UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA - AFRICAN STUDIES CENTER |
SOMALIA REVISITED - IRIN SPECIAL REPORT ON MOGADISHU, 27 April 1999
PART TWO
WHAT THE LEADERS SAY - POLITICAL SITUATION AND THE BENADIR
ADMINISTRATION
In interviews with the two main faction leaders in Mogadishu,
Ali Mahdi Mohamed and Hussein Aideed - presently in
an alliance - both admitted to the limits of their
authority as their joint administration struggles to
gain control of the city.
The Benadir Administration, set up to govern Mogadishu and its environs in August 1998 as a result of talks in Cairo, has been "recognised" by four governments: Egypt, Libya, Sudan and Yemen, which have a diplomatic presence in Mogadishu. Regional organisations and representatives from international bodies had demonstrated cautious interest in the progress of the Benadir Administration, until fresh fighting erupted in the capital in March-April 1999.
According to the Egyptian ambassador in Mogadishu, Mahmoud
Mustafa, who has taken a direct role in the Cairo talks
and has lived in Mogadishu for more than a year, there
has been "real progress" with the Benadir
Administration. He told IRIN that "the international
community should continue what has already been started
by supporting the administration as it will help resolve
problems in the other regions. Despite setbacks, security
has improved considerably". He said support was
needed in terms of representation, mediation and in
efforts to encourage flexibility in dealing with Somalia.
The recent fighting was initially blamed on a tax dispute,
but Musa Sude (former vice chairman to Ali Mahdi Mohamed)
and Osman Ato (formerly vice chairman to General Mohamed
Aideed, father and predecessor to Hussein Aideed) have
presented a challenge to the administration. The Benadir
governor's house in north Mogadishu was destroyed,
and, in April, Ali Mahdi's house was looted. The challenge
led to a serious outbreak of fighting in north Mogadishu,
with some 60 people reported killed, and has also created
tension in south Mogadishu. The two main faction leaders
say talks are still in progress with elders, in the
hope the dispute can be peacefully settled.
Ali Mahdi Mohamed, interviewed in his offices in north
Mogadishu, lamented his own lack of authority but claimed
Musa Sude and Osman Ato did not have a large enough
force or following to destroy the Benadir Administration.
He said the 3,000 strong police force, which has received
uniforms and medicines from Egypt, had only received
two months of salary and rations provided by Libya,
but was now without funding. "The administration
can't pay the salaries so we can't deploy the force",
he said. Libya initially injected US $800,000 into
the new administration. Ali Mahdi is adamant that the
international community take responsibility for Somalia
until there is a breakthrough with reconciliation -
"I am not the police, I am not an authority, I
can't stop people killing each other, so how can I
as a leader take responsibility?". Islamic courts
have reduced in influence in Mogadishu, and are now
functioning only on a limited, local and ad hoc basis.
Local Imams are called upon to settle local disputes.
General Secretary of the Benadir administration, Ahmed
Abdikarim Noor, agrees that attempts to establish dialogue
over the last seven months had so far failed. Both
Musa Sude and Osman Ato are technically members of
the Supreme Council but refuse to attend meetings.
Things had "slowed down" since the recent
fighting, he said, and added that the administration
was relying on contributions from private businessmen.
The joint administration has two co-chairmen (Ali Mahdi
and Hussein Aideed), 29 members of a Supreme Council
(which incorporates other faction representatives)
and a body of governors, including a port manager and
an airport manager. One of the main aims of the administration
is to open the port and airport. At present Cel'maciin
Port, about 40 km north of Mogadishu, is used, and
occasionally Merca to the south. Balidogle airport,
a former military facility, and Kuid'sanuy airport,
also outside the capital, are used in place of the
main airport. But these facilities are described as
being "for Hawiye residents" - in other words,
members of Ali Mahdi and Hussein Aideed's clan.
THE POWER OF BUSINESS
In the absence of government structures and international support, the most consistent and powerful dynamic in Mogadishu is private business. Although faction leaders receive some funding from regional and international players, their main backers are Mogadishu entrepreneurs.
Remittances from abroad continue to be crucial for the
economy, but have been complemented over the last few
years by locally operating businesses. With no taxation
or controls on the airports, the coast or the borders
- but with relatively good security over the last two
years - businessmen are regularly importing sugar,
oil, fuel, pasta, clothes, cars and electronic goods.
Livestock is exported to Dubai and Yemen, but livestock
exports to Saudia Arabia were halted after a suspected
outbreak of Rift Valley Fever in northern Kenya and
southern Somalia in 1997. The ban is expected to be
lifted soon. Fish and fruit are also exported.
An example of new business is the Barakaat Telecommunications
Company, which has enjoyed considerable success over
the last year. It offers public telephone, fax and
postal services as well as private land lines and mobile
phones. It has a stake in the international code (+252),
and brought in new telephone equipment from Canada,
US and Sweden in 1995 with an initial investment of
about US $800,000. The rental fee of a mobile phone
is US $10 with billing for international calls only,
at US $1.50 a minute. The manager of Barakaat, Abdullahi
Hussein Kahie, says business is "very good",
and that communications services have in turn assisted
businessmen in dealing with Dubai, Kenya and the Arab
States - as well as providing much sought-after communication
with the enormous Somali diaspora abroad.
The success of business is directly interlinked with
the position of "warlords" in that it provides
essential financing for the leaders, but also depends
on a relatively secure environment - in other words,
protection. Smaller businesses employ exclusively from
the clan, so that security and theft is tightly controlled.
INTERNATIONAL ABUSES
While big business enjoys the "no-holds-barred"
economy, elements of the international business community
have also taken economic and political advantage of
the lack of border controls and the absence of government
structures, particularly along Somalia's long coastline.
Fishing fleets from Taiwan, Korea, Japan and European
countries obtain illegal licences to fish for lobster,
grouper, snapper and tuna, using illegal methods such
as explosives and gill nets, causing damage to the
coastline and mass fish mortality.
All fishing and mining should take place outside the
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Somalia, which is
200 (nautical) miles from the shore, but the pirate
fleets reportedly fish so close to the shore line that
they have direct - and often hostile - contact with
local fishermen in small boats. Somali businessmen
- especially former employees from the Ministry of
Fishing under Siad Barre's former regime - have profitably
exploited the lack of government by setting up companies
abroad issuing illegal licences. There is also concern
that licences and deals are being offered to some European
companies to dump industrial waste, which has been
investigated by FAO and some European governments.
In the area of northern Somalia now known as Puntland,
local leaders from the Bossaso port area have actively
pursued foreign ships. Using small boats with mounted
anti-aircraft guns, militia have attacked large factory
ships and held crews hostage for hundreds of thousands
of dollars - one ship was released for US $700,000.
Somali businessmen are used as go-betweens, and receive
a percentage of the "fine" when the ship's
company has been tracked down and persuaded to pay
up.
Other concerns about the way in which Somalia's predicament
has been internationally exploited centres on political
influence by extremist fundamentalist groups, which
enjoy freedom of movement in the absence of any border
controls. Since the failure of the military intervention
in 1992-93, the US has been particularly concerned
with what it sees as the growing influence of Islamic
fundamentalism, and is anxious about the potential
of Somalia as a base for terrorism.
ISOLATION OF MOGADISHU
The vulnerability of Somalia is exacerbated by the pull-out
of most international humanitarian organisations, leaving
Mogadishu very isolated. The threat to aid workers
in Mogadishu was such that aid moved out of the capital
and almost exclusively into the regions - particularly
Somaliland, Puntland, and areas of southern Somalia
- with expatriate presence in Mogadishu on a visiting
basis only. In Mogadishu, since the pull-out of the
humanitarian and military operation, expatriate staff
are, in many ways, seen as a "commodity"
or a "resource". Hostage-taking has sometimes
resulted in huge pay-outs by local businessmen. Likewise,
aid programmes are seen far more as an economic opportunity
than a humanitarian effort - in terms of employment,
finances and equipment. Not only an economic asset,
the expatriate aid worker is also a political target,
with resentment over the international military and
humanitarian effort still a factor.
International organisations have therefore headquartered themselves in Nairobi and operate "in absentia" through a skeleton local staff, which results in large proportions of available funding being used for logistics and salaries - and has increased feelings of resentment.
One consequence of this is that Mogadishu has become
one of the most isolated capitals in the world. Apart
from the strictly controlled aid flights, no commercial
flights as such operate from the capital - chartered
small aircraft from Nairobi, carrying the stimulant
plant qat, take only one or two passengers at a time.
Information is therefore very scarce, and dependent
on the security perspective of humanitarian agencies
based in Nairobi - which try to act in concert over
threats, kidnappings and killings in order to protect
staff and programmes. This extreme isolation of Mogadishu
and lack of information in itself inhibits development.
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
While there was some hope that Somalia - particularly
southern Somalia - had recently been more conducive
to successful, community-based programmes, there is
now real concern that tension between factions and
clans is on the increase again. This has been attributed
to increased interference by regional countries, particularly
related to the Ethiopia/Eritrea war.
Regional countries may not want to "take on" Somalia, but do nonetheless want significant influence with any administration or leader who looks set to hold power. "There are many more weapons around than before; they may be less visible, but there are more heavy weapons", said an international representative. In particular, diplomats and aid workers are concerned that the proxy war in Somalia is opening new doors for the fundamentalist movement, al-Ittihad, who indirectly benefits from renewed instability, gaining more arms and more room to manoeuvre.
There is also entrenched pessimism over the numerous peace and reconciliation attempts between the different factions, even though the violent push into the fertile south by the Habr Gedir has stabilised. "In the early days of the civil war there seemed to be more desire by the different factions to try and sort it out, but now it seems to have gone on for too long" said one observer from the various talks.
UNICEF Somalia representative Gianfranco Rotigliamo said there was both good news and bad news for Somalia at present: "We have had a successful experience in southern Somalia, with a major influx of commodities and food, yet few problems - but we have to keep an eye on Gedo region and hope that inter-clan conflict doesn't increase". An expatriate aid worker from Terra Nuova was kidnapped in Gedo region in April, and negotiations for his release continue; this follows the killing of an expatriate vet in January from the same organisation, also in Gedo.
Fighting has also flared in the south following the killing in February of a US aid worker by Islamic fundamentalists in the coastal town of Ras Kamboni. The local clan carried out reprisals against al-Ittihad, resulting in some armed fundamentalists fleeing across the Kenyan border. Mogadishu, according to Rotigliamo, is "a special case" because insecurity makes it is difficult to involve the community in humanitarian programmes. But, he says, any progress by the newly established administration is seen as "promising" for the future.
[ENDS]
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 1999 16:18:01 -0300 (GMT+3) From: IRIN - Central and Eastern Africa <irin@ocha.unon.org> Subject: SOMALIA: IRIN Special Report on Mogadishu - part 2 of 2 [19990428]
Editor: Dr. Ali B. Ali-Dinar, Ph.D
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