beyond delays in the implementation process, specifically:
- Splits in the AFRC
According to Sierra Leone observers tension has grown between the official army and the RUF elements in the AFRC. On 19 November the AFRC arrested Steve Bio, a relative of former military ruler Brigadier Julius Maada Bio, and Colonel Gibril Massaquoi, the RUF's former Abidjan spokesman, for allegedly plotting a coup. A Freetown humanitarian source told IRIN they had been "attempting to discourage the RUF from disarming." According to the source, the RUF element within the AFRC has been consistently unwilling to disarm without a release of Foday Sankoh. This appeared unlikely after Kabbah said Sankoh's return could disrupt the peace process.
On 4 January, six members of the AFRC were also arrested for looting the Iranian Embassy. Soldiers from the RUF and AFRC also clashed in Freetown on 20 January in a petty dispute, which killed at least three combatants, Reuters reported.
- Regional and international involvement
Both Liberia and Nigeria have strong vested interests in the outcome of the Conakry peace accord. These interests threaten to unbalance the Conakry accord, analysts say.
Liberia's President Charles Taylor has a strong link to the RUF, having helped to found the movement as a punishment to the then Sierra Leonean government for supporting ECOMOG troops sent to stop his advance on Monrovia during the Liberian civil war. Taylor is also reportedly concerned that members of the Mandingo wing of the former United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO-K) have allied themselves to the Kamajors and will use this opportunity to create a sphere of influence in Sierra Leone, threatening his government.
Meanwhile, analysts also say Nigeria's interest in seeing the restoration of Kabbah goes beyond its mandate as ECOWAS chairman. "They are the regional superpower, and they want to prove it by showing a strong arm in Sierra Leone," a West Africa analyst in Monrovia told IRIN. "It is ironic the Commonwealth summit praised Nigeria's military government for its commitment to democracy outside Nigeria," the analyst said.
Abidjan, 26 January 12:30 GMT
[ends]
[The material contained in this communication comes to you via IRIN West Africa, a UN humanitarian information unit, but may not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations or its agencies. UN IRIN-WA Tel: +225 21 73 66 Fax: +225 21 63 35 e-mail: irin-wa@africaonline.co.ci for more information or subscription. If you re-print, copy, archive or re-post this report, please retain this credit and disclaimer. Quotations or extracts should include attribution to the original sources. IRIN reports are archived on the Web at: http://www.reliefweb.int/emergenc or can be retrieved automatically by sending e-mail to archive@dha.unon.org . Mailing list: irin-wa-extra]
Date: Wed, 28 Jan 1998 13:12:39 +0000 (GMT) From: UN IRIN - West Africa <irin-wa@wa.dha.unon.org> Subject: SIERRA LEONE: IRIN-West Africa Background Briefing on the Conakry Peace Accord, 98.1.28 Message-Id: <Pine.LNX.3.95.980128130425.22466A-100000@wa.dha.unon.org>
Editor: Ali B. Ali-Dinar
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