BACKGROUND

The 1992 Harvest and the 1993 Food Aid Requirements

There were several factors that made the 1992 Meher (main rainy season) crop exceptional with production increasing by 8.5% over 1991 and 5% over the 1990 record for a total of 7.15 million M/T grain (8.84 million M/T of food in grain equivalent- i.e 7.15 million M/T Meher harvest, projected 1993 Belg harvest of 0.54 million M/T plus root and livestock products[1]):

Rains were fairly heavy and well distributed in terms of timing. (Timing is actually often a more critical element to a good harvest than total quantity of rain and, in 1992 the timing of the rain for most areas was exceptionally good.)

Fertilizer usage was 30 % higher than the previous year and reached a record consumption of 185,000 M/T¹ . (As an indicative figure, each M/T of fertilizer used results in an average increase in production of about 5 M/T. Consequently, just the increase in fertilizer consumption resulted in around 215,000 M/T additional grain.)

The actual area planted in 1992 was about 7% more than planted in 1991. This increase in planted area was due to the following factors:

improved security meant increased access to land;

farmers were no longer worried about forced conscription and young men no longer had to hide or work only at night;

the revised and more liberal marketing procedures initiated by the previous government as well as improved grain prices encouraged farmers to plant more;

demobilized soldiers and returnees from resettlement sites increased the amount of labour available in rural areas¹.

Pest infestation was generally moderate and the use of crop protection chemicals increased in 1992.

Although some areas were affected by adverse weather conditions, generally losses because of late rains during harvesting, hail damage, lodging and flooding were moderate.

In spite of this record harvest, the FAO/WFP Crop and Food Assessment report of December 1992 projected emergency food aid requirements for 1993 (excluding refugees and returnees) of 591,000 M/T. However, one reason for this fairly significant food aid requirement was the very high numbers of displaced and demobilized soldiers and their families as these special groups required 241,611 M/T of food (41% of the total). Although the displaced and demobilized required extensive assistance in 1993, on the more positive side carryover stocks and 1992 pledges to be delivered in 1993 were very high at 234,485 M/T so that the net requirement of new pledges for 1993 was 356,515 M/T, 63% (224,714 M/T) of which has been met[2].

The 1993 Harvest and Estimated Food Aid Requirements for 1994

The 1993 Belg (small rains) harvest was poorer than expected (as low as 200,000 M/T vs. an initial estimated of 540,000 M/M), which not only meant lower yields than expected but delays in ploughing in many areas where the Belg rains are used to prepare land for main the Meher season.

Overall the 1993 Meher rains were more "normal" than in 1992 but, for Ethiopia, "normal" rains have a devastating effect as the 1993 Meher was erratic in many areas of the country, first coming too early and then followed by a long dry spell at just the wrong time. Again, the timing of rains can be as important as the quantity.

Although erratic rains are probably the single most important factor in determining production, these other factors also played a part in the 1993 season:

As mentioned previously, the increase in fertilizer use in 1992 probably accounted for an increase in production of 215,000 M/T. Originally projected fertilizer usage for 1993 was set at 180,000 M/T and actually available for use was close to 200,000 M/T; unfortunately, because of pricing problems brought on by the devaluation in October 1992 as well as some distribution problems, actual consumption of fertilizer in 1993 is estimated to be about 105,000 M/T[3]. Overall this means that in 1992 fertilizer accounted for 925,000 M/T of grain but in 1993 it will produce only about 525,000 M/T.

Although there may have been as much as 6% more land ploughed in 1993 than in 1992, the area actually planted will probably remain at about last year's level because of drought or erratic rains. In other words, there will be no increase in production because of an increase in area planted³.

Erratic rains forced farmers to replant in many areas with other, short-cycle crops. However, replanting invariably means less production per hectare planted.

Increases in the production that took place in 1992 because of improved security, more labour and better grain prices etc. will not have a significant effect in 1993.

Pests, which did relatively little damage in 1992, were worse in 1993. Although locusts have been a major concern over the last year, control efforts have generally been effective and, so far, locusts have not cause significant damage. However, other pests such as army worm, stalk borer, the Wollo bush cricket and rodents have already created serious problems in a number of areas. Also, the threat of a re-invasion of locusts remains and the increase in rodents could cause increased post-harvest losses.

Floods in the Ogaden were generally beneficial but heavy floods in other areas such as the Awash River Basin caused extensive damage.

Finally, Ethiopia's population continues to increase at an alarming level and the mid-1993 population figure of 52.23 million will be increased by about 1.5 million by mid-1994 requiring an additional 240,000 M/T of food over last year.

In terms of projected food aid imports for 1994, the one positive element is that the numbers of displaced and demobilized soldiers and their families have significantly decreased as a result of the special rehabilitation programmes sponsored by the RRC, the UN agencies and the donor community. However, unlike 1993, carryover stocks and undelivered pledges from 1993 into 1994 are likely to be limited and will probably not exceed 100,000 M/T vs. 234,485 carried over from 1992 into 1993[4].

Beneficiary figures or tonnage requirements from the regions are still very tentative and in some cases there are only rough beneficiary numbers but no indication of whether it is anticipated that these projected numbers would need assistance for a full year or only for the lean period. By the conclusion of the FAO/WFP/RRC Crop and Food Assessment in December, there will be a much clearer indication of needs but a few of the figures currently being mentioned by regional representatives from some areas indicate fairly substantial food aid needs for 1994:

The low land and eastern areas of Tigray as well as Adigrat and Maychew are reported to have had poor harvests although the highland areas are "normal" to poor. REST has just completed their own assessment and their initial estimate is a food aid requirement of 350,000 M/T vs. 274,000 M/T requested for 1993[5] .

The administration in Gonder (Region 3) is currently talking about as many as 400,000 beneficiaries in 1994 whereas for Wollo only in 1993 there were 102,000 drought victims plus 384,990 demobilized and displaced. North Wollo, particularly the Kobo/Alamata area is, according to ERO, RRC and JRP, particularly bad (preliminary estimate 210,000 beneficiaries) with Sokota alone speaking of 110,000 beneficiaries. (JRP currently has 90,000 people on their Sokota beneficiary lists but only enough food for 7,000. JRP also reports some stress migration as people leave in search of work[6].)

Although most of Shewa areas will probably have fairly good harvests, North Shewa remains uncertain and may require some food aid in 1994. (In 1993 the only food aid required for the Shewa regions was for the displaced and demobilized.)

In West Harerge the situation is serious because of very poor rains and agencies working in the area believe that significantly more than the 30,000 M/T requested for 1993 will be needed in 1994[7].

The situation in East Harerge is better than in West Harerge but initial indications are that this area will require at least as much as the 32,000 M/T requested for 1993⁷.

The RRC in North Omo has mentioned up to 200,000 people in need in 1994 while South Omo has been particularly badly hit by poor rains and expects a production of only 2,000 M/T against a normal production of 10,000 M/T. Initial estimates for South Omo are about 72,000 beneficiaries for a total for North and South Omo of 272,000 beneficiaries vs. 116,000 beneficiaries in 1993[8].

Ilubabor has suffered from too much rain as well as rodent infestations and a shortage of oxen. Initial estimates are between 40,000 and 50,000 beneficiaries vs.[9] food assistance requested 40,000 in 1993.

There has also been some concern expressed about Borena (the southern part of Region 4) but an assessment of this pastoral area will not be possible until later in the year. The Ogaden also remains extremely vulnerable but, like Borena, an assessment will only be feasible after the main rainy season for this area, which generally starts in late October or early November.

Although several areas are worse off than last year, Ethiopia is not facing an emergency per se but rather a "normal" year - the problem is that a normal year for Ethiopia is a bad year and, because of erratic rains, a decrease in fertilizer consumption and a 3% increase in population, food imports for 1994 could range from a minimum of 750,000 M/T up to 1 million M/T. As it is unlikely that the Transitional Government of Ethiopia will have funds for major commercial food imports, the vast majority of these food needs will have to be met by the donor community. Donors should also be aware that food for work activities, encouraged by the TGOE, UN Agencies, donor community and NGOs as an alternative to free food distributions, probably can not be expanded to cover all food distributions in 1994 because of management constraints. Also, carryover stocks will be limited so new pledges will be needed quickly and the amount needed in pledges could be two to three times the amount pledged in 1993.

Finally, as an historical note, food aid imports to Ethiopia during the major emergency of 1985 amounted to a little over 1.2 million M/T. The 1994 combined food aid imports for Eritrea[10] and Ethiopia could easily match this figure. Although Ethiopia does not face an emergency yet, if this essentially structural food deficit is not met there will be an emergency situation at the end of 1994.

Jim Borton

UN/EPPG

22 October 1993

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