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U N I T E D N A T I O N S
Department of Humanitarian Affairs
Integrated Regional Information Network
Tel: +254 2 622123
Fax: +254 2 622129
e-mail: irin@dha.unon.org
IRIN UPDATE ON SOUTH KIVU - 26 OCTOBER 1996
The information in this report is current as of early this morning (26 October 1996). An evacuation of international aid staff from Bukavu is likely today. The situation is very fluid, and events may overtake this report over the next hours.
1. THE WIDENING CONFLICT
1.1 The conflict in South Kivu is reaching a peak as the provincial capital, Bukavu, is squeezed by military advances from the south and land routes for aid and trade are blocked. An attack on Bukavu is regarded by the Zairean Camp Security Contingent as within the capacity of the Banyamulenge-dominated forces at any time.
1.2 Despite urgings (and even appeals for contributions for the war effort) from the Zairean Prime Minister and President, it appears clear that the FAZ are losing territory and retreating, sometimes even before engaging the rebels. Zairean forces have been pushed back beyond Nyangezi, less than 30 kms south of Bukavu, where some 10 Zairean Camp Security Contingent soldiers were captured mid-week. The Banyamulenge-dominated forces opposing them now control most of the area between Uvira and Buakvu, including Kamanyola and part, if not all of the border with Rwanda. Zairean forces occupying Uvira have apparently been defeated by the rebels during Friday night and Saturday morning after shelling was reported on the night of the 24th October and in the morning of the 25th. BBC carried an interview with a spokesman for the "Alliance of Forces for Democracy and Liberation of Congo-Zaire", who claimed to be in Uvira, having won the town with a force of 400 fighters.
1.3 The FAZ have mounted roadblocks in Bukavu city for checking identification papers and the number of car-jackings by Zairean soldiers is high - 10-15 UN and NGO vehicles were seized on Tuesday alone. While the Governor declared himself "serene" earlier in the week, the FAZ have reportedly set up defensive positions around the city. A 8pm to 6am curfew was enforced on Wednesday.
1.4 While the Banyamulenge forces control most of the Rusizi plain and probably parts of the Haut Plateaux in the west, some observers expressed surprise that they had climbed the escarpment road and taken highland areas around Nyangezi on Wednesday.
1.5 The ultimate objective of the Banyamulenge-dominated forces is unclear, as the conflict obstensibly began as an exercise in self-defence. The possibility of some kind of "master-plan" linking attacks in North Kivu and the South Kivu conflict is hard to discount entirely.
1.6 Zairean state radio announced that military aircraft are to be deployed in the South Kivu conflict. Further ammunition was supplied to the FAZ during the week. Accusations and denials continue to fly between Kinshasa and Kigali as to the alleged involvement of Rwandan Patriotic Army forces in the fighting. Zaire has also protested to the UN Security Council. There remains no conclusive evidence of RPA involvement nor of Burundian forces taking part. Other allegations include reports of anti-Zairean forces using Burundian and Rwandan territory in the campaign.
1.7 Prompt diplomatic initiatives by the EU, UN and OAU have yet to bear fruit but talks hosted by Belgium have started in an attempt to broker a meeting between Zairean Prime Minster Kengo wa Dondo and either Rwandan Prime Minister Pierre Celestin Rwigema or Vice President and Minister of Defence, Paul Kagame. The US, France and EU Special Envoy have lent weight to Belgian efforts. The UN Secretary-General and the Chairman of the OAU, have lent their support to the idea of a regional Conference for Peace, Security and Development in the Great Lakes Region. UN Special Envoy, Ibrahima Fall, is reported to have made progress in persuading Uganda and Rwanda of the usefulness of the Conference. The UN Secretary-General has further proposed a mediator to negotiate a ceasefire. Zairean President Mobutu is reported to remain in very poor health in Switzerland, adding to the general uncertainty.
1.8 Opposition groups from Rwanda (the RDR) and Burundi (CNDD) have weighed in with statements alleging an over-arching plan for a "Tutsiland" beyond the borders of Rwanda and Burundi. Muller Ruhimbika, exiled Banyamulenge leader of the newly-named Democratic Alliance for the People, said that Shaba and Kasai-based Zairean opposition groups now support the Tutsi rebels. This raises the possibility of an even broader conflict within Zaire. Also the Banyamulenge were ready for talks, he said in a BBC interview on Thursday. On Friday, he upped the stakes by saying to "We are not fighting for the Kivu region, but for the whole of Zaire...Mobutu must go."
1.9 The widening conflict in North Kivu includes border areas between Uganda and Zaire. Uganda's Major-General Salim Saleh, Special Presidential Advisor on Military and Political Affairs in the North has asked parliament to allow government Ugandan People's Defence Forces to pursue and assault bases of Ugandan rebels in Zaire and Sudan.
2. HUMANITARIAN IMPACT
2.1 As the crisis broke, all 220,000 refugees grouped in the Uvira camps were reported to all have fled. Now, however, it appears that some camps remian more or less intact and the refugees are still in residence. Those that were abandoned have since reportedly been burnt. As far as anyone can tell, four or five camps to the north of Uvira are the ones which have been abandoned. Figures being used by the humanitarian community in Bukavu indicate that there are up to 80,000 mainly Rwandan refugees from the Uvira camps on the move. But some refugees from the Uvira camps have reportedly fled westwards - and some may have returned to Burundi. Since the deterioration in security and the evacuation of relief workers, as many as 140,000 refugees may remain around Uvira and are unlikely to receive any supplies in the near future.
2.2 The second group of affected people are the refugees of the southern Bukavu camps, in particular the two at Nyangezi. A total of 37,000 refugees from those two camps left beginning Tuesday 22 October. In addition, it appears that Nyantende camp may also be abandoned (approximately 9,000 more "displaced refugees" may have moved out).
2.3 The third group of affected people are local Zairean populations displaced by the fighting. In the whole of South Kivu, a current "guesstimate" of the numbers suggests 15,000 displaced in Fizi Zone, south of Uvira, 30,000 between Uvira and Bukavu and 10,000 in the environs of Bukavu. Some urban Zaireans in Uvira and Bukavu are also leaving town to seek sanctuary in the countryside. These figures are little better than guesses, and needs among this group are likely to be talken care of by relatives. However, the strain of accomodating displaced family members will, in the medium term, begin to take a toll on local services in health and other sectors.
The hospital in Bukavu is full, with wounded soldiers still armed, causing disruption.
3. BREAKDOWN OF POPULATION IN NEED
3.1 Table of current population estimates
Displaced refugees (frm Uvira): 80,000
Displaced refugees (from Bukavu): 46,000
Remaining refugees (at Bukavu): 264,000
Remaining refugees (at Uvira): 140,000
Total: 530,000
3.2 Additional non-food needs are likely for Zairean displaced in the mid-term.
3.3 Up to 16,000 of the estimated displaced refugees from both areas listed above have re-appeared at other Bukavu camps.
3.4 These figures shoiuld of course be treated wiuth caution, as they are "best available" estimates.
4. HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE
4.1 The activities of humanitarian agencies are severly restricted by looting of vehicles in the town, the possibility of ambushes outside and the threat of a rebel assault on the town. WFP had a warehouse looted on Wednesday and a staff member assaulted on Thursday. It is questionable whether the current level of insecurity can be tolerated by the majority of aid agencies, and a planned pull-out is being reviewed constantly. Within these limitations, aid agencies are trying to assist the displaced refugees on arrival at the Bukavu camps, continue services to established refugees and give some support to local structures.
4.2 The displaced refugees are beginning to arrive in westerly Bukavu camps, giuded by Zairean soldiers along the route. This group are - in general - prevented from entering Bukavu by Zairean security forces. As many of the Bukavu camps are effectively "full" (no unused or suitable land is adjacent), UNHCR is encouraging those who wish to stay, to move to emptier camps, and Chimanga in particular.
4.3 Chimanga, managed by CARE, is the most westerly of the Bukavu camps, and had a population of about 18,000 before the crisis broke. So far, about 2,000 displaced refugees have arrived there. Larger numbers of refugees (7,000-14,000) have arrived at camps along the route, but protest at having to move further. They are building shelters on the edges of the current camps, and are accepted by the other refugees. Aid agencies are planning to porvide water and high-protein biscuits along the road if security permits.
4.4 The UNHCR, however, has urged the Rwandan refugees to seriously consider retunrning home in a message from Ms Ogata braodcast to the region on 25 October.
5. HUMANITARIAN IMPLICATIONS
5.1 The current land routes to Bukavu seem likely to be closed or unreliable for the near future. If the roads to Uganda, north of Goma become safer, Bukavu could then be supplied by barge from Goma. The road between the two provincial capitals is unsuitable for any truck carrying more than 10 metric tonnes, and even then it is a rough road.
5.2 The southern route through Uvira (itself supplied either by barge from Kigoma, Tanzania, or in the past, overland through Burundi) seems likely to be closed for some time unless there is a resolution to the fighting one way or the other. There are alternative land routes - through Rwanda, but since April 1995, the Rwandan Government has blocked the transit of refugee relief supplies through its territory. On its past record, it would be surprising if Rwanda were to relent now.
5.3 Monthly food requirements for the 310,000 refugees of the Bukavu caseload plus the additional displaced refugees from Uvira could be over 6,000 metric tonnes per month. The World Food Programme intends to operate an airlift from Uganda to Bukavu, using a C-130 transport aircraft. The first flight of food was planned for Saturday, carrying nutritional biscuits or CSB. However, the supply of the current caseload in South Kivu with a general raytion would be prohibitively expensive. An attempt to supply even a half ration by air could cost well over $100,000 oer day. A single C-130 flight from Entebbe to Bukavu costs between $12,000 to $15,000.
5.4 Other relief items may be deliverable by barge from stock in Goma, but in general, further supplies will have to come by air. However, Bukavu airport is a 40-minute drive north of the town and so is vulnerable to being cut off too.
5.5 The delivery of food and other relief items to Bukavu is only one part of the story. If Bukavu remains cut off, the effects of a de facto blockade will begin to show in fuel shortages, inflation and perhaps additional population displacement and looting. Diesel is already in very short supply.
5.6 The contortions required to "classify" the affected populations in South Kivu are one aspect of the humanitarian system's sometimes overlapping mandates: refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and recipients of "development aid".
5.7 The UNHCR message urges Rwandan refugees to make a virtue of a necessity, and go home where their security and dignity are assured by the Rwandan government and attested to by the international community. While reassuring them that the choice is theirs, in a "terrible" situation, UNHCR urges them to ignore "malicious rumours" when deciding where to go. If the rebels control the southern land border between Rwanda and Zaire, however, there may not presently be a safe corridor for refugees willing to return.
6. CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Reliable information on the number and location of the displaced and refugees of all groups is very scarce. Also, details of the progress of the fighting is almost non-existent. The few foreign journalists in Bukavu are constantly harrassed and asked for bribes. A foreign correspondent (with a valid visa) leaving Bukavu on Friday had to pay a total of $500 in bribes at seven checkpoints along the airport road and at the airport itself. Another journalist, fully accredited with Kinshasa was locked up overnight earlier in the week.
6.2 The size, composition and location of rebel forces is also hard to confirm. Even displaced refugees interviewed at Nyamirangwe could not report actually seeing rebel troops. Several camp populations made decisions to move on hearing shooting or after the Zairean troops pulled out. They do not seem to have fled in panic in disarray, but rather with trepidation, planning and forethought.
6.3 While the situation for the displaced refugees appears precarious, the needs of the remaining Uvira caseload (mainly Burundian Hutus) may in fact be greater and more urgent, given their location near the centre of the conflict, and the complete absence of international aid or monitoring.
6.4 Insecurity may increase in Bukavu, either from a direct attack, or a breakdown in discipline by already jumpy Zairean troops, and trigger an evacuation of aid workers. Already, armed soldiers are paid by agencies when moving around the city, but car-jackings continue. Soldiers are sometimes reported to want the cars to move themselves and their families out of the area.
6.5 Humanitarian agencies should continue to seek access to populations in need, and insist on their impartiality, and state their intentions and modus operandi clearly and publicly. However, given the experience of aid agencies in Uvira, it may be impossible in the short term to deliver even basic life-saving services in South Kivu. The principle of maintaining a joint approach to evacuation and/or suspension of activites among the UN agencies and partners seems well-established. External assessment missions (a two-man French team arrived Friday from Paris) will no doubt proliferate.
6.6 Options open to humanitarian agencies are extremely limited. The current crisis is a "litmus test" of the willingness of Rwandan refugees to return home. The humanitarian community may wish to consider ways to guarantee safe corridors for the refugees to reach Rwanda. For the displaced refugees in South Kivu, there is no easy route to the Rwandan border.
6.7 The real crisis is not about refugees - they, in the widening conflict, are both a symptom and a cause of the problems of the Great Lakes. The status of the Banyamulenge has been an issue for at least 200 years, but the arrival of Burundian and Rwandan refugees over the last three years - caused by internal conflicts - has brought the Banyamulenge's predicament to a climax, and potentially drawn others into the conflict.
6.8 Eastern Zaire - lush, fertile and well-watered, is now the theatre of many unresolved regional political problems. The widening conflict, unless cooled by talks, external military intervention or ceasefire has the potential to generate a new spiral of crises, putting more and more civilian populations at risk, and at worst, breaking into full-scale war.
[ENDS]
[Via the UN DHA Integrated Regional Information Network.
The material contained in this communication may not
necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations
or its agencies. UN DHA IRIN Tel: +254 2 622123 Fax:
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Date: Sat, 26 Oct 1996 14:01:16 +0300 (GMT+0300) From: UN DHA IRIN - Great Lakes <irin@dha.unon.org> Subject: Zaire: IRIN Update on South Kivu, 26 October 1996 96.10.26 Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.3.91.961026140058.25035M-100000@dha.unon.org>
Editor: Dr. Ali B. Ali-Dinar, Ph.D
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